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3Abstract
K
Southern Africa has the worst HIV/AIDS epidemic in the world. In some 
states the HIV prevalence is close to 40% of the adult population. This thesis shows 
that, in spite of the formal commitment of Southern African governments to follow 
the international guidelines for fighting the epidemic and the financial and technical 
support of powerful donors, three regional states - Botswana, Mozambique and 
South Africa - presented significant variations in the domestic assimilation of 
internationally-devised prescriptions for HIV/AIDS action. These international 
policy guidelines are based on an innovative conceptualisation of security that proclaims the 
global epidemic a threat to international peace and stability. Drawing upon a new 
theoretical synthesis between the constructivist literature on international norms and the 
securitisation scholarship, the study provides an analytical framework for understanding 
the global securitisation 6f HIV/AIDS as an international norm. The H IV /A ID S  
securitisation norm (HASN) is an attempt by the present work to combine in a single 
concept the myriad of ideas and international prescriptions about HIV/AIDS 
interventions. By analysing the incorporation of H A SN  in these three Southern 
African states, which are highly impacted by HIV/AIDS, the study demonstrates 
that pre-existing political cultures and social practices have defined quite different 
policy outcomes and domestic interpretations of transnational (security) 
understandings of the epidemic.
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Medium Term Plan 
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National Association of People Living With AID 
North Atlantic Treaty Organisation 
Non-Governmental Organisation
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NIC National Intelligence Council
NP National Party
NPPHCN National Progressive Primary Health Care Network
OAU Organisation of African Unity
OECD Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
ONUMOZ United Nations Operation in Mozambique
PACHA Presidential Advisory Council on HIV/AIDS
PAIGC Partido Afticano da Independencia da Guine e Cabo Verde
(African Party for the Independence of Guinea-Bissau and Cape 
Verde)
PEPFAR US President’s Emergency Plan for HIV/AIDS Relief
PIDE Policia Intemacional de Defesa do Estado (International State
Defence Police)
PLWHA People living With HIV/AIDS
PMA Pharmaceutical Manufacturer’s Association
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PSI Population Services International
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RSC Regional Security Complex
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SARS Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome
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STP Short Term Plan
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TAC Treatment Action Campaign
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UDF United Democratic Front
UN United Nations
UNAIDS Joint United Nations Programme on HIV/AIDS
UNDP United Nations Development Programme
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UNFPA United Nations Population Fund
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Chapter 1
The Incorporation of International HIV/AIDS Norms into Domestic 
Practices: An Introduction
1. Defining the Puzzle
Nothing we have seen is a greater challenge to the peace and stability of African societies than the 
epidemic of A ID S [...] We face a major development crisis, and more than that, a security crisis
James Wolfensohn1
On 10 January 2000, the then US Vice-President A1 Gore chaired a 
landmark Security Council Meeting devoted to the security impact of HIV/AIDS in 
Africa. It was the first time in the history of the UN that an issue related to health 
rather than the military had been considered a potential threat to international 
security. Four years earlier, the Joint United Nations Programme on HIV/AIDS 
(UNAIDS) had been created to deal with the expanding global epidemic; this was 
also an unprecedented event. Never before had the international community of 
states put in place a global structure of governance such as the UNAIDS to deal with 
an epidemic of a single disease. Following the January 2000 meeting, national 
governments adopted a number of high-profile declarations of commitment and 
multilateral agreements.2 These documents articulated ideas, policy principles and
1 Speech delivered by the World Bank president at the UN Security Council Special Session on “The 
Impact o f  AIDS on Peace and Security in Africa” (UNSC, 2000a).
2 The declaration o f  commitment issued at the UN General Assembly Special Session on H IV/AIDS  
(UNGASS), in June 2001, is a watershed document in this regard. The following chapter further
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norms, aiming to tackle the emerging threat of HIV/AIDS. By this time, HIV/AIDS 
had placed itself firmly on the international security agenda.
The present study is focused on the impact of this singular international 
phenomenon, namely the global securitisation of H IV jA ID S , on the domestic structure 
of three African states: Botswana, Mozambique and South Africa. These countries 
are geographically located in the epicentre of the global HIV/AIDS epidemic, 
Southern Africa. However, notwithstanding their common HIV/AIDS burden, 
Botswana, Mozambique and South Africa present fairly different political 
cultures/identities and social institutions which reflected upon the distinctive way 
they responded to the influence of international HIV/AIDS actors and norms.3 So, 
by investigating the latter’s impact in these rather diverse settings, this thesis aims to 
empirically evaluate variations in the effects of norm adaptation across states. It 
addresses three interrelated questions:
1. What explains the similarities and differences in the effects of international 
HIV/AIDS norms on the conduct of these Southern African states?
2. What are the policy outcomes resulting from the interaction between the 
international proponents of the securitising of HIV/AIDS and their 
domestic audiences in Botswana, Mozambique and South Africa?
3. To what extent have HIV/AIDS securitisation attempts been more 
successful in one domestic setting than in another?
examines the specific H IV /A ID S norms and policy principles agreed by states in multilateral 
gatherings.
3 Some authors (e.g., Rotberg, 1995; Vale, 1996) assume that the nature and scope o f Southern 
Africa’s political economy, built initially by British imperialism and then by the long-standing 
economic dominance o f  South Africa, forged deep-rooted cultural, linguistic, political and economic 
bonds among states in the region. Although it is certainly true that these factors have shaped the 
current political and socioeconomic outlook o f  Southern Africa and deeply impacted upon the
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In response to these questions, I present three models of state reaction to 
the securitisation of HIV/ AIDS found in the three empirical cases: 1) the model of 
active engagement exemplified by Botswana; 2) the model of instrumental acceptance 
pursued by Mozambique and, finally; 3) the model of ideological resistance illustrated by 
the South African case. These archetypes are analytical simplifications of the 
socialisation outcomes identified in each of the above case studies. Through their 
examination, this thesis hopes to demonstrate that the widely used notion of “Sub- 
Saharan Africa” (or more specifically “Southern Africa”) poorly reflects the diversity 
of policy responses and local interpretations of HIV/AIDS. In this regard, I argue 
that, despite a certain level of pre-colonial/colonial homogeneity and a densely 
intertwined post-independence regional history, Southern African states have 
developed very distinct national characters. This is more evident in the case of 
Mozambique, due to the distinctive influence of Portuguese colonialism, Marxism- 
Leninism, civil war and (internationally-driven) post-conflict reconstruction in the 
formation of its national ethos. However, it is also true in the cases of Botswana and 
South Africa, in spite of their similar colonial backgrounds and shared regional past. 
As shown in more detail later, the approach of the British colonial power to the 
ethnically homogeneous and politically stable protectorate of Bechuanaland 
(currently Botswana) differed significandy to that which was applied to the racially 
divided and fiercely disputed region which is now South Africa. Contrasting with 
Botswana’s case, racial strife between the Boer white supremacists and the 
indigenous black population played a fundamental role in understanding South 
Africa’s history and politics. These historical differences had an enormous impact on 
the formation of these states’ particular political cultures and social configurations.
domestic structure o f  regional states, this thesis emphasises the particular internal dynamics that 
modelled and differentiated individual nation-states in the region.
17
The study also provides a theoretical framework for understanding the 
securitisation of HIV/AIDS as an international norm defined and promoted mainly 
by multilateral bodies, powerful states in the north, and transnational HIV/AIDS 
advocacy networks (including here NGOs, CBOs, and epistemic communities). The 
H IV  I  A ID S securitisation norm (HASN) is an intellectual attempt by the present 
analysis to synthesise in a single analytical concept the myriad of ideas and 
international prescriptions about HIV/AIDS interventions. The application of this 
analytical tool aims to facilitate the management of empirical data as well as to 
provide a coherent conceptual basis for this thesis.
2. Theoretical Framework: Preliminary Comments
This research project aims to make a contribution to a growing literature 
looking at the transnational emergence and domestic impact of norms in 
international relations. In this respect, it proposes a theoretical innovation which 
consists of a synthesis between the securitisation framework (Buzan et al, 1998) and 
the constructivist scholarship on international norms (e.g., Finnemore, 1993; Risse, 
1994; Risse, Ropp and Sikkink, 1999; Barnett and Finnemore, 1999; Finnemore and 
Sikkink, 1998). This latter perspective challenges traditional neorealist/neoliberal 
theories that stress material factors (economic, military, etc.) as determining the 
impact of ideas and norms. Rather, for these social constructivists, “material factors 
and conditions matter through cognitive and communicative processes, the “battle 
ground of ideas”, by which actors try to determine their identities and interests” 
(Risse and Sikkink, 1999:7).
Despite this constructivist emphasis on the role of social interactions in 
constituting international norms, this approach has systematically failed to
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understand and empirically identify the processes of communicative behaviour by 
which actors/states internalise those norms. Whereas the specialised literature in the 
domestic structural constraints (political culture, state-society configurations, regime 
type, etc.) to an international norm’s penetration is well established (eg., Risse, 1994, 
1995; Klotz, 1995; Legro, 1997; Checkel, 1999), the same cannot be attested for 
constructivist studies looking at the actual dynamic interaction between international 
and local normative orders. This scholarship has also neglected the special character 
and importance of the social construction of international security norms. It tends to 
focus exclusively on “good” international norms and on the domestic “violators” of 
those norms and their “bad” local practices (Acharya, 2004:239).4
Conversely, Ole Waever, the inventor of the concept of securitisation in 
international relations, claims that “security should be seen as a negative, as a failure 
to deal with issues of normal politics” (Bu2 an et al, 1998:29). The advocates of the 
securitisation model (as articulated in the works of the so-called Copenhagen School) 
built on the speech-act theory (Austin, 1962; Searle, 1969) to understand how 
(securitising) actors engage in argumentative practices to convince (socialise) 
audiences about the threatening character of a particular issue. In this regard, 
securitisation, as an analytical concept, is a very helpful tool in unfolding processes 
whereby issues are moved from the realm of normal politics (politicisation) to that of 
emergency (securitisation). The securitisation framework is used here as a theoretical 
device with which the author traces incidences of securitisation towards the 
HIV/AIDS epidemic at the system level and in the domestic structure of the three 
case studies.
4 For an example o f  this type o f  normative approach, see Risse et al’s (1999) evaluation o f  the impact 
of international human rights norms on the behaviour o f  national governments.
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According to this particular understanding of security relations, the use of 
instruments of securitisation by political leaders is aimed at avoiding catastrophe and 
massive death in moments of allegedly exceptional (security) crises (Buzan et al, 
1998). In this sense, it represents the contrary of the abovementioned “good” 
models of international governance, since the latter deals with situations of normality 
in international relations. Drawing upon these insights, it is shown later that, at the 
global level, HIV/AIDS was successfully securitised by powerful actors, namely 
UNAIDS, the US government and transnational HIV/AIDS NGOs. In this regard, 
this thesis claims that the global securitisation of the epidemic became an 
international norm embedded in diverse international declarations and agreements 
that urged states to create long-term policies and permanent bureaucracies. Similarly, 
the creation of an international body to deal with HIV/AIDS, namely UNAIDS, has 
crystallised the epidemic as an enduring security threat. The insidious and gradual 
impact o f the HIV/AIDS epidemic transformed this particular security crisis into a 
long-term emergency. This important particularity of the HIV/AIDS case poses 
some theoretical challenges to the normality/exceptionality division in the 
securitisation framework.
At the domestic level, the discursive interactions between these global 
speakers of securitisation and their state audiences were also fundamental elements in 
understanding the processes by which international HIV/AIDS norms were 
socialised domestically. In this instance, the case studies revealed different internal 
dynamics of securitisation. However, the actual application of the securitisation 
framework to the case studies demonstrated that it is not sufficiently equipped to 
empirically reveal the limits between processes of politicisation and securitisation 
towards HIV/AIDS policies.
States are complex audiences of securitisation. They are not black boxes as the 
(neo) realists say. Rather, states represent collective entities composed of different 
institutions, cultures and individuals. This means that, even when a national 
government endorses, at the global level, the international norm claiming for the 
securitisation of HIV/AIDS, it is still important to understand the influence of this 
norm in the social and power-laden contexts within which domestic securitisation 
practices take place. It is only then that the analyst can decisively determine whether 
or not a securitisation move is successful. Thus, it is argued here that the securitisation 
framework should be complemented with other analytical tools that would allow for 
a more comprehensive understanding of the inter-relation between securitising 
actors, their audiences and the social and political contexts where these actors are 
situated. In this respect, the thesis explores the domestic determinants that either 
constrained or facilitated HIV/AIDS securitisation processes within the three case 
studies. It focuses on their particular political cultures, state-society relations and 
types of political leadership.
This analysis is inspired by (yet not firmly grounded in) the insights of a 
number of constructivist authors who looked at national-level factors in attempting 
to understand the impact of international norms (e.g., Risse, 1994; Klotz, 1995; 
Cortell and Davis Jr, 1996, 2000; Legro, 1997; Checkel, 1999). Risse, for example, 
argued that the capacity of external actors to successfully promote norms is 
dependent upon the particular configuration of state-society relations as well as the 
nature of political institutions, and “the values and norms embedded in the political 
culture” (1994:187). Similarly, Checkel asserts that the domestic influence of 
international norms is a function of the congruence between the norm and the pre­
existing political culture of the target state (1999:86). Cortell and Davis Jr. claimed, in 
turn, that the measurement of the domestic salience of an international norm
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demands the investigation of “changes in the national discourse, the state’s 
institutions and state policies” (2000:70). I believe that this type of disaggregation 
exercise is essential to achieve a better understanding of the (rather striking) variation 
in HIV/AIDS securitisation outcomes across Southern African states.
So, what the above suggests is that the social constructivist branch of 
international norms’ authors and the securitisation literature are, in many aspects, 
complementary. With regards to this thesis’ problematic, the securitisation theory 
provides analytical instruments to elucidate how transnational securitising actors 
persuade domestic audiences that HIV/AIDS should be dealt with in terms of 
security. Conversely, the constructivist perspective on norms allows the analyst to 
identify the broader social and political structures in which these discursive 
interactions actually happen. The theoretical make-up as well as the advantages and 
implications of this combination are further exposed in the upcoming chapter.
3. Some Methodological Considerations
There is no such a thing as a logical method of having new ideas [...] discoveiy contains
an “irrational element” or a “creative intuition”
Karl Popper5
The initial design of this research project sought to explore the regional 
assimilation of international HIV/AIDS norms through the examination of the 
Southern African Development Community (SADC). Given that HIV/AIDS is 
aggressively spreading throughout southern Africa, it is reasonable to assume that 
states in the region would look for co-coordinated action in tackling the epidemic.
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Accordingly, the regional institution, the SADC, would be the appropriate forum to 
promote deeper cooperation towards HIV/AIDS policies, since it can provide the 
institutional resources for harmonising national policies and for defining regional 
strategies to face the epidemic.
However, these initial assumptions about the role of this particular 
institution as a recipient of international norms were not confirmed. Two research 
visits to the SADC’s headquarters in Gaborone, Botswana, and a number of 
interviews with officials involved with HIV/AIDS regional activities revealed an 
institution struggling to coordinate the HIV/AIDS policies of its member states and 
at the margins of national decision-making. Evidence collected during field research 
in Botswana, Mozambique and South Africa has also exposed these countries’ 
common disregard for regional HIV/AIDS initiatives led by SADC and an inward- 
oriented tendency while defining common strategies to combat the epidemic. The 
explanations for this lack of regional commitment towards HIV/AIDS policies are 
complex and it is not the aim of this particular research to explore them. It is suffice 
to say that HIV/AIDS is not an exceptional case in Southern Africa regarding lack 
of effective regional cooperation. It is, in fact, part of a general trend that has 
inspired a number of academic works, particularly in the area of regional security 
studies (eg., Evans, 1991; Albright, 1991; Vale, 1991, 1994; Khadiagala, 1994; Booth 
and Vale, 1995,1997; Malan, 1998; Tsie, 1998; Tapfumaneyi, 1999; Thompson, 1999; 
Alden and Le Pere, 2000; Baregu, 2003; Nathan, 2004).
Nathan, for example, argued that the inefficiency of collective security 
arrangements within the SADC is due to the combination of three main factors, 
which have hampered the “development of trust, institutional cohesion, common
5 Quoted from King, Keohane and Verba (1994:13).
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policies, and a unified response to crises” (2004:1). Firsdy, he points to the absence 
of common values among SADC member states as the most important problem in 
understanding poor security coordination in the region; a second related problem has 
to do with their reluctance to give away a measure of their sovereignty rights to a 
regional security regime; finally, this unwillingness to partially surrender sovereignty 
stems from the political weakness of many member states, which undermines the 
implementation of regional strategic plans (Nathan, 2004:3). He asserted that SADC 
member states are essentially incompatible in terms of their domestic and foreign 
policies, which would impair the establishment of a successful regional organisation. 
In his words,
A viable regional organisation might be able to develop common policies and 
perform a range of security and cross-border functions but its members must have 
sufficient commonality in values if the body is to be at all viable. Frequent interaction 
between member states will not in itself overcome divisions and mistrust that derive 
from incompatible national policies. Common values are the foundation rather than 
the outcome of close political and security co-operation (2004:14).
The important point to bear in mind here is that, notwithstanding the 
creation of regional structures and policy guidelines, the SADC has not been able to 
put in place an effective institutional mechanism for inter-state policy harmonisation 
along the lines of the international securitisation of HIV/AIDS. In spite of the 
coordinating efforts of the SADC’s Secretariat, litde progress was made in 
implementing regional HIV/AIDS interventions. As a result, the domestic structures 
of states have prevailed in terms of being the central and autonomous settings in 
which processes of norm incorporation have been more strongly manifested. In this 
respect, Acharya notes that variations in the regional acceptance of international 
norms depend upon the “differential ability of local agents to reconstruct 
transnational norms to ensure a better fit with prior local norms” (2004:239). In the
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Southern African context, this processes of norm localisation had a significant impact 
only at state level, since the SADC has not developed a strong normative structure 
that could accommodate new transnational understandings on security issues.
Given the above, the sources of explanation of this study cut across two 
inter-related levels: It is argued here that,
1. At the system level, the international establishment of HASN represented a 
structural constraint (yet also an opportunity) in terms of the capacity of 
Botswana, Mozambique and South Africa to make autonomous decisions 
about HIV/AIDS policies.
2. At the domestic level, the understanding of the process by which HASN is 
incorporated in their domestic structures is dependent upon the analytical 
unpacking of the dynamic relationship between political, ideological and 
societal processes within states.
The rationale behind the selection of the case studies is as follows,
• Firstly, they all present extremely high HIV prevalence rates. At the end of 
2005, South Africa alone had an estimated 5 million people living with HIV, 
which represents roughly 20% of its adult population. The situation in 
Botswana is even worse, with around 24% of its adult citizens carrying the 
vims. In Mozambique, 16% of the adult population, which corresponds to 
1.6 million people, are similarly infected (UNAIDS, 2006a).
• Secondly, given their equally dramatic HIV/AIDS situation, these countries 
have all been subjected to substantial pressure from the international 
community to securitise their HIV/AIDS epidemics. Moreover, they are all
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major recipients of bilateral and multilateral aid to combat the epidemic, such 
as the Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria, the World 
Bank’s Global HIV/AIDS Program of Action, and the US President’s 
Emergency Plan for HIV/AIDS Relief (PEPFAR).
• Lastly, despite this common international pressure, they present quite distinct 
colonial experiences, political cultures, and levels of economic development, 
which allows the author to engage with a wide variety of domestic 
configurations.
It is important to clarify that this thesis is an exploratory investigation of 
three case studies. As such, it provides evidences that sustain the hypothesis that the 
externally induced securitisation of HIV/AIDS (here called HASN) resulted in three 
models (or outcomes) of state reaction. This methodological approach neither 
involves a strong causal inference nor the attempt to systematically apply a 
supposedly universal theoretical model to a particular “objective reality”. Rather, the 
theoretical conceptualisation of HASN is solely intended to organise and limit the 
analytical scope of this thesis and, as a corollary, to contribute to a particular debate 
in the international relations literature. The methodological position taken here is
more closely linked with a humanistic and interpretative approach (along the lines of
\
Max Weber’s Verstehen and hermeneutics) as opposed to an objectivist/positivist 
view about the production of knowledge in social sciences.6
Although the present study follows a historically coherent line of events, it 
is not attached to a very strict time-framing. Rather, the investigation concentrates
6 For an interesting discussion o f  Verstehen and hermeneutics in social sciences, see Diesing (1991). On 
methodological/epistemological issues related to the limits o f  “objective knowledge” and “causation”
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strongly on identifying a particular universe, which characterises one important 
phenomenon: the global securatisation of HIV/AIDS. The case studies were 
examined within the class of events that defined this particular phenomenon. In this 
sense, I refer to historical developments that occurred mosdy from the early 90s to 
the present day. Most of the primary data was collected in the year 2004 and, for that 
reason, the principal time-cut of the present examination is on that year. This does 
not mean that subsequent events were not taken into consideration. Their relevance 
was assessed for consistency with the research proposal and then included in the 
analysis accordingly.
Given the scarcity of secondary materials tackling key issues, such as the 
role of external actors in HIV/AIDS policy decision-making, a great deal of research 
was conducted direcdy in Botswana, Mozambique and South Africa. During two 
research visits, in July/September 2004 and February 2006, the author consulted 
numerous primary sources (Government’s publications, donors’ policy statements, 
meetings’ proceedings, etc.) and conducted interviews with a wide range of actors in 
both the private and public sectors. Additionally, a number of local newspapers, 
academic articles and specialised books were examined. The internet provided access 
to many key policy documents, reports and a wide array of official documentation 
from the UNAIDS, the US and transnational NGOs. Some representatives of those 
actors were also interviewed on the ground in Gaborone, Maputo and 
J ohannesburg/Pretoria.
The most challenging methodological aspects of this research were related 
to the reconstruction of events and processes which were neither documented nor 
accessible to the larger public. On many occasions, the author relied on the memory
in the discipline o f  international relations, see, for example, Hollis and Smith (1990) and Wendt 
(1998).
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of the interviewees to retrace policy decision-making procedures, to understand the 
functioning of state institutions and to assess the role of international partners in 
influencing domestic HIV/AIDS policies. Moreover, some of the most important 
actors were either not available or were unwilling to provide the relevant 
information. It is important to bear in mind, in this respect, that HIV/AIDS is still a 
very sensitive and politicised issue in some national contexts. These gaps in data were 
filled by other documental sources and interviews with lower-ranked individuals, 
who nonetheless were in possession of reliable knowledge about (or were directly 
involved with) the issues under examination here.
I would like to offer a final note on definitions and terminology. All the 
central concepts used in this thesis are first explained, and then applied in a coherent 
manner. The particular usage of “international norm”, “securitising actor”, 
“audiences of securitisation” and “referents objects of security” is further clarified in 
the next chapter. Given the symbiotic application of two sets of theories with their 
own particular terminologies, certain concepts may at times be intertwined. It is 
worth noting, in this respect, that the terms “securitising actors”, “norm leaders” and 
“norm entrepreneurs” are used interchangeably due to their similar meaning, as 
representing the actors who embrace and promote a particular interpretation of a 
social event. Similarly, the concepts of “norm takers” and “audiences” are both used 
to describe the actors who receive, react and reconstruct the HIV/AIDS 
securitisation norm.
4. Organisation of the Thesis
This thesis is divided into seven chapters, including the present 
introduction and the conclusions. The five core chapters are organised as follows:
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Chapter 2 provides an analytical framework for guiding the subsequent empirical 
analysis. It further develops on the theoretical underpinnings and implications of 
HASN as well as explaining the historical process of the emergence and 
consolidation of this norm in the international system. It also looks at the origins and 
evolution of the academic and policy debates linking HIV/AIDS and security and 
how they were translated in terms of principles and norms for state action.
Chapter 3 looks at three major global securitising actors (or norm 
leaders/entrepreneurs) concerning the securitisation of HIV/AIDS. These are the 
UNAIDS, the US Government and a number of transnational HIV/AIDS non­
governmental and faith-based organisations. It is claimed that by using different 
persuasion strategies and operational resources, such as UNAIDS’ knowledge-based 
authority about the epidemic, the US’ disproportional material capabilities and the 
transnational NGOs’ ability to spread information, these actors became powerful 
sources of the diffusion of HASN. This chapter explores their different (and many 
times conflictive) rationales, sources of legitimacy and worldviews about HIV/AIDS 
and how they promote those particular understandings worldwide.
The three subsequent chapters examine the process by which HASN was 
absorbed in the domestic structures of this thesis’ audiences (or norm takers), namely 
Botswana, Mozambique and South Africa. These chapters focus on these countries’ 
political cultures and colonial legacies, the particular characteristics of state-society 
relations and the sources of political leadership. Chapter 4 explores the case of 
Botswana and shows that a significant degree of conformity between international 
and national normative systems shaped the HIV/AIDS policy process in this 
Southern African state. It argues that post-colonial Botswana developed a political 
culture friendly to Western values and this was reflected in its policy response to 
HIV/AIDS. Moreover, the government’s commitment to the social and economic
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uplifting of Botswana’s people coupled with a stable political system and strong 
public institutions have also contributed to a national response to HIV/AIDS in line 
with the international agenda of the securitising actors.
The Mozambican case is analysed in chapter 5. It reveals a domestic context 
rooted in a political culture that has experienced very high levels of dependency on 
international actors. Given the virtual destruction of the state as the result of a 
prolonged civil war, Western powers, international institutions and NGOs have been 
active in the country’s political process from very early on. Furthermore, the social 
and economic decline of the country due to war has contributed to the emergence of 
a culture of survival among its political leadership. In this respect, Mozambique’s elites 
have instrumentally used the country’s many crises to influence the international 
community of donors. This kind of management of dependency (Bayart, 2000) is aimed at 
gaining external support, therefore perpetuating deep-rooted patterns of domestic 
control. The incorporation of HASN in Mozambique should be interpreted against 
this background.
Chapter 6 examines the South African case. It shows that South Africa’s 
assimilation of HASN took place in a domestic context profoundly marked by the 
legacies of the Apartheid regime. It is argued that the South African government 
(largely under Thabo Mbeki’s rule) has placed HIV/AIDS within a broader political 
agenda of opposing Western white domination in Africa. In this respect, the 
government’s rationale is primarily ideological and clashes with the established 
authority of HASN norm leaders. Mbeki has systematically challenged the Western 
scientific community, pharmaceutical corporations and Western policies on tackling 
the global epidemic. This active dissidence of the South African government towards 
HASN should be situated in a political culture strongly permeated by ideological and 
racial divisions. However, contrasting with the cases of Botswana and Mozambique,
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in South Africa a vibrant and proactive civil society sector has confronted the 
government’s views and policies on HIV/AIDS. In addition to their domestic 
activism, these civic organisations link up with transnational networks of NGOs, 
who then convince international organisations (IOs) and major donor states to exert 
pressure on the government to change its HIV/AIDS policies.7 As a result, Mbeki 
and his Minister of Health have softened up their antagonistic rhetoric and, in 2003, 
the South African government finally agreed to provide universal access to AIDS 
drugs in the public health system.8
The conclusive chapter sums up the most important theoretical and 
empirical findings of the thesis. It also points to possible avenues for further 
research, mostly concerning processes of international (security) norm incorporation 
at the regional level and the conceptual expansion of HASN to incorporate the 
securitisation of other critical epidemic diseases.9 Regarding the former, the analytical 
concept of regional security complexes (Buzan, 1983; Buzan and Waever, 2003) could be 
applied in a subsequent study of Southern Africa to structure a more detailed 
examination of whether national concerns about HIV/AIDS could (or could not) be 
tied together into a single regional formation (or audience o f securitisation).
7 Keck and Sikkink (1998) called this pattern o f  external influence the “boomerang effect”.
8 However, fierce divergences over treatment and prevention strategies between the Ministry o f  Health 
and domestic H IV /A ID S activists have again surfaced during the 2006 International Aids Conference 
in Toronto. This particular event has revealed the still sharply divided domestic politics o f  H IV/AIDS  
and the South African government’s persistent contestation o f  internationally devised solutions to the 
African problems. Those issues are further analysed in chapter 6.
9 Such as SARS and Avian Influenza (or Bird Flu).
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Chapter 2
“The HIV/AIDS Securitisation Norm (HASN)” -  An Analytical Framework 
for Understanding the Global Securitisation of the Epidemic
1. Introduction
This chapter discusses the emergence and diffusion in the late 90s of an 
innovative conceptualisation of security that proclaims the global HIV/AIDS 
epidemic an emergencial threat to international peace and stability. The study 
provides a framework for understanding the securitisation o f the HIV/AIDS epidemic 
as an international norm defined and promoted mainly by epistemic communities of 
academics and international organisations, powerful states in the north, and 
transnational HIV/AIDS advocacy networks.10 The H IV  I  A ID S securitisation norm is 
an intellectual attempt by the present chapter to synthesise under a single analytical 
concept the myriad of ideas and international prescriptions about HIV/AIDS 
interventions.
The following discussion explores the theoretical and empirical foundations 
of HASN. Specifically, it first explains what is meant by considering the securitisation 
of HIV/AIDS as an international norm. The chapter then investigates some 
analytical advantages for the present study in linking the constructivist literature on 
the emergence and diffusion of international norms with the securitisation 
perspective. It points to some important shortcomings in both scholarships and 
elaborates on how they could work more efficiently as a combined analytical tool. It
10 The term “transnational advocacy networks” is from Keck and Sikkink (1998).
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also assesses the empirical contributions of HASN to the theoretical debate on how 
pre-existing normative orders, political structures and agents condition the domestic 
reception of international norms. Finally, the work explores the conceptual and 
empirical origins of HASN. It focuses on the social construction of HIV /AIDS as a 
security threat and how these ideas became crystallised into international norms.
2. The Conceptualisation of the Securitisation of HIV/AIDS as a Norm
Before the actual exploration of the advantages in linking the securitisation 
framework and the constructivist debate about norms, some conceptual issues 
should be briefly clarified. The HASN is analytically divided here in two integrated 
parts: 1) one that defines the idea of HIV/AIDS as a security issue, which presupposes 
rights and obligations (normh and 2) one which prescribes the right policies to be 
implemented at the international, regional and national levels to combat the threat 
posed by the epidemic (rule). In this respect, one can say that the (international) 
norm is deterministic in terms of defining a unique and uncontested understanding of 
what the HIV/AIDS epidemic is and also normative in the sense of knowing what are 
the supposedly best policies to be put in place by states.
At first glance, the concept of regime sounds analytically more 
comprehensive than the concept of norm. For example, Stephen Krasner provides a 
definition of international regime which encompasses a “set of implicit or explicit 
principles, norms, rules, and decision-making procedures around which actors’ 
expectations converge in a given-area of international relations” (1982:186). 
However, in Krasner’s formulation regime is not a single concept but a set of blurry
terms that are really hard to cope with when applied to specific empirical cases.11 
Hence, to avoid intangible definitional complexities, the present analysis has opted 
for a minimalist conceptualisation of HASN in terms of an internationally agreed 
prescriptive framework promoted with the help of states, IOs and transnational 
advocacy networks. It accepts Krasner’s definition of norm as “standards of 
behaviour defined in terms of rights and obligations” (1982:186). This is different 
from rules that comprise the application of norms to particular situations. As 
Kratochwil points out, “the regime literature emphasises this important difference in 
arguing that rules deal with specific problems while norms are more general 
prescriptions” (1984:687). Since HASN presents characteristics of both, the 
subsequent discussion conveys in a single definition the above understandings of 
norms and rules.
The main interest of this study is not on the actual interpretation of 
HIV/AIDS as a security issue. To put it in other words, the present analysis is not 
mainly concerned with the question of why HIV/AIDS has been securitised. Rather, 
it aims to show what explains the securitisation of HIV/AIDS and how this norm has 
been diffused worldwide. In doing so, it looks at the origins of this particular 
normative understanding and the social mechanisms by which this so-called norm 
exercises influence in the behaviour of states. It is important to make clear, therefore, 
that the present analysis does not engage with the ongoing debate about the 
(real/imagined) links between HIV/AIDS and security.12 Nor is it the purpose of this 
chapter to judge either the reasonableness or the ethical implications of the 
securitisation of HIV/AIDS. In this sense, the normative aspects of HASN should 
not be confounded with questions about whether the securitisation of HIV/AIDS
11 For an elaboration on this criticism, see Kratochwil (1984).
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moves the response from the domain of universal humanitarianism to that of self- 
referential national interest. As highlighted later, most of the writers and practitioners 
looking at HIV/AIDS and security operate within this basic dichotomy. For some of 
these actors, it has become necessary to securitise HIV/ AIDS precisely because the 
human security! developmental approach to the epidemic produced only an insufficient 
response in the international system. For others, the framing of HIV/AIDS in the 
language of national security can push the response in the wrong policy direction. Elbe, 
for example, asserts that this is due to susceptibility for undemocratic decision­
making in situations of national security crisis, with power concentrated in just a few 
state institutions, such as the military and intelligence services, and away from civil 
society groups (Elbe, 2006:121).13
The focus of the present analysis is rather different. It aims to set up an 
analytical framework to understand the formation of a powerful global claim for the 
securitisation of HIV/AIDS. Building on social constructivist insights of other 
authors (e.g. Finnemore, 1993; Finnemore and Sikkink, 1998; Ruggie, 1998), this 
chapter argues that international HIV/AIDS norms - or “standards of 
appropriateness” (March and Olsen, 1998) - have changed considerably since the 
early 80s. It shows how these cognitive maps evolved from an early biomedical, and 
then developmental approach, to one based on the securitisation of the 
epidemic.This framework also works as a useful investigative tool in this thesis’ later 
assessment of the impact of the global securitisation of HIV/AIDS on the domestic 
structure of three states in Southern Africa, namely Botswana, Mo2 ambique and 
South Africa.
12 See section 4 o f  this chapter for an overview o f this debate.
13 For more on the normative/ethical implications o f  securitising HTV/AIDS, see Peterson 
(2002/2003).
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Therefore, the use of norm here is broadly analytical. It refers to this study’s 
appreciation of the (almost) consensual agreement by governments, IOs and NGOs 
that HIV/AIDS indeed represents a special type of emergency and that governments 
should implement the internationally devised best practices to fight the epidemic. As 
shown later, the explicit and tacit rules/norms/principles governing HASN were 
consolidated in successive conferences where states’ representatives met and reached 
agreements intended to foster a particular understanding of the global epidemic. In 
these conferences, the signatories of joint declarations agreed upon general 
principles, identified specific recommendations for state behaviour and established 
decision-making procedures at the multilateral and state levels.
3. Theoretical Perspectives on Norm Formation and the Securitisation Debate
This section aims to combine in a single analytical framework some of the 
theoretical contributions given by the securitisation framework and the constructivist 
scholarship on norm formation and diffusion. It explores the analytical advantages 
that such a merge could offer to the understanding of HASN.
Fundamentally, the constructivist scholarship on international norms 
focuses on the mechanisms by which ideas emerge and spread. This school is divided 
into two inter-related perspectives.14 The first research agenda looks primarily at the 
system level (Finnemore, 1993; Barnett and Finnemore, 1999; Finnemore and 
Sikkink, 1998). It focuses on how international norms emerge and the means of their 
propagation in the international system. This perspective is also interested in the 
actors who embrace and promote these norms. They focus on the role of
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transnational social movements, multilateral institutions and states as teachers of 
norms.15
The second group stresses the process by which international norms 
penetrate the domestic structure of states (Cortell and Davis Jr., 1996; Risse, 1994; 
Klotz, 1995; Gurowitz, 1999; Legro, 1997). This perspective confines the analysis to 
how the particular political, societal and cultural characteristics of states produce 
distinct outcomes in terms of the domestic absorption of international norms. They 
describe the levels of convergence between international and domestic 
understandings of a given issue and how bureaucracies, legal systems, and shared 
principled beliefs serve as filters for international norms.16
In general, these perspectives are exclusively concerned with universal 
norms of good international citizenship (protection of wildlife, promotion of human 
rights, protection of women and minority rights, anti-slavery campaigns, 
transnational movements against land mines, etc.) and with how they promote 
normative change (Acharya, 2004; Carpenter, 2005).17 However, norm formation and 
diffusion in international politics also involves other types of norms. These authors 
usually ignore the essential quality and special appeal of some of these international 
norms that are identified as responding to existential threats to peace and security.18
14 Cortell and Davis Jr. (2000) pointed to “two waves” in the scholarship on international norms. 
Amitav Acharya (2004) also acknowledged this division in the literature.
15 The idea o f  IOs working as “teachers o f  norms” is from Finnemore (1993). There are a number o f  
other concepts to define the role played by transnational actors in promoting norms, such as “norm 
entrepreneurs”, “norm leaders”, “norm maker/norm taker”, etc. For examples, see Keck and Sikkink 
(1998), Checkel (1998) and Naldeman (1990).
16 For a useful review o f this literature see Cortell and James Jr (2000).
17 Acharya (2004:242), e.g., used “moral cosmopolitanism” to describe the process whereby 
international norms are promoted as “universal” and not subjected to resistance or contestation.
18 They are also blamed for failing to grasp the forms by which norm entrepreneurs sometimes 
manipulate international norms to serve their own particularistic interests (Bamett, 1999; Joachim, 
2003; Carpenter, 2005).
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The present argument claims that, by way of drawing the line between 
processes of politicisation and securitisation, Buzan et al (1998) framework provides 
an important contribution to the constructivist scholarship on international norms in 
terms of pinning down the constitutive dynamics of international security norms. 
Concerning this chapter’s discussion, the securitisation framework offers, with some 
degree of precision, the analytical parameters to understand the historical process 
that led to the current global securitisation of HIV/AIDS. Through the application 
of the four constitutive elements of the securitisation speech-act (as presented 
below), it is argued later that HIV/AIDS has been successfully constructed as a security 
threat by a number of very powerful securitising actors. In fact, by the examination of 
the emergence, dissemination, and final institutionalisation of HASN, this chapter 
aims to go beyond these authors' typology, arguing that, at its final stage, the 
securitisation process becomes an international norm. It does not mean, however, that 
after being widely accepted at the global level, HASN has become automatically 
embedded in the domestic structures of the states most affected by the epidemic. As 
demonstrated later, despite their joint declarations and formal commitments in 
multilateral gatherings, the actual response of governments to the global 
securitisation of HIV/AIDS is dependent on their pre-existing political attitudes 
towards the epidemic. In what follows, this section briefly examines some relevant 
assumptions underlying the securitisation framework.
Drawing upon early postulations of the speech-act philosophy (Austin, 
1962; Searle, 1969), the so-called Copenhagen School (e.g. Waever, Jahn, and 
Lemaitre, 1987; Waever, Lemaitre and Tromer, 1989; Buzan, Kelstrup, Lemaitre, 
Tromer and Waever, 1990; Waever, Buzan, Kelstrup, and Lemaitre, 1993) posit that 
security is not a static concept, as understood by traditional security studies, but an 
intersubjective rhetorical practice. Through his speech-act theory, Austin (1962)
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recognises the transformative importance of language in social relations. For him, 
speech is a form of social action which has a significant political impact. Rather than 
only describing events or encoding information, he demonstrates that, through the 
use of speech-act, social/political actors define standards for social activity. Consistent 
with Austin’s early formulations, Waever (1989) and his Copenhagen colleagues 
pioneered the definition of security as a form of speech-act. For him, the utterance of 
security entails the claim that some issue represents an existential threat to a valued 
referent object and that the exceptionality of the threat would justify extreme 
measures to deal with it.19 In this sense, to label something in security terms is 
nothing more than a discursive articulation in which social/political actors try to 
inculcate a particular quality (threat, emergency, etc.) into an issue.
Based on this premise, Buzan, Waever and Wilde (1998:36/37) broke down 
the security speech-act into 4 constitutive parts. They say that, in framing something in 
terms of security, a (i) securitising actor(s) should present a (ii) specific issue as an (iii) 
existential threat to the survival of a (iv) referent object. For them, securitisation is only 
successful when a securitising actor is able to convince a significant audience that 
something constitutes a threat. In that sense, the measurement of (in) security is not 
given only by an objective assessment of the actual nature of the threat but mainly by 
the analysis of the conditions by which a securitisation claim becomes widely 
accepted and eventually institutionalised. After an issue is successfully securitised, the 
next step is the institutionalisation of the security rhetoric. At this stage, there is no 
further need to persuade others through the use of discourse. The security argument 
and the sense of urgency are implicit in the standards of behaviour, principles,
19 There are some interesting similarities between Carl Schmitt’s (1985) definition o f  the “political” 
and the above understanding o f  securitisation. For Schmitt, sovereign power reveals itself when 
normality is threatened, therefore demanding exceptional measures outside the state’s legal order.
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policies, and bureaucratic procedures that were created to deal with the problem. The 
securitisation is institutionalised only if the threat (either perceived or real) is resilient 
enough to demand the build-up of standing bureaucracies and procedures.20
Those attempting to institutionalise the securitisation of new threats, as in 
the case of transnational advocacy networks (Greenpeace is a good example, 
concerning environmental issues), have in general to face the resistance from a 
international political context still dominated by traditional security institutions. The 
degree of either confrontation or adequacy towards these securitisation moves can vary 
greatly, depending on the characteristics of the political setting (either multilateral, 
regional, or national) in which securitisation is attempted (Buzan et al., 1998: 29).
International norms can assume various forms and most of them fall in the 
realm of politicisation. This means that they are in general part of normal public 
debate and policy decision-making and do not represent an urgent matter requiring 
actions outside the usual political procedures. However, depending upon 
circumstantial changes, issues can be moved further up in the list of policy priorities, 
requiring a special type of politics and increased allocation of human and material 
resources. As shown later, the HIV/AIDS epidemic is an interesting example, 
whereby an issue has been gradually moved from the politicised to the securitised 
category. In this sense, one can say that the process of constituting international 
security norms is analogous to the image of a pendulum that swings from politicisation 
to securitisation and vice-versa in terms of the perceived levels of urgency and threat 
that are allocated to a specific issue. In the case of HIV/AIDS, the pendulum has
Williams (2003), for example, tried to trace some influences o f  Schmitt’s philosophical thought on the 
securitisation framework.
20 Buzan et al (1998:27-28) note that this process is most clear in the military sector, where the 
enduring perception o f  threats, as internal strife and external invasion, demand the built up o f  strong 
bureaucracies.
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already swung from politicisation to securitisation and, as long as the disease is 
eventually controlled, it can move back to the sphere of politicisation.
Given the above considerations, this chapter proposes that the explanation 
of the cognitive process by which issues in the transnational system are moved from 
the category of normality to emergency and .back, is the most compelling 
contribution of the securitisation framework to the study of how international 
security norms emerge and spread. In this respect, the securitisation theory fills an 
important gap in the literature on international norms; that is their lack of interest on 
the strategic social construction of threats to international security. Consistent with 
the view put forward by the Copenhagen group, in general, and Buzan et al, in 
particular, this study argues that, through the use of rhetoric practices (speech-act) as 
well as other forms of persuasion, H A SN  entrepreneurs promoted change in pre­
existing interpretations of the HIV/AIDS global epidemic. As further elaborated in 
the following section, these actors successfully reframed the disease from an early 
biomedical issue to the current immediate threat to global security.
However, despite its relevance to the present discussion, the securitisation 
scholarship has, at least, two very important shortcomings. Firstly, the 
aforementioned pendulum analogy illuminates a fundamental problem common to most 
of the proponents of the securitisation approach, including Buzan et al (1998). This 
is the empirical identification of the tipping point in which an issue is moved from an 
area of normality to one of exceptionality. In other words, the question is “how, in 
practice, can the analyst draw the line between processes of politicization and 
processes of securitization?”(Buzan et al, 1998:21). In the military sector, emergency 
measures are very clearly defined (i.e. declaration of war), but in the case of health 
(incidentally, the securitisation framework does not contain a health sector), is the 
international community really responding to the epidemic in emergency mode?
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Indeed, the creation of special HIV/AIDS bureaucracies and policies at system, 
regional and state levels indicates that the aforementioned pendulum has moved 
towards the institutionalisation of the security threat.
Nevertheless, this does not mean that a significant world audience was 
convinced about the emergencial threat posed by the epidemic. Contrasting with the 
more present danger of international terrorism, for example, the insidious character 
of HIV/AIDS has disguised the actual magnitude and emergency of the security 
threat. This particular feature of the securitisation of the HIV/AIDS epidemic 
challenges previous understandings about the determinants of successful 
securitisation claims. It is suggested here that the successful securitisation of HIV/AIDS 
can only be measured by looking at the internalisation of its constitutive principles in 
the domestic structure of states.
According to Buzan et al (1998:41), the defining characteristic of a 
successful securitisation is the acceptance by an audience that something is 
threatening and demands exceptional action. Therefore, the actual understanding of 
the limits between politicisation and securitisation is dependent on a strong analytical 
focus on the acquiescence of the audience. At a global level, this chapter argues that 
the securitising of HIV/AIDS can be empirically demonstrated by the widespread 
acceptance of the securitisation claim in multilateral organisations, namely the UN. In 
this respect, it is shown that states’ adherence to prominent international declarations 
of commitment indicates that the large audience of UN member-states was convinced 
about the specific security nature of HIV/AIDS.21 However, the national 
governments’ acquiescence at the international level did not translate into the
21 Important in this regard were the UN Security Council’s Resolution on H IV /A ID S o f  2000 and the 
subsequent “Declaration o f  Commitment on HIV/AIDS: Global Crisis — Global Action” o f  the UN  
General Assembly’s Twenty-Sixth Special Session on H IV/AIDS.
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immediate internalisation of the securitisation norm at the domestic level.22 This means 
that in the domestic structure of states, the securitisation of HIV/AIDS presented 
different outcomes in terms of its assimilation. This point relates to the second 
problem of the securitisation framework.
While digging deep into the theoretical puzzle, Buzan and his followers 
neglect the empirical verification of actual processes whereby issues, after being 
successfully securitised in the realm of discursive practices (speech-act), become 
widely embedded in transnational institutions and states’ bureaucracies.23 These 
authors also lack conceptual tools to understand the impact of externally induced 
securitisation processes in pre-existing regional and domestic systems. A similar 
criticism was first raised by authors (Balzacq, 2005; Stritzel, 2005) who pointed to the 
need of proper social contextualisation in the analysis of processes of securitisation. 
Notwithstanding their emphasis on the role of social power and facilitating conditions 
(1998: 31-33), Buzan et al do not satisfactorily elaborate on the interplay between the 
autonomous linguistic practices of securitisation and the structured social and power 
contexts in which those practices take place. Instead, they centre the analysis almost 
exclusively on the subjective practices of discourse, omitting, therefore, the strategic 
environmental factors that deeply influence them.24
This chapter claims that these conceptual tools are better provided by the 
abovementioned “second wave” constructivist scholarship on international norms.
22 Finnemore and Sikkink note that “at the extreme o f  a norm cascade, norms may become so widely 
accepted that they are internalized by actors and achieve a “taken-for-granted” quality that makes 
conformance with the norm almost automatic” (Finnemore and Sikkink, 1998:904).
23 I empirically address this analytical gap in the forthcoming appraisal o f  the global securitisation o f  
the H IV /A ID S epidemic.
This literature maintains that states and regional institutions do not react in 
the same manner to externally induced/imposed normative frameworks. Rather, 
their particular domestic and regional contexts conditioned the reception of 
international norms by governments and regional institutions alike. Within this 
research agenda, a number of important factors have been shown to condition the 
domestic incorporation of international norms. They have argued that variations in 
the domestic adaptation of international norms can be explained by the distinctive 
features of local actors1 principled beliefs and cognitive identities as well as by the 
(mis)match between international norms’ prescriptions and states’ political structures.
Peter Gourevitch (1978), for example, has usefully demonstrated, in his 
influential analysis of the role played by domestic structures in mediating the effects 
of systemic pressures, that some actors have more access than others to policy 
discussions due to the particular institutional configurations of the decision-making 
process. Other authors explored a number of similar issues. These are the causal link 
between the ability of international norms to influence state behaviour and the 
different configurations of state-society relations (Risse, 1994), the congruence 
between international norms and pre-existing political cultures (Checkel, 1999), the 
processes wherein domestic groups appeal instrumentally to international norms to 
further their own local interests (Cortell, and Davis Jr., 1996), and the processes by 
which international norms reconstitute national interests (Klotz, 1995).
While attempting to demonstrate causality relations between international 
norms and domestic policy structures, these scholars have shown that states are not
24 Drawing from Bourdieu’s framework o f  power analysis, Bigo (2000) develops an alternative 
approach to the securitisation perspective which explores more closely the power structures 
underlying the linguistic characteristics o f  the speech-act.
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only passive recipients of international norms but also respond to them in distinctive 
ways. In other words, in understanding norm diffusion in the inter-state system, they 
have demonstrated that the agency role of norm takers does matter a great deal 
International actors and norms meet at the state-level particular cultural, social and 
political contexts that do not necessarily go hand in hand with their prescribed 
guiding principles. As illustrated later, South Africa is an interesting case in this 
regard. Despite the objective threat posed by HIV/AIDS (the virus is spreading 
faster in South Africa than anywhere else in the world), the South African President, 
Thabo Mbeki, and his close advisers, including the Minister of Health, have 
constantly defied the mainstream international approaches to the epidemic. Mbeki 
links the epidemic's spread to poverty and the deep-rooted legacies of the Apartheid 
regime. Until recendy, he also claimed that HIV and AIDS are not related and that 
pharmaceutical companies, backed by powerful states, are exploiting (one could also 
say securitising) the epidemic exclusively to achieve financial gains.25
The South African government’s ideological resistance to HASN 
entrepreneurship in the country clearly illustrates how a cultural mismatch (Checkel, 1999) 
between external and internal understandings of the epidemic's impact can hamper 
the process o f successfully transmitting the H IV / A ID S securitisation norm from the 
international to the domestic. In South Africa, this conflictive encounter between 
international normative understandings (securitisation) and local belief systems and 
practices (de-securitisation) resulted in sustained domestic resistance to the 
internationally prescribed securitisation of the HIV/AIDS epidemic.26 The remainder
25 For more on this, see, for example, "Stop denying the killer bug", The Economist, 21 February 2002.
26 A comprehensive examination o f  the domestic incorporation o f  FIASN in South Africa is beyond 
the scope o f this chapter and is instead carried out in chapter 6 o f  this thesis.
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of this chapter seeks to find empirical support for the theoretical assumptions put 
forward here.
4. The Origins and Substance of the HIV/AIDS Securitisation Norm (HASN)
4.1. HIV/AIDS and Security: Setting the Debate
The following analysis focuses on the concept of security and the current 
understandings of its relationship with the HIV/AIDS epidemic. It describes the 
ideational changes in the definitions and referent objects of security since the early 
80s and how HIV/AIDS became part of this academic and policy debate.
The notion of security in international relations is a contentious one. It is 
muddled by a plethora of unresolved debates about its actual meaning. These debates 
can be divided into two main groups. The first is made of scholars who interpret 
security mosdy as national or state security, which basically means fear from military 
threats from states against other states. This school in security studies is deeply 
rooted in the realist tradition of international relations (e.g., Carr, 1939; Morgenthau, 
1948). The realist understanding of the national security problem is well exemplified by 
the widely acknowledged idea of the security dilemma (Herz, 1950). This is the notion 
that the security needs of one state will necessarily lead to the insecurity of other 
states as each interprets the behaviour of others as potentially dangerous (Buzan, 
1991:14). For realists, the international system is anarchic, signifying the lack of a 
central authority restraining state behaviour. In this rather unstable external 
environment, states will inevitably develop military capabilities to protect themselves.
This largely pessimistic view of security is shared by contemporary neo­
realist authors such as Kenneth Waltz (1979) and John Mearsheimer (1990), who
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envisage the balance of power politics as the permanent structural feature of the 
international system (Baylis, 2005:302).27 Kenneth Waltz, in particular, had a 
profound impact in the area of security studies. His neorealist theory argues that the 
structural characteristics of the international state system mould state behaviour. 
According to Waltz, states are the most important analytical units in international 
relations. For him, the utmost goal of states is self-preservation, “since no one can be 
relied on to do it for them” (Waltz, 1979:109). In this sense, he argues that “the units 
of an anarchic system are functionally undifferentiated. The units of such an order 
are then distinguished primarily by their greater or lesser capabilities for performing 
similar tasks” (Waltz, 1979:97). This means that the structure of a particular system is 
defined by the distribution of capabilities among like units rather than through 
differences in their character and functions (Waltz, 1979:98). In Waltz’s formulation, 
security can be only achieved through balancing the power capabilities of the most 
important units in the system.
Since the early 80s, however, the neorealist conceptualisation of inter-state 
security relations has been challenged by a growing number of writers who argued 
for an alternative understanding of security (Buzan, 1983/1991; Ullman, 1983; Jahn, 
Lemaitre, and Waever , 1987; Tickner, 1992; Buzan et al, 1998). This new research 
agenda included in the security analysis non-military threats as well as non-state 
actors. Richard Ullman (1983), for example, argued that national security can be 
undermined by events other than military conflict. He articulated an unconventional
27 Some neorealist authors are more optimistic about the prospects for cooperation among states. 
They reject the assumption that states find themselves in a condition o f  perennial conflict, arguing 
that there are certain situations in which states seek cooperation rather than competition. See, for 
example Glaser (1994/95). Authors linked with the neo-liberal school in international relations have 
also questioned some neorealist assumptions about international security. Contrary to the neo-realist 
view, these writers believe that international institutions can provide the regulatory means for 
improved security cooperation among states. For more on this literature, see Keohane and Nye 
(1977), Keohane (1984), Keohane and Martin (1995).
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definition of national security threat in terms of an action or series of events (such as 
internal rebellions, blockades and boycotts, decimating epidemics, catastrophic 
floods, etc.) that drastically threaten the quality life of the inhabitants of a state 
and/or narrows the policy options available to the government of a state or a 
nongovernmental entity (Ullman, 1983:133). Following the same trend, Barry Buzan 
(1983/1991) made analytically clear the distinction between economic, political, 
environmental, social and military security threats that could affect states and non­
state actors alike. He also delineated the security dynamics at three inter-related 
levels, the individual, the state and the system.28
The introduction of this new security agenda in academic works was 
accompanied by a strong tendency in the wake of the Cold War’s collapse to shift the 
referent object of security from states to individuals. The United Nations was at the 
forefront of these developments. In 1992, following the request of the Security 
Council, the UN Secretary General, Boutros Boutros-Ghali produced the first of a 
series of influential documents aiming to address the changing international security 
order. Boutros-Ghali’s A n  Agenda for Peace outlined the rationale and methods for 
moving away from the Cold War’s conceptualisation of state security towards a 
closer focus on the security of individuals. The subsequent emergence of the human 
security perspective is intrinsically linked with the principles and themes initially 
developed in A n Agenda for Peace. It focuses on a broad understanding of security that 
encompasses not only the security of states against external or internal armed threats, 
but also the security of people living within states against non-military threats, such 
as disease, environmental degradation, economic and social instability, etc. While
28 According to Buzan, however, international security studies should focus on the latter two levels 
because security means the protection o f  human collectivities rather than individual human beings 
(Buzan, 1983:50-51).
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breaking down state security into many subcategories, this perspective shifted the 
levels o f analysis from states and the inter-state system to societies and individuals 
within and across states.29
The United Nations Development Program (UNDP) was the first
%
organisation to officially champion the human security perspective. The UNDP 
launched the concept of human security in 1994 through its Human Development 
Report. It lists several categories in which human security can be at risk, such as food 
security, economic security, personal security, community security and political 
security. Subsequently, UNDP proposed a series of measures to institutionalise the 
concept, as, for example, the formulation of a world social charter, the creation of a 
global human security fund and the recommendation of global taxes for resource 
mobilisation and the establishment of an Economic Security Council (UNDP, 1994: 
24-25). Following the lead of UNDP, other international bodies such as the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank have adopted the concept 
of human security in their policy frameworks. In addition, a number of governments 
have also embraced the concept when defining their national security policies - 
Canada and Norway being pioneers in this regard.30
HIV/AIDS clearly falls into this latter categorisation of security, which led 
to the adoption of this broad perspective by a wide range of governments, 
multilateral agencies and academics. This group has raised questions concerning the
29 Theoretically, the human security approach is connected with the social constructivist literature in 
international relations. This school o f  thought posits that ideas rather than power shape the relations 
between states (Wendt, 1992). Social Constructivists, such as Alexander Wendt, for example, would 
focus their analyses on the ideational move away from traditional narrow understandings o f national 
security to a more comprehensive notion o f  human security. For them, this move illustrates the power 
o f  ideas in shaping international relations.
30 In 1999, a group o f  states with human security policies launched The Human Security Network. It 
is currently formed by Austria, Canada, Chile, Costa Rica, Greece, Ireland, Jordan, Mali, the 
Netherlands, Norway, Slovenia, Switzerland, Thailand and South Africa. For more on this, see 
http://www.humansecuritynetwork.org/.
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economic impact of the disease at the community and family levels, how the 
epidemic is engendering m illion s of orphans, whether it can become a threat to food 
security, how it contributes to crime and the implications of the epidemic to 
governance and economic development (Khstofferson, 2000; Elbe, 2001; Piot, 2001; 
Fourie and Schonteich, 2001; Chen, 2003; Leen, 2004). There have also been a 
number of academic studies and policy reports addressing the epidemic within the 
more traditional framework of security. Generally, this literature explores the indirect 
impact that HIV/AIDS could have on the territorial security and integrity of (mostly 
Western) states. The issues examined in this regard include, for example, whether 
high prevalence rates can constitute a threat to the national security of regimes 
friendly to the West, therefore requiring external intervention. They also assess 
whether economic and social burdens associated with HIV/AIDS could cause 
further domestic and regional instability in areas already characterised by entrenched 
conflict, and whether new strands of the HIV vims could penetrate Western societies 
(Heinecken, 2000, 2001a, 2001b; National Intelligence Council (NIC), 2000; Price- 
Smith, 2001, 2002; Singer, 2002; Elbe, 2003; Fidler, 2003a, 2003b; De Waal 2003, 
2004; Prins, 2004; Garrett, 2005a, 2005b, Ostergard, 2002, 2005).31 Some of these 
scholarly studies and policy reports explore the implications of HIV/AIDS on the 
readiness of national armed forces with high HIV prevalence rates (Mills, 2000; 
Heinecken, 2001b; Elbe, 2002)32, and how international peacekeeping operations can 
serve as an important vector for further spreading HIV in the emergency areas where
31 Writers from a plethora o f disciplines, such as economics, social policy, anthropology and 
development studies, have also addressed the special and multifaceted impact o f  the H IV/AIDS  
epidemic on the social, political, economic and cultural structures o f  societies, states and regions. See, 
for example, Bloom and Godwin (1997); Barnett and Whiteside (2002); Campbell (2003); Hunter 
(2003); Holden (2003); Kauffman and Lindauer (2004).
32 In some African countries the HTV prevalence among armed personnel is estimated to be as high as 
40% to 60% (Elbe, 2002, 2006).
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these forces are deployed (Tnpodi and Patel, 2002; Bratt, 2002; Elbe, 2003, IASC, 
2003).
What this amounts to is a two-tier perception of the security implications of 
the epidemic. At one level the referent objects are individuals and societies, whereas 
in the other states and the international system are seen as the main analytical focus. 
The human security approach in general accuses the traditional perspective of 
focusing exclusively on a narrow state-centric understanding of the security 
implications of HIV/AIDS that frequently ignores the well-being of people both 
affected and infected by the epidemic. In turn, traditionalist security theorists charge 
the human security approach of losing focus and expanding the concept too widely, 
thus neglecting veiy important questions about the impact of the epidemic on state 
institutions and governance (Ostergard, 2002; Elbe, 2001).33
This chapter claims that these two tiers are not divorced from each other. It 
argues that the variations in meaning between human and national security 
approaches to HIV/AIDS indicate the presence of different mental models or road maps 
(Goldstein and Keohane, 1993:13) within a common worldview about the existential 
threat posed by the epidemic. This shared broad notion about the security threat 
posed by HIV/AIDS is what defines this group as a particular epistemic community 
(Haas, 1992). According to Haas, epistemic communities provide crucial information 
to policy makers by interpreting problems and offering solutions to those problems 
(Haas, 1992:4). However, they are not a monolithic bloc in which all members agree 
with one another. Participants of an epistemic community do squabble over issues. 
What is important for an epistemic community is that members share a general 
worldview of a problem. With regard to this thesis’ case, their shared belief that
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HIV/AIDS is an emergencial threat does not necessarily translate into identical 
interpretations about how to deal with it and who is targeted by the threat (either 
states or human beings).
Moreover, this broader worldview is often based on feeble empirical 
evidence. Barnett and Prins (2006), for example, have raised interesting questions 
about the reliability of the evidence presented in some of the studies about 
HIV/AIDS and security. They point to serious problems in terms of poor data 
collection and the pervasiveness in some analysis of “factoids”, meaning “soft 
opinions that have hardened into fact” (Barnett and Prins, 2006:18). These authors’ 
analysis shed some light on the social construction of reality concerning the links between 
HIV/AIDS and security. This means that in the case of HIV/AIDS, the interaction 
between the various discursive articulations (or speech-acts) about the security 
impact of the epidemic is what really makes HIV/AIDS a security issue rather than 
any identifiable objective fact.
In light of the above, it is argued here that the human and national security 
perspectives on HIV/AIDS represent two general tendencies that the present study 
attempts to convey in a single analytical concept, HASN. As shown later, this is done 
by way of examining how these intellectual developments around the ideas of 
national and human security are translated in terms of international norms and 
practices through the work of states, transnational networks, and IOs, notably the 
US and UNAIDS. The epistemic community of scholars with an interest in the 
security aspects of HIV/AIDS is just one of the many providers and carriers of 
knowledge about the epidemic’s security impact. In this respect, the creation of a
33 Stefan Elbe (2001) has first acknowledged this division on the security interpretations o f  
HIV/AIDS.
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strong discourse claiming for the global securitisation of HIV/AIDS is the result of 
the interaction among powerful players involved in the epidemic’s policy arena. The 
question of who they are and how they are connected to each other as well as with 
their respective audiences plays a fundamental role in understanding the 
securitisation of the epidemic. It is important therefore to understand the ideational 
and political process by which those actors have successfully reconceptualised 
HIV/AIDS to signify security.
The following chapter demonstrates how those securitising actors I  norm leaders 
used both national and human security arguments to spread the idea that, because 
HIV/AIDS threatens the security/survival of a referent object (either states or 
human beings), the epidemic should be treated as a special kind of emergency. As 
shown next, the new theorising about the security impact of the global HIV/AIDS 
epidemic coupled with the growing acknowledgment of its multidimensional and 
destructive impact promoted a turn in the way the epidemic would be responded to. 
At this stage, the aforementioned pendulum started to swing steadily towards the 
securitisation pole.
4.2. Translating theory into practice: from a Biomedical Approach to the 
Institutionalisation of HIV/AIDS as a Security Issue
This section discerns how the above conceptualisation of the links between 
HIV/AIDS and security translated into actual political moves to securitise the 
epidemic. It unfolds the historical process whereby HASN emerged and, after reaching 
a “tipping point” (Finnemore and Sikkink, 1998), cascaded throughout the 
international system. The (un)successful internalisation of this international norm by 
states critically affected by the epidemic is assessed later through the analysis of its
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incorporation in the domestic structures of Botswana, Mozambique and South 
Africa.
The first notified cases of AIDS in the world occurred in 1981 among 
young gay men in New York (Hymes, Greene, and Marcus, 1981). In the early 80s in 
the US, the HIV virus became primarily associated with homosexuals. The early 
association of the virus with this politically unpopular group caused indifference 
towards social movements demanding a more assertive policy action from the US 
government.34 This lack of urgency in dealing with the problem was reproduced 
internationally.
During the 80s and early 90s, the responses from multilateral agencies were 
directed exclusively to the biomedical aspects of the epidemic. These early efforts 
were fragmented and under-resourced. Nobody identified the new disease as a 
mounting global threat. The World Health Organization (WHO) was very slow in 
responding to HIV/AIDS. This was mostly due to the perception among WHO’s 
officials that AIDS was a disease of well-off minorities in the richest states in the 
world. By contrast, WHO had been created to concentrate its resources on the 
provision of healthcare to poor populations in Third World countries (Iliffe, 
2006:68). In 1986, however, following the publication of alarming reports about 
growing HIV prevalence in several parts of Africa, WHO began to address 
HIV/AIDS as a serious public health problem on a. global scale. By this time, WHO 
had established its Global Programme on AIDS (GAP) and advised governments to 
create surveillance systems and HIV/AIDS committees within their Ministries of 
Health. It also set up a department of HIV/AIDS whose primary goal was to assist
34 The political climate in the US during the 80s took a conservative turn with the election o f  Ronald 
Reagan. Family and religious values were strongly emphasised as indispensable components o f  
society’s cohesion (Ostergard, 2002: 338).
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health ministries and governments to put in place national plans, through the 
provision of technical expertise, financial support and the centralisation of all the 
information about HIV/AIDS.
W HO’s Global Programme on HIV/AIDS was the first multilateral 
initiative that was aimed at raising the profile of the epidemic as a public health issue 
of global importance. It promoted a worldwide mobilisation of institutional and 
financial resources to deal with the epidemic. In its initial stages, GAP’s policy 
initiatives concentrated mainly on the promotion of public awareness, blood 
screening, condom distribution and prevention efforts. From 1986 to 1990, under 
the active leadership of the first head of GAP, Jonathan Mann, WHO helped to 
devise short and medium term plans for more than 150 countries (Ulife, 2006:70). 
However, despite the rising global mobilisation against HIV/AIDS led by 
W HO/GPA, the rapid growth of the global epidemic was not yet seen as an 
emerging security threat. By then, Mann, the most important figure in the WHO’s 
Global Programme, propounded a human rights approach to the epidemic based on 
the American gay activism of the early 80s. His strategy of preventing discrimination 
against people infected by HIV served the interests of gay minorities in Western 
states well and somehow reduced the stigma surrounding them. Nevertheless, it was 
not clear whether Mann’s logic would be applicable to a mass heterosexual epidemic 
such as that in Africa (Illife, 2006:69).
In the early 90s, the proportion of people affected by HIV/AIDS in 
Western Europe and the US was still relatively low. In Africa, on the other hand, the 
prevalence rates were notably higher and growing rapidly. In spite of the already 
alarming HIV/AIDS situation on the African continent during this period, the US 
administration of George Bush Senior seemed unaware of the looming crisis. The 
shift in the US foreign policy as a result of the collapse of the Cold War system was
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not helpful to the cause of HIV/AIDS in Africa (Ostergard, 2002:339). With the end 
of the bipolar conflict and the disappearance of the Communist threat, the US began 
to reduce their diplomatic presence in Africa. Social programmes were discontinued 
or significantly reduced and diplomatic representations closed (The New York Times 
07.05.2000).35
The epidemic’s initial securitising move came in the mid 90s. As the virus 
spread at an accelerated pace in Africa, showing the ineffectiveness of the global 
response, W HO/GPA’s leadership began to fade. By this time, the international 
community had begun to realise that HIV/AIDS was not only a medical condition 
and that all branches of government and more international actors should mobilise 
against the impact of the epidemic. During this stage of the global epidemic, it 
became clear that no single United Nations organisation or state could provide the 
coordinated level of assistance needed to address the many factors driving the spread 
of HIV/AIDS, or help countries deal with its impact. A growing sense of urgency 
prompted the creation of special multilateral and national bureaucracies and more 
comprehensive policies to deal with the impact of the epidemic. Moreover, as a 
consequence of the end of the Cold War, the very meaning of security had been 
transformed. As already noted, normative reformulations of the concept of security 
prompted policy-makers and academics to rethink what the HIV/AIDS epidemic 
really meant in terms of a reformed security framework. According to the human 
security approach of the UNDP, for example, the protection of people against a wide
35 In the years after the fall o f  the Berlin Wall, the State Department’s Bureau o f  African Affairs laid 
off staff in 70 positions. Consulates in important African states were closed, as in the case o f  Kenya, 
Cameroon and Nigeria. The US Agency for International Development (USAID) reduced the staff in 
its African wing by 30% (Michaels, 1992).
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range of new threats, including epidemic diseases, should be a primary concern of 
national governments and multilateral organisations (Axworthy, 2001:19).
As a result of these normative and policy changes, in 1996 the United 
Nations took an innovative approach by drawing six organisations together in a joint 
and cosponsored programme, the Joint United Nations Program on HIV/AIDS 
(UNAIDS). The creation of a separate multilateral HIV/AIDS agency was an 
unusual development in the history of the UN. In fact, it was the first time that the 
world organisation had taken this kind of approach to deal with a single disease. 
UNAIDS is in charge of promoting a particular understanding of what HIV/AIDS is 
and how it should be dealt with by states and non-state actors alike. UNAIDS 
embodies a variety of actors and has the institutional capacity to build up wide 
consensus towards HIV/AIDS policies and practices. The goal of UNAIDS is to 
catalyse, strengthen and orchestrate the unique expertise, resources, and networks of 
influence that each of these organisations offers. Working together through 
UNAIDS, the so-called cosponsors expand their outreach through strategic alliances 
with other United Nations agencies, national governments, corporations, media, 
religious organisations, community-based groups, regional and country networks of 
people living with HIV/AIDS, and other nongovernmental organisations (UNAIDS, 
2001). The creation of an organisation such as this was a visible change of direction 
concerning the multilateral response to the epidemic.
It should be stressed nonetheless that the knowledge about the full-scope 
impact of HIV/AIDS, together with its necessary corollaries, policy and strategy, 
evolved gradually over time. In the beginning, the UNAIDS did not articulate a 
unified message concerning the security threat posed by the global epidemic. At this 
early stage, both researchers and high political authorities had not yet fully 
recognised, either through systematic scientific work or international policy debate,
the potential impact that the epidemic could have on global security.36 As noted 
before, the UN system at the beginning of the 90s was going through a process of 
normative adaptation to the new post-Cold War international order. The 
transformation in the meaning of security was an integrative part of these changes. 
The UNDP, not accidentally one of the UNAIDS cosponsors, took the lead in 1994 
by formulating and adopting the idea of human security as a core principle in 
promoting peace and development after the end of bipolarity. The expanding 
international acceptance of the concept of human security as a viable alternative to 
the national security logic of the Cold War resonated with pre-existing interpretations 
of HIV/AIDS. The human security perspective attracts attention to issues direcdy 
related to the impact of the epidemic, such as poverty, famine, social instability, etc. 
The renaming (or reframing) of HIV/AIDS in terms of human security can be 
partially seen as the result of these broader normative changes in the understandings 
about security.
The definitive turn in the language used to name, interpret and dramatise 
HIV/AIDS took place only in the late 90s. During this period, a growing circle of 
high profile politicians, transnational activists, and academics began consistendy to 
make it clear that, indeed, the global HIV/AIDS epidemic was a serious threat to 
security (Prins, 2004). From that point onwards, the UNAIDS embedded this view 
and started to take the securitisation of HIV/AIDS as a teaching mission, whereby this 
organisation would work to supply states and other HIV/AIDS actors with 
information about the best HIV/AIDS policies and organisational practices at the 
state level (Finnemore, 1993).
36 These questions started to be asked systematically in the academic literature as well as in the 
political circles only about 6 to 7 years ago.
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Another important step towards the securitisation of HIV/AIDS came in 
1999, when the Bill Clinton administration designated the global HIV/AIDS 
epidemic a threat to the security of the United States. It was the first time that a US 
President had provided such a designation to a disease. Clinton’s decision followed 
the release of an influential report produced by the US government’s National 
Intelligence Council (NIC) on “The Global Infectious Disease Threat and Its 
Implications for the United States”. This document described in detail the direct and 
indirect impact that the HIV/AIDS epidemic could have in the US and global 
security in the next 20 years. Moving in the same direction, on 10 January 2000, this 
unconventional thinking on security issues was captured at the UN Security Council 
(UNSC) when the US Vice-President A1 Gore presided a historical meeting devoted 
to the impact of HIV/AIDS on peace and security in Africa (UNSC, 2000a). On that 
occasion, for the first time in the history of this institution, an issue, other than 
military, was granted the relevance of an international security threat. The UNSC 
resolution 1308 that followed fully recognised the potential threat posed by 
HIV/AIDS to stability and security and represented an important step towards 
achieving broad international conformance with HASN (UNSC, 2000b).
In April 2001, African states met in Nigeria to discuss the special 
challenges posed by HIV/AIDS. The resulting Abuja Declaration of 27 April 2001 
was endorsed by all fifty three members of the Organisation of African Unity 
(OAU). They joindy declared that HIV/AIDS “[...] is not only a major health crisis 
but an exceptional threat to Africa’s development, social cohesion, [...] as well as the 
greatest global threat to the survival and life expectancy of African peoples [.,.] [my emphasis]” 
(OAU, 2001). Two months later, in 27 June 2001, the Heads of State and 
representatives of government adopted, at the 26th Special Session of the UN 
General Assembly (UNGASS) dedicated to HIV/AIDS, the Declaration of
59
Commitment on HIV/AIDS. This document was a landmark in the history of the 
epidemic. It represented an official recognition by all the UN member states that the 
epidemic was a "global emergency" and "one of the most formidable challenges to 
human life and dignity", therefore demanding global action and unrestricted 
commitment by member states. It also recommended that the multilateral response 
should be coordinated under the leadership of the UNAIDS, "[...] which could 
assist, as appropriate, member states and relevant civil society actors in the 
development of HIV/AIDS strategies [...]" (UNGASS, 2001).
Also part of the agreements set up at the UNGASS, the establishment of 
the Global Fund to fight HIV/AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria, represented a 
substantial step towards the actual implementation of HASN.37 The fund was 
formally established in 2001 by the UN and the G8 group of industrialised nations as 
the global war cashbox against the three most serious epidemic diseases in the world, 
namely tuberculosis, malaria and HIVAIDS. Most developed and some middle- 
income states have established bilateral assistance mechanisms for assisting national 
HIV/AIDS plans in poor countries. Initially, these initiatives were located in classic 
foreign aid agencies, such as Britain’s Department for International Development 
(DFID) and the United States Agency for International Development (USAID). 
With the introduction of the Global Fund, some of these states have now shifted a 
large share of (in some cases most of) their financial assistance to the Fund (Garrett, 
2005:12). The Global Fund is an unprecedented case of comprehensive multilateral
37 In 26 April 2001, at the African Summit on HTV/AIDS, Secretary-General Kofi Annan called for 
the creation o f  a Fund to channel money to affected countries. Two months later, at the UNGASS, 
the representatives o f  states committed themselves to the creation o f  such a fund. The Fund’s 
Secretariat was established in Geneva in January 2002 and the first money allocations were approved 
to 36 countries three months later.
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action to finance the global fight against the three main global killers, namely malaria, 
tuberculosis and HIV/AIDS.
The Fund is an innovative wide-reaching mechanism of health financing. It 
is formed by a board of international partners (donor and recipient states, multilateral 
agencies, as the UNAIDS and the World Bank, NGOs and representatives from the 
private sector). The Fund's secretariat is based in Geneva and deals with the routine 
activities of the organisation. It links the disbursement of HIV/AIDS grants to the 
creation of country coordinating mechanisms (CCMs). These country-based 
committees include not only members of the recipient government but also 
representatives of NGOs and the international community of multilateral and 
bilateral donors (Global Fund, 2005a). Under the “technical assistance” of the 
international partners, the CCM is responsible for preparing the proposals for the 
Global Fund. In fact, to be approved, the proposals should embody the principles 
and guidelines taugjit to states by the international actors involved with the promotion 
of HASN. After grant approval, the CCM is also in charge of overseeing the 
implementation of the projects. In recipient states, pre-existing institutional 
structures have to adjust to manage the Global Fund’s money. In general, the CCM 
nominates a few public or private agencies (in general either the National AIDS 
Council or the Ministry of Health) that will control the management of the funds 
(Global Fund, 2005a).
From 2001 onwards, the securitisation of HIV/AIDS became permanently 
infused into the international normative understandings of the epidemic. With the 
signature of the UNGASS Declaration of Commitment “a critical mass of states” 
(Finnemore and Sikkink, 1998:895) embraced the new norm proclaiming the 
securitisation of HIV/AIDS. In May/June 2006, Heads of State and Government 
gathered in New York to renew the strong commitments they made back in 2001
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and to review progress in implementing the UNGASS Declaration. Despite the 
political manoeuvring of a few dissident states, this high level UN meeting was 
concluded with the adoption of a comprehensive political declaration that reaffirmed 
the national government’s engagement in the implementation of the policies and 
principles stated in the first UNGASS (UN General Assembly, 2006).38
Yet, in several important respects, the understanding of HASN as a single 
and coherent normative framework should be contextualised within broader North- 
South ideological and political cleavages. The case of the political disputes over 
treatment with generic antiretroviral drugs (ARVs) is significant in this regard. The 
hope that ARVs brought to millions of people suffering from AIDS in poor 
countries encouraged some states in the South such as Brazil and India to produce 
and deliver generic ARVs to their populations.39 The quarrel that followed with 
pharmaceutical companies over the issue of patent rights was eventually decided in 
favour of those developing countries’ claims. In November 2001, in the Doha round 
of trade talks, the World Trade Organisation (WTO) agreed that TRIPS40 should not 
prevent states from taking measures to protect their societies against epidemic 
diseases such as HIV/AIDS.
This meant that, in a situation of threat to public health, governments could 
manufacture, buy and import generic copies of patented medicines. The Doha 
agreement of 2001 was an unprecedented move towards the securitisation of severe
38 For more on this, see “Final Declaration o f  Commitment on H IV /A ID S Adopted — Disagreement 
over Strengths and Weaknesses Persist”, Aidsmap, 05 June 2006. Available at 
http://www.aidsmap.com/en/news/23430F64-73AC-4AF1-9D13-C3EDC8A72251 .asp (accessed on 
01.08.2006).
39 Brazil, for example, was the first state in the world to provide through its public health system the 
cocktail o f  Aids drugs to all the patients in need o f  them (Brazilian Ministry o f  Health, 2000).
40 TRIPS stands for Trade-Related Aspects o f  Intellectual Property Rights. It is an agreement drawn 
up by the World Trade Organisation (WTO) between 1986 and 1994 to ensure intellectual property 
rights are respected within international trade. It came into force on 1st January 1995, although 
implementation dates vary from country to country.
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epidemic diseases. It was also perceived as a significant victory of (relatively) small 
states against the powerful economic interests of the North. For the first time in the 
history of trade negotiations, states were legally entided to issue compulsory licences 
to copy patented drugs in case of health emergencies. These developments had a 
kind of emulative or cascading impact in the rest of the developing world (Finnemore 
and Sikkink, 1998). Transnational advocacy networks began pressuring donor 
governments and multilateral agencies to give a renewed relevance to the provision 
of generic HIV/AIDS drugs as a core priority in the domestic national plans to 
combat the epidemic.41
The introduction of generic versions of branded AIDS drugs promoted a 
radical change in the manner global HASN leaders would relate to each other and 
with their securitising audiences. While the US government strongly backed the 
patent protection claims of pharmaceutical corporations, the UNAIDS/WHO 
launched in 2003 an ambitious global initiative for treating 3 million people by 2005, 
using both generic and branded AIDS medicines.42 It was only in 2005 that Bush’s 
Global Initiative on HIV/AIDS included a few genetic medicines as part of its 
financial aid for treatment in developing countries. Those global divisions among 
HASN leaders reflected upon treatment policies at the national level of decision­
making. As will be further shown below, South Africa and Mo2 ambique adopted 
treatment plans based completely on generic drugs. The South African government 
took a more radical stance, while openly accusing the US-backed pharmaceutical 
companies of exploiting the suffering of impoverished Africans. Conversely, the
41 In this respect, chapter 6 explores the important role played by the H IV/AIDS advocacy N G O , 
Treatment Action Campaign (TAC) in South Africa.
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Botswana government brokered a deal with the US pharmaceutical giant Merck and 
the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation by which they would provide branded AIDS 
drugs in the public health system. This is an issue to be further explored later on in 
this thesis.
4.3. The Tri-Dimensional Character of HASN
In order to enhance clarity, it is worthwhile at this point to be more 
specific about the content of the so-called HIV/ AIDS securitisation norm. Basically, 
it has three interconnected dimensions. The first dimension is more subde than the 
others and empirical detection is therefore more difficult. It concerns a broad 
subjective tendency in the international community to gradually move HIV/AIDS 
away from the area of “business as usual” while dealing with public health issues. 
This is part of a progressive historical transition that started years before the first 
actual utterance of HIV/AIDS to mean security in the mid 90s. This historical move 
towards the securitisation of HIV/AIDS can be generally identified by some 
watershed events in the history of the global response. These were, for example, the 
creation of the W HO’s Global Programme on HIV/AIDS in the mid 80s, when 
HIV/AIDS began to be seen as a very serious issue in some African countries. It was 
followed by the establishment of the UNAIDS ten years later, given the partial 
failure of W HO’s biomedical approach to the epidemic, and finally by the 
formalisation of the links between HIV/AIDS and security with the Security Council 
meeting of 2000 and the UNGASS Declaration of Commitment one year later.
42 W HO has its own qualifying system for AIDS drugs which has, as far as December 2005, approved 
70 ARVs, being 36 from generic companies and 34 from branded manufacturers (WHO, 2005: 
internet source).
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It is beyond the scope of this thesis to engage in a comprehensive historical 
sociology of HASN. However, the argument here is that the social construction of 
the H IV  I  A ID S Securitisation Norm would not be comprehensible without the 
previous acknowledgment of the historical (social, material and interest-based) 
conditions that led to its creation. At the ontological level, this means that the 
HIV/AIDS actors constituted their social world in the same way that the social 
world they created defined the possibilities of their future interaction (Wendt, 1987). 
This dimension also corresponds to an externalist (Stritzel, 2005) understanding of 
securitisation that is generally neglected by the Copenhagen School. Contrary to its 
view of the securitisation process, the argument put forward here claims that the 
semantic articulation of security should be analytically integrated with the larger 
process of securitisation that involves social/political phenomena other than solely the 
speech-act. Stephan Elbe’s (2005) exploration of the biopolitical dimension of the 
securitisation of HIV/AIDS sheds some light on the contextuality problem in the 
majority of the securitisation literature. Foucault designates biopower as the power that 
“brought life and its mechanism into the realm of explicit calculations and made 
knowledge-power an agent for the transformation of human life” (Foucault quoted 
in Elbe, 2005:405). In demonstrating the biopolitical dimension of HIV/AIDS, Elbe 
uses the example of UNAIDS, “as an institutional apparatus for the detailed 
statistical, monitoring and surveillance of world population in relation to 
HIV/AIDS” (Elbe, 2005:405). Borrowing from Foucault’s reflections on the 
concept, he further argues that,
The unfolding of the securitization of AIDS follows a net-like deployment of 
biopower, as it is being simultaneously driven by a plethora of actors [...] The net of 
the securitization of AIDS has been widely cast, corroborating Foucault’s view that 
biopower is never solely the property of one agent; it is always plural, decentralized 
and capillary in nature. “Power”, he reminded his readers, “is everywhere; not
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because it embraces everything, but because it comes from everywhere” (Elbe, 2005: 
407/408).
What is interesting in Elbe’s transposition of biopower to illuminate the 
securitisation of HIV/AIDS is that it allows for a holistic understanding of the 
securitisation process. Rather than being solely the activity of isolated securitising 
actors performing speech-acts, the securitisation process is seen through these lenses 
in the form of a chain of events and actors, or something that historically mutates 
and evolves into something else. In line with Elbe’s biopolitical stance on the 
securitisation of HIV/AIDS, I argue that the historical and social construction of the 
disease eventually led to the creation of a hegemonic grammar that portrays the epidemic 
in terms of a special type of problem, which demands special institutions and 
policies.
In this sense, the securitisation of HIV/AIDS can be understood as a 
constitutive element of a larger hegemonic world order that encompasses long-term 
political, ethical, economic and ideological spheres of activity on a global scale. This 
is what Gramsci called a historic bloc (Gramsci, 1971). According to Robert W. Cox, in 
the historic bloc “there is an informal structure of influence reflecting the different 
levels of real political and economic power which underlies the formal procedures 
for decisions” (Cox, 1993:63). For him, “international institutions perform an 
ideological role. They help define policy guidelines for states and to legitimate certain 
institutions and practices at the national level. They reflect orientations favourable to 
the dominant social and economic forces” (Cox, 1993:63). I do not use here the 
concept of historic bloc in precisely the same sense Gramsci (and also Cox, concerning 
international relations) gave to i t  International relations are more diffused and 
complicated than the big power-centred concept of world order those authors 
conceived. However, Gramsci’s interpretation of history as a successive movement
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of powerful hegemonic forms of collective subjectivity is fully applicable to what was 
called here the first dimension of HASN. This means that the proposed 
securitisation of the epidemic is the result of social and political processes that are 
organically integrated into the current dominant historic bloc.
After the successful institutionalisation of the hegemonic grammar of 
HIV/AIDS, as seen, for example, by the creation of UNAIDS and later by the 
adoption of the UNGASS Declaration, the utterance of security becomes less 
important, or simply epiphenomenal. The next step is the actual application of the 
securitisation principles and policies. This relates to the second and third dimensions 
of HASN. The second dimension is narrower than the first in the sense that it 
provides the actual conceptual framework which defines/frames HIV/AIDS as a 
special kind of global emergency. It may also be defined in terms of principled beliefs 
“that mediate between world views and particular policy conclusions” (Goldstein and 
Keohane, 1993:9). This was demonstrated earlier in this chapter through the shift of 
arguments about the ways in which the epidemic threatens security. The 
formalisation of these principled beliefs about the securitisation of HIV/AIDS appears, 
for example, in the Security Council Resolution 1308/2000. As already noted, this 
document recognised HIV/AIDS as a threat to all levels of security (human, national 
and international).
The third and final dimension is more prescriptive!practical than the others 
and draws from the abovementioned principled beliefs. It sets up the policies, best 
practices and bureaucratic mechanisms that state and non-state actors should put in 
place to fight the HIV/AIDS threat. The list of recommendations is extensive, so the 
following concentrates on two key frameworks elaborated by UNAIDS and the US 
respectively in collaboration with other HIV/AIDS actors. These are UNAIDS’ 
“The Three Ones Framework” and the principles underlying President Bush’s
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Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief (PEPFAR). The UNGASS Declaration of 
commitment also appears in this dimension since it provides a very clear policy base 
for HIV/AIDS action.
In April 2004, UNAIDS sponsored discussions in Washington among 
governments of affected countries, key donor states and multilateral organisations, 
aiming to achieve further international harmonisation of the HIV/AIDS global 
response. As a result of those talks, the participants agreed upon a set of guiding 
principles that became known as “The Three Ones”. Basically, “The Three Ones” is 
a blueprint of general policies to be implemented by all governments affected by the 
HIV/AIDS epidemic. Its strategic message is for donor states, multilateral agencies 
and governments affected by HIV/AIDS to coordinate their response to the 
epidemic within a single normative and institutional framework. The policies are:
1. One agreed HIV/AIDS action framework that provides the basis for 
coordinating the work of all partners;
2. One national AIDS coordinating authority with a broad based multi-sectoral 
mandate;
3. One agreed country-level monitoring and evaluation system (UNAIDS, 2004b).
Each of the three basic pillars of the “The Three Ones” is constituted by 
other principles for national authorities and their partners to follow. These principles 
are offered to states as a basis for optimising their national responses and improving 
coordination among all the actors involved (UNAIDS, 2004c). Shortly after the 
2004 meeting, UNAIDS started to engage with other leading states in building 
commitment towards the fulfilment and wide adherence to these improved standards 
for state behaviour. Within the agreement that led to the adoption of “The Three
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Ones”, UNAIDS was recognised as the main facilitator between stakeholders as well 
as the institution with the responsibility of monitoring its implementation by national 
governments.
The UNGASS Declaration of Commitment of June 2001 is also an 
important guideline for action for both state and non-state actors. It describes the 
extent of the epidemic, the effects it has had, and the ways to combat it (UNGASS, 
2001). It may also be considered part of the second dimension of HASN since it 
establishes the main normative ideas that justify state action. Although the UNGASS 
Declaration is not a legally binding document, it is a clear statement by governments 
about what HIV/AIDS represents and what they should do to reverse its impact. 
The Declaration provides the policy priorities agreed among states. These policies are 
a basic element for improving coordination across partners and funding mechanisms 
at the state level. The main tenants of the response, as established in the UNGASS 
Declaration are:43
• Leadership: “strong leadership at all levels of society is essential for an 
effective response to the epidemic”.
• Prevention'. “Prevention must be the mainstay of our response”.
• Care, support and treatment “Care, support and treatment are fundamental 
elements of an effective response”.
• H IV / A ID S and human rights'. “Realization of human rights and fundamental 
freedoms for all is essential to reduce vulnerability to HIV/AIDS”
• Reducing vulnerability, “the vulnerable must be given priority in the response”
43 All the quotations were taken from the original UNGASS Declaration o f  Commitment on 
H IV/AIDS (UNGASS, 2001).
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• Children orphaned and made vulnerable by H IV / AIDS: “children orphaned and 
affected by HIV/AIDS need special assistance”
• Alleviating social and economic impact, “to address HIV/AIDS is to invest in 
sustainable development”
• Research and development, “with no cure for HIV/AIDS yet found, further 
research and development is crucial”
• H IV  I  A ID S in conflict and disaster-affected regions: “conflicts and disasters 
contribute to the spread of HIV/AIDS”
• Resources: “The HIV/AIDS challenge cannot be met without new, additional 
and sustained resources”
The President’s Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief (PEPFAR) was launched 
in January 2003 by the US President, George W. Bush.44 It is an unilateral initiative 
by the US government which had a great impact in the global response to 
HIV/AIDS. The Plan is the largest global intervention of a single state to fight 
HIV/AIDS. Its contours were established by the United States Leadership against 
AID S, Tuberculosis and Malaria A ct of 2003. Among other things, the Plan involves 
large-scale HIV preventive efforts based on behaviour change that follows the 
“ABC” model (Abstinence, Be faithful and Condoms, in that order of priority). 
Although it was not the main focus of the plan, treatment with ARVs was also 
included as a supplementary way to enhance prevention efforts by motivating 
patients to be tested (US Department of State, 2003). In fact, abstinence-until- 
marriage programmes are the cornerstone of the Plan, receiving a substantial share
44 PEPFAR is further analysed in the next chapter.
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(33%) of the HIV prevention funds.45 Despite active US investment in the 
formulation and adoption of multilateral arrangements, such as “The Three Ones”, 
the UNGASS, and the Global Fund, PEPFAR works mainly through bilateral aid 
programmes with target states.
It is important to note that the above recommendations and coordinating 
structures do not form a harmonious and coherent set of policies. As elaborated 
later, these policies are on many occasions competing, contradictory or overlapping. 
PEPFAR’s moral logic and the parallel (normative and bureaucratic) structure it put in 
place are the main sources of conflict. The myriad of transnational HIV/AIDS 
actors with their sometimes chameleonic identities and alliances also add complexity 
to the understanding of HASN. At the domestic level, these transnational grievances 
unfold in distinct manners while interacting with local actors and their pre-existing 
belief systems and political cultures. The remainder of this thesis aims to dissect and 
analyse some of these complex processes.
5. Conclusions
This chapter has proposed a new conceptual framework to help in 
understanding international responses to the HIV/AIDS global epidemic. By 
combining insights from scholarship on international norms and the securitisation 
debate, this framework defined a single concept, namely the HIV/AIDS 
Securitisation Norm (HASN). It is aimed to analytically embrace the myriad of
45 In 2004, programmes that focused on sexual abstinence received US$ 50,545,000 o f the US$ 
91,630,000 overall from PEPFAR’s prevention budget (US Department o f  State, 2004b).
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implicit and explicit principles, rules, and ideas underlying international action 
towards HIV/ AIDS.
Regarding the historical constitution of HASN, the analysis has claimed 
that the securitisation of the HIV/AIDS global epidemic in the late 90s followed the 
steps described before from politicisation, in the early stages of the epidemic, to a 
securitising move through the emergence of a security discourse, in the early 90s, and 
finally to the institutionalisation of the securitisation process towards the end of the 
decade. This later period was marked by the creation of a specialised multilateral 
bureaucracy, namely the Joint United Nations Program on HIV/AIDS (UNAIDS), 
designed to respond to the global threat posed by the epidemic. Subsequently, as a 
result of the United Nations General Assembly Special Meeting on HIV/AIDS 
(UNGASS), the UN member states unanimously adopted the Declaration of 
Commitment on HIV/AIDS. By this time, the securitisation of the epidemic became 
a recognised international norm. This norm held a series of understandings, policy 
prescriptions and recommendations about the epidemic, which were internationally 
promoted as the panacea for efficient HIV/AIDS interventions.
The next chapter explores the role played by UNAIDS, the US and the 
HIV/AIDS transnational NGOs as norm leaders. UNAIDS maintains a global 
bureaucracy and is widely supported by the international community due to its 
knowledge claims about HIV/AIDS. The US is a superpower, controlling massive 
material and political resources, which allows it to globally promote their particular 
views on the epidemic. As intermediate institutions, transnational non-governmental 
actors transit between the two, bridging gaps and building winning coalitions at the 
system, regional and local levels.
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Chapter 3
The “Norm Leaders”: Cognitive frames, Institutional apparatus and Norm 
Diffusion
1. Introduction
This chapter is devoted to the actors who developed the main strategic 
prescriptions of HASN and the transnational mechanisms that promoted the 
diffusion of its concepts throughout the state system. It focuses on the three main 
securitising actors (or norm leaders) involved in the promotion of HASN, namely the 
Joint United Nations Programme on HIV/AIDS (UNAIDS), the US Government 
(notably under George W. Bush’s administration) and transnational networks of 
NGOs working with HIV/AIDS. These agents have strong and quite frequently 
contested views on appropriate behaviour in responding to the epidemic. As shown 
next, these normative contestations are very important elements in understanding the 
social and political makeup of the H IV  IA ID S Securitisation Norm.
The following three sections provide an analysis of these three actors’ 
strategies and motivations in promoting HASN. They explore the different manners 
in which UNAIDS, the US, and transnational NGOs influence other states and non­
state actors to comply with the norm. The study also unveils the particular social 
mechanisms by which they build their cognitive frames concerning the epidemic, the 
sources of their symbolic/actual power and how they affect the 
securitisation/diffusion of HASN. The conclusive section briefly introduces the 
upcoming analysis of the incorporation of HASN in Botswana, Mozambique and 
South Africa.
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2. UNAIDS
In the foreword of UNAIDS' 2004 Report on the Global AIDS Epidemic, 
Peter Piot assertively affirmed that "as our report indicates, we know what works".46 
Piot's confidence on the guiding role played by UNAIDS is based on this 
organisation's unmatched capacity to acquire comprehensive global information and 
technical expertise on the evolution of the HIV/AIDS epidemic. This factor alone 
becomes an important institutional asset in terms of building its legitimacy as a global 
norm leader or, employing Foucault’s terminology, as an institution of truthf
In very sensitive and complex issue-areas in which international policy 
coordination is needed, policymakers must rely on the advice given by recognised 
epistemic communities, including authoritative multilateral institutions that are 
capable of globally providing and disseminating information.48 This dependency 
upon international sources of expertise is even greater in states lacking the capacity 
to produce local knowledge about issues, as in the case of many developing states. 
This type of technical/bureaucratic authority on HIV/AIDS confers UNAIDS with 
a great deal of symbolic power (Bourdieu, 1994) to influence states' national policies as 
well as allowing it to spread that power on a global scale.
Bourdieu, for example, uses the term habitus to explain how human beings 
are socialised into "a system of durable, transposable dispositions which functions as
46 Every two years, UNAIDS publishes an H IV /AIDS Global Report to update the state o f  the 
epidemic worldwide. This study is considered the most reliable H IV/AIDS statistical reference to 
almost all the institutes, N G O s, governments and anyone interested in following the progress o f  the 
epidemic in the world.
47 Foucault (1980:115) describes a normative collection o f  rules, or “discursive knowledge”, which is 
produced in the service o f  modem institutions and has the character o f  truth. For more on this, see 
also Clegg (1994).
the generative basis of structured objectively unified practices" (Bourdieu quoted in 
Dreyfuss and Rabinow, 1999:86). If one transposes his concept to the level of states 
and other transnational actors, UNAIDS can be seen as a source of habitus in the 
sense of determining the meaning of organised practices concerning HIV/AIDS. In 
this respect, Finnemore and Barnett (1999:700) observed that "even when they lack 
material resources, IOs exercise power as they constitute and construct the social 
world". The authors resorted to Weberian assumptions about how bureaucracies 
produce and use knowledge to develop a constructivist approach to think of the role 
of IOs as autonomous and powerful non-state actors in world politics.49 Their claim 
about the important agency role of IOs offers an alternative approach to traditional 
perspectives. These conventional views see them exclusively as static structures, 
which are either an institutionalised representation of the balance of power logic 
between states (neo-realists) or used by them to maximise the benefits o f collective 
action (neo-liberals).50 According to Mearsheimer, for example, “what is most 
impressive about international institutions is how little independent effect they seem 
to have had on state behaviour” (Mearsheimer, 1993:47).
The present study argues that IOs, in general, and UNAIDS, in particular, 
embody elements of agency and structure pointed out by both schools. It agrees with 
the constructivist assumption that the power of IOs derives from their capacity to 
produce autonomous knowledge and promote normative change. Since its creation,
48 This author’s understanding o f  epistemic community resembles Peter M. Haas’ (1996:3) insightful 
notion o f  a “network o f  professionals with recognised expertise and competence in a particular 
domain and an authoritative claim to policy-relevant knowledge within that domain or issue-area”.
49 These authors are part o f  an expanding constructivist scholarship who since the mid 80s sought to 
more systematically challenge the realist hegemony in international relations. Among key 
representatives o f  this group are Ashley (1984,1987), Wendt (1987,1992,1994,1999), Kratochwil and 
Ruggie (1986), Ruggie (1983, 1993, 1998), Onuf (1989), Koslowski and Kratochwil (1994), Kappen 
(1994).
50 For an interesting review o f the different theoretical positions with regards to the autonomous role 
o f  IOs in world politics, see Reinalda and Verbeek (1998). See also Baldwin (1993).
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UNAIDS has led the global response to HIV/AIDS, defining new concepts and 
policy priorities that are adopted widely by states and non-state actors alike. In this 
sense, unlike the (neo) realist view, UNAIDS1 behaviour cannot be seen simply as the 
result of a compromise between its powerful member states. Rather, it produces a 
kind of autonomous social/scientific interpretation that has proven strong enough to 
suppress other competing views concerning the epidemic.
The previous chapter discussed how international attitudes and 
interpretations regarding HIV/AIDS have changed since the inception of the 
epidemic in the early 80s. The creation of UNAIDS in 1996 was the result of the 
international community’s admission that HIV/AIDS would not be defeated by 
conventional public health institutions and policies. As mentioned elsewhere, there is 
simply no precedent, in the history of the UN for the establishment of an 
autonomous bureaucracy to deal with a single disease. The very existence of this 
highly authoritative organisation could be interpreted as a sign that the epidemic has 
been gradually moved away from the dimension of politicisation. As has already been 
shown, since the late 90s there have been several academic studies and 
policy/intelligence reports assessing the implications of HIV/AIDS for security. 
UNAIDS fully embraced this new conceptualisation of the epidemic’s impact. Since 
then, it has become a strong securitising actor; promoting and further elaborating the 
current predominant view that links HIV/AIDS and security.
In a lecture given at the United Nations University in Tokyo, on 2 October 
2001, Dr. Peter Piot, executive director of UNAIDS since its creation, exposed the 
links between HIV/ AIDS and human security. He affirmed that,
We must pay attention to AIDS as a threat to human security, and redouble our 
efforts against the epidemic and its impact. Since the creation of UNAIDS six years 
ago, we have been positioning AIDS not only as a global epidemic of an infectious
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disease, but as a development issue, as well as an issue of human security (Piot, 2001: 
internet source).
At the London School of Economics, on 8 February 2005, he 
acknowledged the epidemic as “unique in human history” and as “an extraordinary 
kind of crisis”. Demonstrating the shift in the UNAIDS’ institutional rationale from 
an early politicisation of the epidemic to its current securitisation, Piot asserted on 
this occasion that,
I once thought that the answer [to HIV/AIDS] was that we all had to do much more 
and to do it much better. I was wrong. Routine development or humanitarian 
approaches and financing are not sufficient as a response to the pandemic. A ID S is 
exceptional in so many ways that only an exceptional response will succeed ...it needs to move to that 
level of exceptional action [my emphasis] (Piot, 2005a: internet source).
In July of the same year, while addressing the 3rd IAS Conference on HIV 
Pathogenesis and Treatment, in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil, Piot once again emphasised 
the special character of the epidemic and the need for an exceptional and 
comprehensive response. In his words:
I believe we need to move the response to AIDS into another league, on a par with 
other critical global issues such as climate change and extreme poverty, and not stay 
in our AIDS ghetto. Debating AIDS belongs as much in the UN Security Council as 
it belongs in scientific conferences (Piot, 2005b: internet source).
In spite of UNAIDS’ unmatchable capacity to shape understandings about 
HIV/AIDS, the strong influence of the US at both the Global Fund and UNAIDS 
confirms the (neo-realist) presumption that the autonomy of IOs is constantly 
checked by narrow national interests. Since the election of George W. Bush, in 2000, 
the US government has pursued its own foreign policy agenda to deal with the global 
epidemic. As demonstrated later, the main source of contention between the global 
H IV / 'AID S polity and the US government is George Bush's President's Emergency
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Plan for AIDS Relief (PEPFAR) and the disruptions it has caused to the unified 
international front led by UNAIDS. This draws attention to thz power-laden context in 
which securitisation dynamics occur. The differential power positions and political 
agendas of UNAIDS and the US demonstrates that the successful securitisation of 
HIV/AIDS is more than only a function of their linguistic competence, as generally 
asserted by members of the Copenhagen School (Balzacq, 2005).
The problem here is that, in general, social constructivist analyses (and I 
dare to include the Copenhagen School in this category) display an “oversocialised 
view of actors” (Barnett, 1999:7). Focusing attention solely on speech-acts diverts 
attention from both the strategic behaviour of actors and the political and social 
structures in which they are embedded. As noted in the following section, the 
rationale and strategic interest of the US in securitising HIV/AIDS differs from 
UNAIDS’ in a number of ways. Their organisational and political structures, policy 
orientations, and the strategies they implement to persuade their audiences are also 
markedly distinct.
Moreover, the normative power of the rational-legal authority that UNAIDS 
embodies has implications for the ways this agency produces, controls and 
disseminates social knowledge about HIV/AIDS (Bamnett and Finnemore, 
1999:700). UNAIDS, as a semi-autonomous goal-oriented actor in international 
relations, has a clear (rational) interest in galvanising attention on an issue that 
legitimises its existence in the international system, namely HIV/AIDS. The 
successful securitisation of the epidemic put UNAIDS at the forefront of the global 
response, raising its institutional profile and importance as an indispensable institution 
in the fight against the epidemic. Conversely, without the epidemic or with its effects 
significantly reduced worldwide, the raison d'etre of this organisation would be 
seriously compromised. For example, a potential de-securitisation of HIV/AIDS
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would probably lead to the phasing out of UNAIDS or its incorporation into the 
wider bureaucratic structure of WHO. The maintenance of HIV/AIDS at the top of 
the global agenda is therefore a matter of survival to UNAIDS.
Barnett argues that “actors can engage in practices that attempt to rewrite 
the cultural landscape, and their motivations for doing so might stem from principled 
beliefs and/or instrumental gain” (Barnett, 1999:7). The controversy involving the 
overestimation of the HIV/AIDS epidemic in Africa by UNAIDS is an interesting 
illustration of Barnett’s point. Since 1998, the year of its first annual report, UNAIDS 
has presented increasingly dire figures about the global epidemic. In 2000, it 
estimated that 36 m illion people around the world were carrying the virus. In the 
latest update, in 2005, the number jumped to 40.3 million, with 25.8 million in Sub- 
Saharan Africa (UNAIDS, 2005c). However, a study commissioned by the US 
International Development Agency (USAID) and a number of national governments 
and private donors has shown that the number of HIV infections in East, West and 
Central Africa may be much lower than UNAIDS studies have initially indicated.51 
On 6 April 2006, the Washington Post published an article by Craig Timberg, 
suggesting that UNAIDS officials could have intentionally “inflated” their reports 
due to “political calculations, with the emphasis on raising awareness and money” 
(The Washington Post 06.04.2006).
The allegedly over-catastrophic HIV/AIDS figures given by UNAIDS 
could be understood as an attempt to reinforce the emergencial (and security) 
character of the problem and, as a consequence, reaffirm this institution’s centrality 
in the global response. Despite the anecdotal character of this case, it shows that
51 In both studies nonetheless, Southern Africa remains at the epicentre o f  the global epidemic. The 
Demographic and Health Survey was conducted by ORC Macro and John Hopkins University in 
partnership with other private institutions. For more information, see http://www.measuredhs.com/.
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actors may derive their motivations for initiating a securitising move from an intricate 
combination of structural and individual factors. In one dimension, one could say 
that UNAIDS is embedded in a broad normative structure that portrays the epidemic 
as an existential threat to security. In another, this institution rationally manipulates 
these structural discourses in order to advance particular interests (survival in the case 
presented above). The study turns now to UNAIDS’ institutional mechanisms of 
HASN transmission.
UNAIDS works mainly as a coordinating body as opposed to a direct 
implementing and funding agency. Its bureaucratic structure is made up of a 
permanent Secretariat, based ini Geneva, Switzerland. It is guided by a Programme 
Coordinating Board (PCB) which comprises 22 delegates of governments, 
representing all regions of the world, representatives of the 8 UNAIDS Cosponsors 
(UNICEF, UNDP, UNFPA, UNESCO, WHO, World Bank, UNDOC, ILO) and 5 
representatives of NGOs, including associations of people living with HIV/AIDS.52 
The PCB serves as the UNAIDS1 governing body and holds at least one annual 
working session at its headquarters in Geneva. Only the governments' 
representatives have voting power at the PCB. The UN Cosponsors and Secretariat 
meet several times a year as the Committee of Cosponsoring Organizations (CCO) 
(UNAIDS, 2004a: 4).
The largest donor to UNAIDS is the US Government, followed by the 
Governments of the Netherlands, the United Kingdom, Sweden, Norway, and 
Denmark. Other UNAIDS sponsors, such as the UN agencies and the World Bank, 
also provide direct financial support for country-based HIV/AIDS plans. 
Concerning the allocation of money, the Secretariat assesses projects and makes
52 Curiously, UNAIDS is the first United Nations programme to include N G O s in its governing body.
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funds available for selected HIV/AIDS initiatives. All UNAIDS' activities are 
discussed and further coordinated every two years through the Unified Budget and 
Work Plan. This is a very important institutional instrument for controlling overall 
accountability and structuring the organisation's fundraising initiatives (UNAIDS, 
2004a: 4-5).
At the state level, UNAIDS operates mainly through the U N Theme Group. 
It is comprised of the country-based staff of the UNAIDS' seven Cosponsors. In the 
Theme Group, representatives of the cosponsoring organisations share information, 
plan and monitor coordinated action between themselves and with other partners, 
and decide on joint financing of major AIDS activities in support of the country's 
government and other national partners. The principal objective of the Theme 
Group is to support the host country's efforts to organise an effective and 
comprehensive response to HIV/AIDS. In most cases, the host government is 
invited to be part of the Theme Group. Increasingly, other partners such as bilateral 
development agencies and NGOs have also been included.
To date, UNAIDS has established more than 130 UN Theme Groups, 
covering all regions of the globe. For their day-to-day operations, most Theme 
Groups have set up special working groups that involve donors, NGOs and groups 
of people living with HIV/AIDS. In countries with high rates of HIV/AIDS 
infection, the Theme Group has the support of a UNAIDS staff member, called a 
Country Program Adviser (CPA). Elsewhere, a staff member of one of the seven 
Cosponsors serves as the UNAIDS focal point for the country. In addition to 
supporting the UN system, this staff member is in charge of reinforcing national 
commitment to HIV/AIDS action and providing information and guidance to a 
range of host country partners, including government departments and groups and 
organisations from civil society.
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In 2000, the Security Council resolution 1308/2000 led to the creation of 
the UNAIDS Office on AIDS, Security and Humanitarian Response (SHR). Its main 
task is to devise strategies to assist states in meeting their multilateral commitments 
(UNAIDS, 2005a). Since the establishment of this new bureaucracy, UNAIDS has 
developed a number of specific “security” policies, such as the programmes it is 
adopting in the armed forces, peacekeepers and in complex emergencies. These 
programmes have been driven by the UNAIDS/SHR’s Global Initiative on 
H IV /A ID S  and Security. This initiative focuses on reducing the vulnerability of 
populations and building the capacity of military and peacekeeping forces in three 
levels of security: 1) International security', with the focus on supporting HIV/AIDS 
interventions within UN peacekeeping operations; 2) national security', targeting 
uniformed services with a particular emphasis on young recruits, future peacekeepers 
and demobilising personnel; 3) humanitarian response!human security', which focuses on 
vulnerable populations in crisis settings and humanitarian workers (UNAIDS, 
2005b:l).
Barnett and Finnemore (1999:713) observed that “having established rules 
and norms, IOs are eager to spread the benefits of their expertise and often act as 
conveyor belts of norms and models of good political behavior". It is interesting to note 
that the UNAIDS case is consistent with this assumption. Considering the diffusion 
of HASN as an example, these conveyor belts correspond to the institutional 
mechanisms described above through which the UNAIDS Secretariat inculcates and 
globally enforces its norms. By December 2002, around 100 states had already set up 
National H IV /A ID S  plans following UNAIDS recommendations. Additionally, 
UNAIDS has helped 85 countries to establish National H IV /A ID S  Councils. It has 
also supported these governments in the actual implementation of their national 
plans by assisting in many technical areas, such as drafting donor proposals,
82
integrating HIV/AIDS into broader development strategies, and undertaking reviews 
that assess the progress of the national responses (UNAIDS, 2004a). More 
importantly, UNAIDS/SHR, through its Global Initiative on H IV /A ID S  and Security, 
has systematically instilled governments with the message that HIV/AIDS should be 
integrated into their national and regional security strategies. As with the mechanism 
of norm transmission described above, the UNAIDS/SHR office (which is located 
in Copenhagen) works as a conveyor belt by linking up with the UN Theme Groups 
based within states to introduce its principles and guidelines for action. By 2005, 
UNAIDS estimated that approximately 100 states worldwide were supported by the 
Global Initiative on H IV /A ID S  and Security (UNAIDS, 2005b).
What the above suggests is that UNAIDS is a primary source of norm 
creation and diffusion by virtue of its widely recognised authority to orient and 
coordinate state and non-state actors towards the best policies to face the 
HIV/AIDS threat. Nonetheless, the constitution of what is referred to here as 
HANS is not only the work of an autonomous bureaucracy with knowledge claims 
about the epidemic. It is also the result of the interaction between powerful Western 
governments, namely the US government, and transnational networks of HIV/AIDS 
activists who operate strategically both inside and outside the institutional structure 
provided by UNAIDS. Their political agendas can contain shared as well as 
conflicting understandings about HIV/AIDS. This chapter will now explore the role 
played by some of these actors in the process of HASN formation as well as the 
political contexts within which they operate.
3. The US Government
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As demonstrated in the previous section, UNAIDS is a powerful actor in 
creating and promoting social knowledge about HIV/AIDS. It is not alone though. 
The US government and its associate agencies also play a fundamental role in the 
process of creating international understandings about the epidemic. In shedding 
light on the US government’s contribution to the formation of HASN, one should 
first set the epidemic within the wider political context of US foreign policy at the 
beginning of the century. At the heart of the foreign policy of the Bill Clinton 
administration was the problem (later resolved by the terrorist attacks of 9/11) of 
how to use the disproportional power of the United States in the post-Cold War 
world. The answer at the time was to join the EU and the UN in the construction of 
a kind of cosmopolitan new world order in which the notion of national 
sovereignty/security would be downplayed to a holistic conceptualisation of 
humanity. Bill Clinton’s approach to the global HIV/AIDS epidemic should be set 
against this same background of multilateral engagement. It is reflected by the 
Clinton administration’s successful attempt to include the epidemic in the agenda of 
the Security Council (Prins, 2004:941). In the historic January 2000 meeting, Vice- 
President A1 Gore stressed the common security challenges posed by HIV/AIDS. 
He mentioned the “real and present danger to world security posed by the AIDS 
pandemic” and called upon other UN members to “see security through a new and 
wider prism and, forever after, think about it according to a new, more expansive 
definition” (UNSC, 2000a: 2).
This important initiative at the global level was preceded by a significant 
normative turn in the way th e , US government portrayed and acted upon 
HIV/AIDS. In 1999, Clinton officially identified HIV/AIDS as a national and global 
security threat. During this period, the National Security Council became involved in 
the US policy to fight the global epidemic. It was the first time that this agency took
an infectious disease onboard as a potential threat to the US (Johnson, 2002).53 
Clinton doubled the budget for international HIV/AIDS relief to US$ 254 million 
and introduced a new interagency located in the White House, named the Office of 
National A ID S Policy. He also established a Presidential Advisory Council on H IV /A ID S  
(PACHA) to provide expert knowledge that would inform how the federal 
government should respond to the epidemic (Johnson, 2002). Notwithstanding the 
Clinton administration’s open securitising move towards HIV/AIDS, which was 
reinforced by the creation of new institutions devoted to this end, it is with George 
W. Bush that the US policies towards HIV/AIDS were significantly reffamed and 
further implemented.
The George W. Bush administration’s response to the global epidemic 
reflected the logic of its own worldview. In this respect, any assessment of Bush’s 
foreign policy towards the HIV/AIDS has necessarily to deal with the subjective 
issue of how decision-makers see the role of the United States in the world and how 
the epidemic, fits into this. Since the very beginning, the inner circle of Bush’s foreign 
policy establishment was infused by the realist ideas of an elite of neo-conservative 
ideologues, on the one hand, and the President’s own moral instincts, on the other. 
This merge between realism and morality turned into the ideological justification for 
a wide range of divisive policies (Wallis, 2005). The 9/11 incident gave the Bush 
administration the opportunity to fully develop this new foreign policy thinking and 
to act upon it. The pursuit of national security abroad was framed by the symbolic 
image of a battle between good and evil. The terrorist attacks reignited among 
foreign policy pundits the longstanding (yet prior to 9/11 dormant) foreign policy 
principle of an alleged “American exceptionalism” - the idea that, given the United
53 See also “AIDS is Declared Threat to Security: White House Fears Epidemic Could Destabilise
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States' moral uniqueness and disproportional power, God has delegated to its leaders 
the divine duty to protect and lead the world. This means in the words of Michael 
Cox that,
[...] Most members of the Washington foreign policy elite do tend to see themselves 
as masters of a larger universe in which America has a very special part to play by 
virtue of its unique history, its huge capabilities and accumulated experience of 
organizing the world for the last 50 years. (Cox, 2003:21)
The rise of the United Sates as a “crusader state” (McDougall, 1997) is not 
a totally new development. It is rooted in a long history of idealism in the North 
American foreign policy that goes back to the Founding Fathers (Cox, 2003:8). 
However, since Ronald Reagan’s use of American ideology as a powerful foreign 
policy instrument against the Soviet Union, the world has not seen anything like the 
present strong idealist imprint of George Bush’s War on Terror.54 This time, 
nonetheless, the perceived security threat does not come from a communist 
totalitarian regime but from a rather disperse global network of Islamic extremists 
backed by a handful of “rogue” states with weapons of mass destruction.
Goldstein and Keohane asserted that ideas, "and the principled or causal 
beliefs they embody", provide "road maps" for political action. According to them, 
"these conceptions of possibility or worldviews are embedded in the symbolism of a 
culture and deeply affect modes of thought and discourse" (1993:8). Similarly, the 
present argument claims that the Bush government's approach to the global 
HIV/AIDS crisis is deeply embedded in this worldview that understands the US as a 
special nation with global responsibilities.
World”. The Washington Post, 30 April 2000.
54 Some authors believe that the foreign policy o f  George Bush is a revision o f  Ronald Reagan’s 
idealism. See, for example, Wallison (2004).
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You know, the world looks at us and says, they're strong. And we are; we're strong 
militarily. But we've got a greater strength than that. We've got a strength in the 
universality of human tights and the human condition. It's in our country's history. 
It's ingrained in our soul. And today we're going to describe how we're going to act — 
not just talk, but act, on the basis of our firm beliefs (US Department of State, 
2003b).
The idea of a practically innate burden to lead the world against 
HIV/AIDS becomes manifest in this fragment of a speech about the epidemic given 
by Bush, in 31 January 2003, two days after the announcement of his global 
HIV/AIDS plan. More than two years after the September 2001 events, the Bush 
administration publicly acknowledged the devastating impact of the global 
HIV/AIDS epidemic as a global emergency and seemed to be moving towards its 
securitisation. The Secretary of State, Colin Powell, stated that “bureaucracy as usual 
was unacceptable in dealing with this emergency, and we have moved forward 
urgently” (US Department of State, 2004a). He was talking about the launching of 
PEPFAR. Through this initiative, the President committed US$ 15 billion over 5 
years. It is by far the largest pledge to HIV/AIDS international assistance by a single 
government to date.55 The funds will be spent largely on ongoing and new bilateral 
projects with recipient states.
Since the launch of the plan, the Bush administration has redefined its 
HIV/AIDS global strategy in terms of three main axes. The first axis keeps the 
traditional foreign aid approach through the activities developed by USAID. Here, 
the links between the US government and domestic NGOs with a transnational 
impact, which specialised in global HIV/AIDS relief and advocacy (mosdy faith-
55 Assistance from all developed nations to the Global Fund, e.g., amounted to US$ 6 billion in 2004. 
The Global Fund’s believes that US$ 38 billion per year will be needed by 2015 to close the gap in 
health in the poorest countries in the world (Global Fund, 2005b).
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based organisations), are more clearly perceived. Faith-based organisations have been 
implementing HIV/AIDS policies and programmes for USAID for decades. As 
noted in upcoming chapters, their strategic partnership has been constituted as a 
fundamental mechanism for the US government’s penetration in the domestic 
structure of the states afflicted by the epidemic. In a kind of linkage politics (Rosenau, 
1969), government officials articulated common foreign policy strategies with those 
domestic religious groups in a deliberate attempt to influence the HIV/AIDS 
policies of other states and multilateral organisations.56
The second axis explores the multilateral track. It operates mainly through 
the participation of US officials in key decision-making structures of international 
bodies, such as UNAIDS, the World Bank and the Global Fund. Financially, these 
multilateral bodies rely heavily on the support of the US. For example, from 1995 to 
2005, the US government contributed US$ 182,390,000 to support UNAIDS’ 
policies and programmes. This amounts to more than 20% of the total contributions 
during this period, making the US the principal sponsor of this organisation 
(UNAIDS, 2005d). The Global Fund is also very dependent on US funding. The US 
government committed US$ 2.5 billion to the Fund for the period 2001-2008 which 
represents 30% of all the money pledged by states to the Fund (Global Fund, 2005c). 
These numbers are far from impressive nonetheless if compared with the US 
expenditure on bilateral programmes run by USAID. In fact, the ten years (1995- 
2005) of US contributions to UNAIDS corresponds to just a small fraction (less than
56 As noted later, although these influential interest-groups were often co-opted by the US 
government, they have also used the governing structures o f  the state to pressurise the Bush 
administration to act according to their particular political/religious policy agendas. In a way, this 
shows the ambiguity o f  state agency in international politics, or “who acts, for whom and with what 
effect?” (Hill, 2003:2).
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10%) of what the Bush administration spent on HIV/AIDS bilateral programmes 
for the year 2004 alone.57
Finally, the third axis, and the largest, is PEPFAR. The Plan is run from the 
State Department by a Global Coordinator, Randall Tobias, also dubbed the A ID S  
C%ar. Tobias’ Office is hierarchically on top of all the other HIV/AIDS structures in 
the US government. He reports direcdy to the Secretary of State, now Condoleezza 
Rice, who oversees the Plan’s progress. Its management is part of the overall national 
security apparatus of the US government. As Garret notes, “ [PEPFAR] is located 
inside the State Department, where its mission is defined in both foreign aid and 
national security terms” (Garret, 2005:12). The plan targets five key areas, prevention 
by sexual abstinence being the number one priority.
USAID, US diplomatic representations and the US Center for Disease 
Control and Prevention (CDC) are the key actors in charge of managing PEPFAR in 
target states. Institutionally, USAID has several advantage points given its 
geographical reach, well-developed infrastructure, and extensive experience in 
providing HIV/AIDS assistance to developing states in Africa and elsewhere. 
USAID’s international HIV/AIDS programme was established in 1986 and is 
currendy undergoing projects in more than 100 countries all over the world. It funds 
a number of initiatives and develops partnerships with local groups, government’s 
agencies and other organisations as a key strategy for accessing and influencing 
HIV/AIDS activities in host states. The US Embassies are, in general, the 
headquarters of PEPFAR within states and the US Ambassador is the frontline 
commander in the war against the epidemic. The CDC is an important actor in terms 
of its international recognition as an alternative source of policy guidance to national
57 The total amount spent in 2004 was US$ 2.253 billion (Kates and Summers, 2004:5).
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governments fighting HIV/AIDS. It is the most important agency in the US 
government for providing health information and improving public health through 
scientific research. It works in cooperation with governments throughout the world, 
advocating particular HIV/AIDS policies and strategies. As shown later, the 
introduction of a new (and more controversial) HIV testing policy in Botswana was, 
to a large extent, the result of CDC’s influential role vis-a-vis the Botswana’s 
government.58
The establishment of PEPFAR suggests that the epidemic has been 
securitised within the US. According to the securitisation theory, for an issue to be 
successfully securitised, a significant audience should be persuaded by a securitising actor 
that something is threatening and that exceptional measures should be taken to deal 
with it. In the US’ political system, the convincement of Congress (which is formed 
by the elected representatives of the wider audience of the American people) could be 
seen as sufficient evidence of securitisation. The substantive engagement of the Bush 
administration with the global epidemic has been endorsed and mandated by the US 
Congress. In January 2003, for example, Congress authorised the first funds to put 
PEPFAR into motion and in May it approved the Executive Act (H.R.1298) which 
established the Plan. Given the Congress’ formal approval of the Executive’s 
securitising move, it can be strongly argued that the Bush administration spoke security 
successfully while describing the epidemic to its domestic constituencies.
The motivations behind the President’s HIV/AIDS Plan are mixed, 
nonetheless. The securitisation of HIV/AIDS as promoted by the US is the result of 
a complex compromise between domestic and international actors. Within the North 
American establishment, rhetorical security articulations concerning HIV/AIDS are
58 For more on the role o f  CDC in the US’ global response to H IV /A ID S see
90
continually interacting with other ideational and material foreign policy interests. 
Depending on the political circumstances of their interaction, they can either 
reinforce or contradict each other. For example, as part of PEPFAR, USAID is 
working on a complex system to purchase AIDS drugs and distribute them to 2 
million people by 2008.59 It will be the biggest international aid scheme in USAID's 
history, with the release of US$ 7 billion from PEPFAR to be used on AIDS drugs 
and related services (Graham-Silverman, 2005).
However, expensive patented drugs mosdy from North American 
pharmaceutical companies are to be used in this program. Referring to concerns with 
drug safety, the US government has been putting up extra barriers to buying cheap 
generic drugs from developing countries, namely India and Brazil.60 The alleged links 
between the US Executive and pharmaceutical corporations has raised suspicion 
among governments, transnational AIDS activists and multilateral institutions about 
the real agenda of PEPFAR. Moreover, in the 15 countries included in Bush’s global 
HIV/AIDS programme61, development agencies and NGOs fear that the huge 
parallel structure put in place by USAID will duplicate pre-existing systems for the 
management of HIV/AIDS funds and projects, such as the abovementioned "Three 
Ones". The problem is that PEPFAR's management strategies have been neglecting 
these multilateral mechanisms, bypassing National HIV/AIDS Councils and other 
established country coordinating structures.
http://www.cdc.gov/nchstp/od/nchstp.htm l (accessed on 25.06.2005).
59 This programme was launched by mid 2005.
60 Notwithstanding the widely supported approval system run by the World Health Organisation
(WHO), USAID requires that an US agency, the Food and Drug Administration (FDA), approve 
AIDS generics before they become part o f  the American funding programme. By September 2005, 
PEPFAR was not yet supporting the treatment policies o f  states that insisted in using only generic 
drugs. See, for example, “Malawi Counts the Cost o f  America’s Policy for Funding anti-Aids Drugs”, 
The Independent, 16.09.2005.
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The influence of evangelical Christians in the President’s decision to set up 
a HIV/AIDS global plan should also be added to the equation. Influential 
evangelical lobbying groups are behind the selective way the money is allocated to 
HIV/AIDS programmes in target states. Religious conservatives, including not only 
Protestants but also traditionalist Catholics and Jews, are the most loyal supporting 
base of President Bush’s Republican Party.62 The powerful influence of religious 
right wingers goes deep into the US Congress as well as into the Judiciary and the 
Executive. As a result of their strong lobby, at least one third of PEPFAR’s US$ 15 
billion is earmarked for projects that stress abstinence until marriage as the primary 
preventive measure against the epidemic.63 In states financially supported by the US, 
assistance to HIV/AIDS programmes is attached to these moral strings.64
In 2005, for example, Brazil took a strong position against the US 
administration’s attempt to link US$ 40 million in HIV/AIDS grants to an anti­
prostitution pledge by the Brazilian government (The Wall Street Journal 02.05.2005). 
Brazilian authorities rejected the grants and reaffirmed their commitment to the
61 These are Botswana, Namibia, South Africa, Zambia, Ethiopia, Kenya, Rwanda, Tanzania, Uganda, 
Cote d'Ivoire, Nigeria, Guyana, Haiti, and Vietnam. It is interesting to note that, with the exception o f  
Vietnam, every country benefiting from PEPFAR is predominantly Christian.
62 For additional information on this, see, for example, “The Triumph o f  the Religious Right”, The 
Economist, 11 November 2004.
63 Bush himself is a devoted evangelical Christian, who had risked a lot o f  his domestic political capital 
working against very sensitive moral issues such as gay marriage and abortion. In June 2005, e.g., he 
addressed the Southern Baptist Convention, promising to work hard in the promotion o f  their 
common family values. For more on this, see also "You Ain't Seen Nothing Yet", The Economist, 23 
June 2005.
64 Financial aid to H IV/AIDS projects is also linked to political support from recipient states to 
American strategic interests in multilateral institutions, which in many cases are not even slightly 
related to the H IV/AIDS humanitarian crisis. Human rights activists from Botswana, for example, 
accused the Bush government o f  attaching financial aid from PEPFAR to the support o f  Botswana’s 
government to US interests towards the International Criminal Court (Ditshwanelo- Botswana Centre 
for Human Rights, 2003).
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country’s widely praised approach to the epidemic.65 Brazil has been seen by a wide 
community of HIV/AIDS specialists as a model in terms of best practices to fight 
HIV/AIDS. This success is in part due to the inclusive way they deal with high-risk 
groups as well as to the premise that prevention actions should be guided by 
epidemiological assumptions rather than moralistic ones. It is reflected in the strong 
investment by the Brazilian government in nationwide educational campaigns to 
stimulate the use of condoms by the public at large (Brazilian Ministry of Health, 
2000).
This particular case sheds some light on a wider philosophical division 
among the HASN norm leaders/securitising actors. Brazil clearly follows the line of 
UNAIDS and other epistemic communities of public health specialists and 
HIV/AIDS activists. The US administration, on the other hand, has its own (mis) 
perceptions66 about the best policies to fight the global spread of the epidemic. 
During the 15th World AIDS Conference in Bangkok in 2004, the contrast between 
these two worldviews came to light in the fears demonstrated by HIV/AIDS 
activists that the widespread use of condoms had been played down by religious 
dogmas behind the PEPFAR plan (The Economist 15.07.2004). Similarly, the poor 
coordination between PEPFAR and the Global Fund/UNAIDS, concerning the 
funding of AIDS treatment, has led to a competitive political climate and the 
creation of duplicated (and more often than not redundant) systems for delivering 
ARVs (Interview Baggio 11.08.2004).67
65 Prostitution is not considered a crime in Brazil and prostitutes are a very organised group with 
many associations throughout the country. Brazilian public health officials work in coordination with 
prostitutes* associations in condom education and promotion (Brazilian Ministry o f  Health, 2000:15).
66 Robert Jervis (1976) addressed the problem o f misperceptions as a major psychological factor in 
foreign policy decision-making.
67 See also “Early Tests for US in Its Global Fight on AIDS, The New York Times, 14 July 2004.
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Building on the above analysis, one could understandably argue that these 
conflicting worldviews between secular pragmatism and religious morality undermine 
the understanding of HASN as a single and bounded community of knowledge. 
However, this chapter suggests that, rather than falsifying the conceptual relevance 
of HASN, this sort of dialectic engagement between its moral and pragmatic 
understandings reveals interesting empirical dynamics of norm formation and 
socialisation at the level of the international system.68 In the same manner, the 
dynamic interaction between ethical, technical and economic arguments with regard 
to the worldwide provision of AIDS treatment is also part of the wider 
inter subjective social processes that originated what is referred to here as HASN. As 
the next section shows, transnational civil society groups are important channels for 
the communication of international HIV/AIDS norms from the system to the state 
level and vice-versa.
4. Transnational Networks of NGOs69
The widening of the international security agenda in the mid-90s to include 
non-military issues gave extra leverage to the international affairs of many non-state 
actors. A global public space emerged with transnational networks of activists 
pressuring governments and IOs to fulfil their human security commitments.70 Some 
of them framed their traditional causes around areas such as human rights,
681 return to this issue later in this thesis.
69 Several notions have been employed to define transnational civil society actors. For some useful 
distinctions, see, for example, Flotini (1999), Khagram, Riker, and Sikkink (2002). It refers here to 
“self-organized advocacy groups that undertake voluntary collective action across state borders in 
pursuit o f  what they deem the wider public interest” (Price, 2003: 580).
70 For a comprehensive review o f the international relations scholarship on the emergence o f  
transnational advocacy in world politics, see Price (2003).
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development, and environmental issues with the language of security to raise the 
salience of their claims.71 The constant flow of information, further facilitated by 
technological tools such as fax machines and the internet, brought the language of 
security to a wide range of non-governmental groups. Through world conferences, 
web-debates and the circulation of individuals, transnational networks have become 
acquainted with each other’s activities and developed similar world views on the 
security dimension of their distinct issue areas.
Transnational networks involved with HIV/AIDS issues grew against this 
backdrop of increasingly global interactions between non-state actors. During the 
early 90s, their actions were discursively framed by symbolic categories (such as 
development, humanitarianism, human rights, and, after 1994, human security) that 
appealed to a moral language familiar to the international community of donors 
(Carpenter, 2005: 297). Since the late 90s, nevertheless, in the context of the growing 
international securitisation of the epidemic, these transnational actors have been 
increasingly unifying their discursive practises around the concept of security.
The global HIV/AIDS epidemic is a transnational issue par excellence. Its 
indiscriminate global impact blurs the traditional division between the domestic and 
the international. Accordingly, the proposed securitisation of HIV/AIDS also 
transcends the conventional practice of state sovereignty. It prescribes normative 
constraints to the way states behave towards their own citizens. As international 
condemnation of the South African government’s alternative approach to 
HIV/AIDS has shown, go-alone national policies to tackle the epidemic are not an
71 Drawing upon David Snow’s concept o f  “frame alignment”, Keck and Sikkink noted that to 
influence broad audiences “network members actively seek ways to bring issues to the public agenda 
by framing them in innovative ways [...] sometimes they create issues by framing old problems in new  
ways; occasionally they help transform other actors understandings o f  their identities and their 
interests” (1998:17).
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option.72 In highly affected regions, the global mechanisms for promoting and 
monitoring the implementation of internationally agreed HIV/AIDS national plans 
and bureaucracies are transforming the relations between states, its citizens and the 
international community.
In this respect, transnational HIV/AIDS activists are very important 
instruments of norm diffusion. Although often lacking material and economic power 
to make a difference, networks of activists promote norm change and adaptation by 
globally disseminating ideas, information and strategies (Florini, 1999). Since the 
early 90s, transnational NGOs with an interest in HIV/AIDS have increased in 
- number and in the scope of their activities. In addition to their traditional ways of 
exerting influence, more recently they have been direcdy involved in the decision­
making structures of important multilateral bodies, namely UNAIDS and the Global 
Fund. They are also important actors in promoting norm implementation at the state 
level (Keck and Sikkink, 1998). By their participation in National HIV/AIDS 
Councils, by lobbying governments of Western states as well as by linking up with 
civil society groups at the grass-roots level, transnational advocacy networks engage 
in discursive practices with domestic actors. In participating in these social and 
political interactions, they aim to ultimately transform behaviour and policies to 
match international prescriptions.73
Despite their important contribution in opening up an alternative political 
space for the inclusion and dissemination of HASN, the role of transnational 
HIV/AIDS actors in global governance should be better contextualised.74 These
72 Except for the special case o f  the global superpower.
73 Keck and Sikkink (1998), for example, usefully explore the impact o f  transnational civil society 
groups in world politics. The authors set up a list o f  goals these actors pursue and the strategies they 
deploy to achieve them.
networks are immersed in (and are constituted by) the larger power relations which 
underlie the normative makeup of HASN. This means that those groups have to 
operate in (and adapt to) an environment which is dominated by a complex grid of 
ideational and material forces. The engagement of transnational NGOs in 
HIV/AIDS activities is determined not only by their own self-defined missions but 
also by the terms laid down by international organisations and states, in particular 
UNAIDS, the US and other donor states. The rhetorical strategies available to these 
advocates are therefore characterised by various political constraints. Yet, these 
limitations provide them with opportunities to mobilise resources and allies. As in a 
strategic process of framing (Snow et al, 1986), they use the hegemonic grammar of the 
epidemic (security) to galvanise support and to talk the language that their 
transnational constituencies and patrons certainly understand.
As noted before, the normative framework of HASN has been fractured by 
conflicting worldviews about HIV/AIDS. These views have ideologically divided the 
international community of HIV/AIDS activists into two main sets of organisations. 
The first and wider group supports a pragmatic and secular approach to HIV/AIDS 
and is aligned closer to UNAIDS and to most of the UN member states. The 
distinctive feature of these HIV/AIDS networks is that they seek to be widely 
recognised as an autonomous and legitimate political space for civil action regardless 
of either creed or ideological stance. They also stand for the scientific guidelines 
proposed by UNAIDS and WHO, regarding, e.g., the promotion of condoms as the 
best prophylactic available to anyone to counter the spread of the epidemic. Contrary
74 According to some authors (Baker and Chandler, 2005; Chandler, 2005; Heartfield, 2005), the 
academic literature looking at the emergence o f a global civil society (e.g., Salamon, 1994; Kaldor, 
2003; Falk, 1995) have exaggerated the influence o f  transnational civil society in global governance. 
Chandler (2005), for example, argues that this scholarship has overlooked the importance o f  power 
factors in understanding the environment in which those transnational actors operate.
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to the US government’s stance, they are also supportive of a treatment strategy 
focused on generic AIDS drugs instead of branded ones.
The International Council of Aids Services Organizations (ICASO) is one 
such organisation. Since 1991, ICASO has connected and represented HIV/AIDS 
NGOS networks from all five continents. Through its five regional secretariats 
spread throughout the globe, coordinated by a central bureau in Canada, ICASO 
brings the voices of community-based organisations from all over the world to the 
higher levels of decision-making at the state and multilateral levels. Their main arena 
of negotiation is under the institutional umbrella of UNAIDS’ Programme 
Coordinating Board, in which it is one of the NGO sector’s representatives, and the 
United Nations’ Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC). They discuss 
internationally and try to apply nationally the outcomes of those debates by lobbying 
governments at the domestic level and by disseminating information to other 
networks of NGOs. ICASO is an interesting example of a transnational channel for 
the transmission of HASN that works in both directions, bringing ideas and 
experiences from the grassroots levels to the international system and also promoting 
policy outcomes emanating from the HASN decision-making centres back to the 
recipient states.
Through widely exposing the actual or potential violations of HASN, 
ICASO also operates as a sort of watchdog of donor states' commitments towards 
the fight against HIV/AIDS. In July 2005, for example, ICASO and Aidspan, 
another influential global HIV/AIDS network, launched a worldwide advocacy 
campaign, called GF+, in association with other NGOs from Europe, the US and 
Japan. It sought to persuade governments of donor countries to increase their 
financial commitments to the Global Fund. The advocacy groups forming the GF+ 
claimed that with the pledges already made by donors, the Global Fund would not be
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able to launch new grants for the financial year 2006/7. This means that insufficient 
funds from developed states will probably hamper the G8's promise to get close to 
the goal of universal access to AIDS drugs by 2010 (ICASOa, 2005). In the months 
preceding a donor conference held in London, in September 2005, which was 
organised to discuss the replenishment of the Global Fund, ICASO and its allies 
disseminated this politically important information (largely through the internet) in 
order to persuade a worldwide audience to sign a petition urging developed states to 
fulfil their HIV/AIDS commitments to the Fund (ICASOb, 2005).75 Despite their 
coordinating efforts, soon after the end of the conference, on 6 September 2005, the 
GF+ released a communique stating that the final pledges of money (US$ 3.7 billion) 
by donor states fell short of what the Global Fund needs to sustain and scale up the 
global fight against HIV/AIDS, tuberculosis and malaria (GF+, 2005).
Additionally, ICASO, in conjunction with the International HIV/AIDS 
Alliance (IHAA), another influential HIV/AIDS advocacy network76, has overseen 
the implementation of the UNGASS’ Declaration of Commitment. These > 
organisations have also used the Declaration as a political instrument for pressuring 
national governments to comply with the promises they have made to halt and 
reverse the impact of HIV/AIDS in their respective societies. In doing so, they 
disseminate the Declaration to local organisations and elaborate “advocacy guides” in 
which they enlist a number of strategies NGOs should pursue to encourage their 
countries to become more involved in the response to the epidemic. For example,
75 This case is illustrative o f  one o f  the tactics specified by Keck and Sikkink in which HTV/AIDS 
networks generate credible information and quickly move it "to where it will have the most impact" 
(1998:16).
76 The IHAA is the European Union’s largest H IV/AIDS advocacy and services network. It was 
established in the early 90s as an INGO to support community-based action on HIV/AIDS. 
Currendy, IHAA is firmly present in 40 countries where it develops programmes on care, prevention, 
and improved access to treatment. It produces a wide range o f  reports that have had an important 
impact in national policy-making. For more, see www.aidsalliance.org.
ICASO recommended the organisation of meetings by domestic NGOs to “develop 
a common approach for your lobby and advocacy effort” (ICASO, 2001:6). It also 
advised local groups to work closely with UNAIDS representations and to encourage 
UN agencies and other multilateral actors “to modify their own workplans to ensure 
consistency with the Declaration of Commitment” (ICASO, 2001:6). In addition, 
ICASO suggested that NGOs should obtain copies of statements made by 
governments’ representatives in international gatherings and use them as advocacy 
tools at the national and regional levels (ICASO, 2001:6). These are interesting 
illustrations of the means deployed by transnational HIV/AIDS advocacy groups to 
influence policy-making at the domestic level.
Another very proactive HIV/AIDS global network is the US-based Health 
Global Access Project (GAP). GAP's stated mission is to "campaign for drug access 
and the resources necessary to sustain access for people with HIV/AIDS across the 
globe" (GAP, 2005). The organisation's structure is made up of a core "national 
steering committee" of 20-25 people drawn from human rights campaigners, people 
living with HIV/AIDS, fair trade activists, and public health. It has three national 
programme coordinators leading national activities in the areas of advocacy, 
mobilisation and campaigns. Internationally, it is also represented at UNAIDS' PCB 
and has staff members actively participating in international meetings at multilateral 
organisations and in target countries. GAP also pressures governments, IOs and 
multinational corporations by globally disseminating information with the potential 
for political impact upon public opinion. GAP exposed, e.g., the profits of 
pharmaceutical companies in rich states and how they sabotage developing countries' 
efforts to produce cheaper generic drugs. They also use symbolic politics by framing
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situations with sensitive symbols that will make sense to a wider audience (GAP, 
2005).77
The second group is formed by HIV/AIDS activists pursuing a different 
normative agenda. Either for instrumental or ideational reasons, these networks of 
NGOs associated themselves with the US government's global HIV/AIDS policies. 
Although holding the status of "non-governmental", most of these organisations get 
money from the Bush administration’s PEPFAR plan and either directly or indirectly 
work to achieve its goals. In most of these cases, instead of using its own embassies 
and international assistance agencies, the US government takes on these networks to 
actually implement its HIV/AIDS policies abroad.78 The funds are allocated to them 
either directly by US government’s agencies, such as USAID, or indirectly by 
multilateral agencies and other international partners.
Transnational networks linked to evangelical and right-wing religious sects 
are the most active advocacy groups promoting compliance with the HIV/AIDS 
principles of the US government. World Relief, World View, HOPE, CARE, 
Samaritan’s Purse, Catholic Relief Services and Opportunity International are some 
of the North American based international Christian organisations that are very 
active in HIV/AIDS related projects. Each of them received around US$ 100 million 
from PEPFAR to develop HIV/AIDS projects in target countries.79 World Relief, 
for example, is subordinate to the US National Association of Evangelicals, which is 
formed by around 50 member denominations and hundreds of evangelical churches 
all over the US. World Reliefs stated mission is "to work with, for and from the
77 For example, GAP uses human rights claims to challenge multinational corporations to provide free 
AIDS drugs to their workers. The notion o f  symbolic politics is from Keck and Sikkink (1998).
78 Joseph Hanlon, for example, called this process "the privatisation o f  foreign policy implementation" 
(Hanlon, 1991:204).
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Church to relieve human suffering, poverty and hunger worldwide in the name of 
Jesus Christ" (World Relief, 2005). The organisation’s Mobilizing for Life project 
supports a moral/religious approach to HIV prevention (abstinence until marriage 
and fidelity within marriage) in Haiti, Kenya, Mozambique and Rwanda. Although 
they are not systematically promoted, pastors sometimes supply condoms to people 
who request them (Avert, 2005).
Additionally, there is a wide range of smaller international NGOs moving 
between the two groups. As the securitisation of HIV/AIDS got underway, they 
were attracted by the new funding mechanisms being put in place by the Global 
Fund and PEPFAR. These organisations saw the massive influx of cash to 
HIV/AIDS programmes as an opportunity to "stay in business" and expand their 
activities.80 Whatever humanitarian motives may have caused their creation, these 
NGOs have to generate surplus to stay active. This means that their financial needs 
sometimes precede any prior commitments to certain policy principles, as in the case 
of NGOs that are reducing their condom distribution programs to qualify for 
PEPFAR money (The Economist 28.07.2005).
Going beyond the idea that “transnational civil society actors matter” in 
international politics, what the particular phenomenon of HIV/AIDS transnational 
activism shows is that these actors are not always autonomous sources of normative 
change in international relations. They can also be instrumentally co-opted by 
powerful states that are interested in using them to advance their foreign policy 
objectives. The puzzle here has been to empirically differentiate between the political
79 Besides those faith-based organisations, there are hundreds o f  other North American based N G O s, 
Academic Institutions and private companies receiving money from PEPFAR.
80 The opportunities created by the “aid boom” towards H IV /A ID S related projects favoured the 
emergence o f  a number o f  organisations that established themselves in developing countries without 
proper knowledge o f  the local conditions. They were staffed by young professionals and volunteers
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agendas and policy processes of HIV/AIDS transnational NGOs and those of states 
and multilateral institutions. The above evidence suggests nonetheless that these 
boundaries are ambiguous.81
5. Conclusions
This chapter analysed the securitising actors or norm leaders that promoted the 
worldwide diffusion o f HASN. It described the fundamental role of the UNAIDS as 
a recognised global authority on HIV/AIDS. It was demonstrated that, by 
constituting understandings and giving normative value to the epidemic, this 
organisation deeply influences the behaviour of state and non-state actors alike. In 
this sense, I argued that, despite the all-encompassing influence of the US, UNAIDS 
can be considered an autonomous actor in the international politics of HIV/AIDS. 
It produces and controls social knowledge about the epidemic and this is what 
constitutes its normative power. The study then examined the bureaucratic structures 
and social mechanisms through which this organisation creates and spreads 
HIV/AIDS norms from the system to the domestic levels.
The study has also focused on the role of the United States as a powerful 
actor in undergoing international normative change. It was shown that material and 
ideational motivations, derived from deep-rooted worldviews and interests, shaped 
the particular way the US government interpreted and reacted to the global epidemic. 
In this regard, the chapter has demonstrated that the US administration’s particular 
conceptualisation of HASN was the result of complex social interactions that
that frequently engaged in activities outside the grasp o f  the established state agencies and 
coordinating mechanisms.
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included pharmaceutical companies, and their preference for costly brand-name 
AIDS drugs, conservative Christians, who are behind PEPFAR’s heavy promotion 
of abstinence and faithfulness practices, and, the Bush administration’s own political 
ideology.
Finally, this chapter has explored the important role played by transnational 
networks of NGOs as instruments of HASN diffusion. Like a conveyor belt, they 
promote normative change by transmitting norms from the international system to 
states and vice-versa. The chapter looked at the main strategies these social groups 
use to inculcate HIV/AIDS policy ideas and principles into the domestic structure of 
states. It has also exposed some central ambiguities in the institutional mission of 
those organisations. Reflecting broader structural contradictions in the global 
securitisation of HIV/AIDS, transnational NGOs of HIV/AIDS activists and 
service providers have been divided by distinct moralistic, pragmatic and sometimes 
opportunistic motivations. In effect, one could say that those HIV/AIDS groups 
skilfully navigate in the turbulent waters that defined the normative contours of 
HASN, bringing relevant information to state and non-state actors and promoting 
HIV/AIDS principles according to the interests/ideas of their particular 
constituencies and patrons.
Since more systematic research is needed to unveil the evolution and 
effects of the transnational phenomena underlying the emergence and global 
propagation of HASN, the argument presented in the previous and present chapters 
aimed to devise the theoretical and empirical basis for this further endeavour. The 
next three chapters will elaborate on how norm leaders link up with their domestic
81 Theoretically, these contentions bring back to light neorealist and neoliberal assumptions about the 
predominance o f  states in international politics as well as Gramscian perspectives which emphasise 
the underlying logics o f  global capitalism in shaping actors’ preferences.
104
audiences through setting up offices and diplomatic representations. These 
bureaucracies interact with local NGOs, state agencies, politicians and key civil 
servants in governments. As noted before, this process works as a sort of 
transnational transmission belt for the diffusion of HASN.
Without denying the active role of international HIV/AIDS norm 
entrepreneurs in South Africa, Botswana and Mozambique, they impacted in very 
different degrees on the domestic structures of those states. As the following 
empirical chapters will demonstrate, the distinctive socio-political and cultural 
circumstances of these Southern African countries triggered different domestic 
dynamics of norm adaptation. This encounter between international normative 
understandings and local belief systems and practices resulted in dissimilar outcomes 
with regards to the national responses to the HIV/AIDS epidemic in each state.82
82 Regionally, in spite o f  the lack o f extensive international relations scholarship about the effects o f  
international norms on regionalism, they also have an important impact on the (re-) shaping o f  
regional organisations’ political agendas and institutional machinery. In this respect, it was sensitivity 
to the transnational securitization o f  H IV/AIDS that led the Southern African Development 
Community (SADC) to recognise the regional dimension o f  the epidemic and adopt policies in 
conformity with the HASN’s principles. Amitav Acharya is an important exception in this regard. See, 
for example, Acharya (2004).
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Chapter 4
Botswana: The Model of Active Engagement
1. Introduction
The unprecedented devastating impact of the HIV/AIDS epidemic in 
Botswana placed this small state in Southern Africa right at the centre of the 
worldwide fight against the disease. In the late 90s, Botswana became a fundamental 
test case for the effectiveness of the HIV/AIDS global response. The government’s 
efforts to overcome the epidemic were very favourably viewed by the international 
community of donors, multilateral agencies and NGOs. Botswana’s stable political 
institutions, responsible government and well-run economy built a strong sense of 
trust among international partners. The generous international offers of human, 
technical, financial and material resources to fight HIV/AIDS are clear evidence of 
that fact. Notwithstanding their conflicting policy priorities, state donors, mosdy the 
US, and multilateral and bilateral agencies found in Botswana a fertile ground for 
working with local HIV/ AIDS actors and for fully developing their policy strategies 
to combat the epidemic.
The following analysis shows that Botswana’s actions on HIV/AIDS 
largely reflected the agenda of the transnational sources of HASN diffusion. In most 
African states, external interference in HIV/AIDS domestic policies is, to a large 
extent, a function of their high level of economic dependence on international 
funding (Baylies, 1999). In Botswana, on the other hand, financial resources have 
never been the most critical constraint on the formulation and implementation of 
HIV/AIDS national plans. Although the government still relies significandy on
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multilateral and bilateral donors to fund HIV/AIDS activities, Botswana is much less 
in need of foreign aid than most Southern African states (apart from South Africa).
This chapter claims that a more fundamental normative accordance 
between international and national principled beliefs and norms underlies the high 
salience of HASN in Botswana. It is argued that the characteristics of Botswana’s 
political and social structures facilitated external access to its domestic system with 
the consequent building up of a robust domestic/international coalition supporting 
HASN. These characteristics include 1) a relatively democratic but centralised state 
with a single party controlling the government since independence; 2) an assertive 
and committed political leadership 2) an efficient state bureaucracy; 3) a weak civil 
society in terms of home-grown political activism, as well as 4) the absence of an 
anti-colonial political culture, created the proper internal conditions for the 
acceptability of the international thinking on HIV/AIDS.
As a result, after a period of norm adaptation, Botswana’s government put 
in place an impressive process of securitisation praised by the international community 
as a positive example in Southern Africa. It is also shown here that the cascading of 
HASN was triggered by the skilful articulation of a security speech-act by President 
Festus Mogae and other influential securitising actots towards the end of the decade. In 
this respect, this chapter claims that, despite the actual context of high HIV 
prevalence rates in Botswana, the argumentative (and other) interactions between 
international securitising actors and domestic audiences were what really determined 
the successful securitisation of HIV/AIDS in the country.
2. Setting the Stage: Botswana’s Post-Colonial Political Culture, HIV/AIDS 
and the Constitution of a “Norm Friendly” State
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The following explores some features of Botswana’s political system and 
culture. The study concentrates on the historical process whereby Botswana 
gradually moved from a pre-colonial political structure, based on traditional forms of 
authority, to a post-colonial modem state. In this regard, it demonstrates that the 
successful political and economic modernisation of Botswana allowed for the 
constitution of a “norm friendly” nation-state in Southern Africa. Ultimately, it 
means that the recognition of HASN in Botswana resonated with the previous 
acceptance of Western conceptions of modernity by the country’s political elites.83
As shown next, Botswana is a case of state-centred domestic structure 
with great executive autonomy in decision-making. Its political culture values a top- 
down type of state-society relations which leaves less room for civil society 
participation in policy making. In this kind of political system, policy innovation is 
unlikely, unless promoted by the top leadership (Risse-Kappen, 1994:209). Indeed, it 
is demonstrated later that, prior to the election of the securitisation-oriented Festus 
Mogae, transnational exchanges between HASN leaders and Botswana’s HIV/AIDS 
domestic actors had less (even though a still significant) impact on HIV/AIDS policy 
making. In this sense, the Botswana case allows for the analytical isolation of the 
Presidency, in particular the president himself, as a key source of policy guidance and 
domestic norm diffusion.
The colonisation of Botswana was unique in Southern Africa. The colonial 
process was markedly less violent than, for example, in South Africa and 
Mozambique. According to Holm, the colonial rule in Botswana was “so mild that 
even the term “indirect rule” would be an exaggeration” (1988:183). In 1884, the
83 I refer to modernity here in terms o f a political system based on a Weberian conceptualisation o f  
modem state; that is a rational-legal authority typical to the Western capitalist culture. For more on 
this, see Palumbo and Scott (2003).
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chiefs of the indigenous Botswana people (Tswana) invited the British to take 
administrative control of their territory. They feared that without British protection 
the hostile Afrikaners would conquer their lands (Keulder, 1998). In 1885, the 
Tswana territory became the British Protectorate of Bechuanaland.84 The British 
ruled in Bechuanaland until independence in 1966.85 The colonial power did not 
oppose the traditional socio-economic system of chiefdoms. In fact, co-operation 
developed between the Tswana chiefly elite and the colonial administration (Good, 
1992:72). The British were very supportive of the system of “rural capitalism” 
established by the Tswana chiefs (Bauer and Taylor, 2005:86). This allowed them far 
more freedom to engage in profitable economic activities as well as to perform 
functions for the benefit of the populace. Given the fact the fewer Europeans setded 
in the Protectorate, less pressure was placed in Britain to protect their interests at the 
expense of indigenous inhabitants. This meant that racism was not so prevalent and 
power configurations were less distorted than in other Southern African colonies 
(Keulder, 1998:99).
Another factor that distinguishes Botswana from the rest of Southern 
Africa is its ethnic homogeneity. The Tswana is by far the largest ethnic group in the 
country, amounting to 85% of the population (Bauer and Taylor, 2005:84). They are 
divided into 8 main chiefdoms: Bamangwato, Bakwena, Bangwaketese, Batawana,
84 The protectorate was, together with Basutoland (Lesotho) and Swaziland, one o f  Britain’s “High 
Commission Territories” in Southern Africa. It was initially administered by the Governor o f  the Cape 
Colony. Following the formation o f  the Union o f  South Africa, in 1910, the Governor-General o f  
South Africa also became the official administrator o f  the Bechuanaland Protectorate. Locally, the 
administration was headed by a “Resident Commissioner” who acted as an actual Governor, albeit 
with less authority than the Governor-General. From 1894 to 1965, when Gaborone was made the 
capital o f  independent Botswana, the Protectorate’s administration was located outside its borders in 
the town o f  Mafikeng, currently the capital o f  South Africa’s North West Province (Du Toit, 1995).
85 During the years following the establishment o f  the protectorate, Cecil Rhode’s British South Africa 
Company tried unsuccessfully to annex the protectorate to Rhodesia (Holm, 1988).
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Bakgatla, Bamalete, Barolong and Batlokwa (Wiseman, 1977:73). Although the 
powers of traditional leaders were substantially reduced, they remained very 
prominent during the colonial period. In the 19th century, the leaders (or chiefs) of 
those tribes had exclusive control over economic resources, such as cattle, land and 
labour. With the support of the colonial power, they became very powerful 
individuals, controlling territory, population and resources (Good, 1992:69). The 
Bamangwato was the largest and the most important of those groups. During the 
1880s, Khama III (the king of the Bamangwato people and grandfather of the later 
President Seretse Khama) was one of the wealthiest individuals among the Tswana 
people and the largest catde-owner (Good, 1992:70).
An indigenous form of elite nationalism grew considerably during the 
1950s and 60s. In the mid 50s, Seretse Khama, heir of King Khama III and a 
barrister trained in London, began to organise political activities aiming at 
independence from Britain. In 1961, the British provided some degree of political 
and administrative autonomy to the protectorate. A legislative council was set up 
after limited national elections. In 1962, Khama formed the Bechuanaland 
Democratic Party (BDP). BDP was founded as the party of bourgeois nationalists, 
who had previously joined the colonial power to promote a particular kind of socio- 
economic system. An extremely popular figure among an electorate eager for 
independence, Khama easily won the 1965 elections. Acting now as the Prime 
Minister of BDP, Khama maintained the push for the complete independence of 
Botswana, which was achieved on 30 September 1966.
Since independence, the BDP has been the hegemonic political force in 
Botswana. It has elected all three presidents to date, Seretse Khama, Quett Masire 
and Festus Mogae. Its dominance derives from it being the party that peacefully led 
Botswana to independence and economic growth (Wiseman, 1998). The charismatic
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appeal of Khama is also an important factor in understanding the consolidation of 
BDP’s political power. Bauer and Taylor, for example, argue that “once Khama was 
elected president, his personal prestige virtually guaranteed the BDP’s repeated 
election victories until up to his premature death in office in 1980” (2005:97). After 
independence, Khama’s government managed to reconcile internal tribal divisions 
under a liberal and non-racial regime. His job was facilitated by the aforementioned 
homogeneous ethnic composition of Botswana’s indigenous people (Wiseman, 
1977:73).
The political organisation of the Botswana state was inspired by the British 
parliamentary system. The legislature at the national level is formed by the National 
Assembly which consists of 57 members elected by popular vote. It also has four 
special non-elected members appointed by the president. The constitution provides 
for a strong executive whereby the president is both head of state and head of 
government. The president is not elected direcdy by the Botswana people. He/She is 
instead chosen by the National Assembly’s members to serve a five year mandate. 
The executive cabinet is made up of members of the ruling party in the National
t
Assembly. It is appointed by the president usually without previous consultations 
with the Parliament. As elsewhere in Southern Africa, the influence of the president 
over the parliament is significant in Botswana. In this respect, Bauer and Taylor 
assert that “the small size of the national legislature ensures that more than a majority 
of MPs from the ruling party are either ministers or deputy ministers”. The cabinet 
members are therefore “easily able through sheer numbers to determine the BDP 
parliamentary delegation’s position in any vote” (2005:95).
Botswana’s post-independence constitution established a formal role at the 
national level for traditional Tswana leaders in the form of the House of Chiefs 
(Bauer and Taylor, 2005:95) - an advisory body which has no legislative capacity.
I l l
Keulder argues that Botswana’s National Assembly often ignored the advice of the 
House of Chiefs and that “only five were literate enough to read and comment on 
the bills that were forwarded to them” (1998:109). Despite its clear limitations in 
terms of political participation, the establishment of the House of Chiefs helped the 
government to engage those leaders in the political modernisation of rural areas. 
Their formal participation in the government’s structure has also created an 
important institutional mechanism to address potential clashes between the 
traditional and modem forms of political authority (Keulder, 1998:109).86
In the period following independence, the BDP engaged in the 
implementation of laws and policies aimed at the creation of a “developmental state” 
in Botswana (Taylor, 2002). In this regard, the government rapidly expanded the 
central government’s institutional apparatus leading to a significant increase in the 
delivery of public services (Du Toit, 1995:33). According to Du Toit, the BDP has 
succeeded in establishing a technocratic state with an autonomous bureaucracy that 
“contributed as a vital ingredient to the quality of statehood that evolved in post­
independence Botswana” (1995:47). BDP’s post-independence nationalism was 
underpinned by the fundamental task of economic growth and social development 
(Taylor, 2002:5). This national project was accepted and advanced by the political
86 Also a result o f  the post-independence modernisation process, the government o f Khama 
drastically reduced the customary rights o f Tswana chiefs. Although the traditional leaders kept a fair 
amount o f  political power at the local level, Khama’s government moved towards incorporating them 
into depoliticised state bureaucracies. The first major step on this direction came even before the 
formal independence o f  Botswana. In 1965, the Chieftainship Law was established, stripping chiefs o f  
both their legislative power and executive authority. Moreover, the creation o f  district and town 
councils replaced hereditary traditional authorities by elected representatives (Wiseman, 1977:73). At 
the local level, traditional chiefs relied upon a deliberative mechanism that is still in place to this day 
known as kgotla. It is basically an assembly o f  adult males who convene to discuss important issues 
concerning their communities. Bauer and Taylor argue that the kgotla “served as a check on chiefly 
authority, since its principal goal was to gain approval o f the members o f  the chiefdom for a given 
course o f  action” (2005:84). After independence, the kgotla was integrated into the local 
administration, becoming an important space for public deliberation at the grass-roots level (Keulder, 
1998:115).
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and bureaucratic elites and, concomitantly, it gained widespread acceptance amongst 
both the rural and urban populations (Taylor, 2002:5).
During the heyday of socialism in post-colonial Africa, all the significant 
political factions in Botswana were supportive of a strategy of development based on 
a system of welfare capitalism. At independence, Botswana was in the group of the 
25 least developed countries in the world. Its physical and social infrastructures were 
highly underdeveloped, which was reflected in its extremely high levels of poverty 
and adult illiteracy. However, over the past four decades the country’s situation has 
changed dramatically. In contrast with most of its regional neighbours, the 
Botswanan government has traditionally committed a large share of its public budget 
to spending in fundamental social areas. During the 70s and 80s, for example, the 
government significandy reduced the rates of child mortality (children who die 
before the age of 5) and malnutrition and steadily improved levels of literacy in the 
adult population. In the public health sector, the country had in 2003 a per capita 
expenditure of US$ 358, the highest in Southern Africa (UNDP, 2003). The GDP 
per capita of Botswana jumped from US$ 300, in 1966, to US$ 3066, in 2001. 
Currendy, Botswana is classified by the World Bank as a middle-income country as 
compared to its status of least-developed in the late 60s. With diamonds as its main 
source of revenue, Botswana is today a wealthy and politically stable state in 
Southern Africa.
Botswana nonetheless faces many challenges. Chief among them is the dire 
magnitude of the HIV/AIDS epidemic. The first case of AIDS in the country was 
officially reported in 1985. From the time of the first notification onwards the 
number of HIV infections soared rapidly, cutting across all social groups and 
economic classes. In 1995, ten years after the first notified case, Botswana’s Ministry 
of Health estimated that 13% of the population was infected by HIV (Ministry of
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Health, 1997). In 2004, Botswana had an estimated number of 400,000 people living 
with HIV in a country with a relatively small population of approximately 1.8 million. 
This amounts to 37.3% of Botswana’s adult population (UNAIDS, 2004d).
Due to the impact of HIV/AIDS, life expectancy in Botswana is only 39 
years, while it is estimated that it would be 72 without the disease (UNDP, 2000). In 
the last 20 years, the plague of HIV/AIDS and its destructive impact has put at risk 
Botswana’s hard-won social and economic achievements.87 In Botswana, the 
HIV/AIDS epidemic is destroying years of impressive realisations in human 
development. It has caused extreme human suffering, deepening poverty, social 
dislocation and economic destitution. If the progression of HIV/AIDS is not halted, 
it is estimated that by 2021, Botswana’s GDP will be something in the order o f 24- 
38% less than what it would have been without the epidemic (UNDP, 2000:2).
In the politics of AIDS, the case of Botswana is puzzling. It challenges the 
common belief that economic underdevelopment and HIV spreading are direcdy 
related. With nearly 40% of its population carrying the HIV virus, Botswana’s health 
system remains one of the best on the African continent (UNDP, 2004). As will be 
demonstrated in more detail, since the first cases appeared in Botswana, the 
government has closely followed international medical guidelines for action. Since 
1998, President Mogae has pushed the HIV/AIDS problem to the level of a national 
catastrophe. Special state agencies, policies and high-profile partnerships were 
established with a wide range of well-resourced actors to contain the epidemic.
The abovementioned characteristics of Botswana’s domestic structure 
influenced the trajectory of the national response to HIV/AIDS. The peaceful and
87 For example, due to AIDS, child mortality in Botswana increased by 5.3% annually from 1990 to 
2002 (UNICEF, 2004:20).
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negotiated transition to independence with the continuation of friendly relations with 
the previous colonial power facilitated Botswana’s subsequent penetration by 
Western ideas, such as in the case of transnational norms concerning HIV/AIDS. 
Conversely, as shown later in the examples of Mozambique and South Africa, the 
colonial heritage of most African states resulted in quite negative perceptions of 
Western influence. Additionally, the ethnic homogeneity of Botswana’s society, 
coupled with its early inclusion in the BDP’s project of nation-building, facilitated 
the Tswana elites’ task of unifying the nation in situations of perceived crisis. Finally, 
Botswana’s centralised and top-down political system provided transnational HASN 
leaders with just a few entry points into the domestic structure of decision-making. 
Rather than building coalitions at the civil society level, they reached the top skeleton 
of decision-making. After 1998, the openness of Mogae to the ideas of those 
(securitising) actors was reflected by the (rather successful) securitisation of the 
epidemic in the country.
3. Institutional Strategies and HIV/AIDS Policies in Botswana
This section outlines how HASN penetration in Botswana underwent a 
long process of adaptation (or reconstruction), which was reflected in the 
progression of the policy responses put in place by the government over the years. In 
this regard, the latest National Strategic Framework (2003-2009) and the launching, 
in 2002, of the large-scale provision of antiretroviral drugs in the public health 
system represented the ultimate policy outcomes in terms of the institutionalisation 
of HASN in Botswana's political structure of decision-making. These outcomes saw 
the creation of new tasks and procedures and the displacement or considerable 
adaptation of previous methods. During the process, the target issue (HIV/AIDS)
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was institutionally rearranged to become central in the existing hierarchy of policy 
priorities.
Due to its stable political situation and an efficient health system, Botswana 
responded to the problem of HIV/AIDS earlier than its Southern African 
neighbours, including South Africa and Mozambique.88 During the first ten years of 
the epidemic, however, the response was confined to a number of policy 
interventions at the level of the Ministry of Health without the political engagement 
of higher authorities in the government (Interview Tselayakgosi 16.02.2006). The 
first phase of the national response (1987-1993) coincided with the beginning of the 
worldwide expansion of the epidemic. In 1988, the government of Botswana set up 
the National Aids Control Programme (NACP) and developed a Short Term Plan 
(STP). It was followed by a more comprehensive five year plan (1989-1993), named 
the First Medium Term Plan I (MTP I). These two plans were based on the action 
framework provided by the WHO’s Global Programme on AIDS.
By this time, WHO had changed its initial view of HIV/AIDS as primarily 
a public health problem of rich countries in the West. As already noted, around the 
mid-80s, an expanding international epistemic community of doctors, NGOs, and 
other HIV/AIDS actors had given global publicity to the heterosexual epidemic and 
its particular impact in Africa (Iliffe, 2006:69). During this initial stage, WHO 
collaborated closely with Botswana’s Ministry of Health in implementing policies 
focusing mainly on HIV/AIDS surveillance and control. The number one priority 
set by WHO was to screen blood supplies in health facilities in poor countries so the 
medical system would no longer create new infections. Following WHO’s advice and
88 As seen later, internal strife in South Africa and Mozambique delayed their responses to the 
epidemic. South Africa was immersed in the domestic political struggle against apartheid until 1994 
and Mozambique was plagued by a gruesome civil war that only came to an end in 1992.
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with its technical assistance, the Epidemiology Unit of Botswana’s Ministry of Health 
set up a blood screening programme and stepped up its controls of the use and 
provision of disposable needles in the National Health System (Ministry of Health, 
1997).
Another key objective of WHO was to invest in mass public education, 
which in the absence of a vaccine or cure, was the only means available to check the 
epidemic. In Botswana during the late 80s, radio and press were widely used to 
spread information about HIV/AIDS. Posters, t-shirts and car stickers were also 
produced and extensively distributed. The catchphrases used in the government’s 
campaigns followed the standards set up by WHO. Posters with slogans such as 
“AIDS Kills” and “Use Condoms” were put up in health facilities and other public 
places (Ingstad, 1990:29). In 1988, the Ministry of Health launched an educational 
campaign, having the promotion of condom as the central message. As Heald notes, 
“[HIV/AIDS campaigns] were all phrased in terms of the accepted formulations of 
the international organizations. Reading the plans one can not but be impressed.” 
(2005:5).
These campaigns had a very limited impact nonetheless. In the early 90s, 
because of the high publicity given to an elusive illness that most people had not 
experienced in their real lives, HIV/AIDS became ironically known amongst 
Botswanans as the “radio disease” (Ingstad, 1990:29). In 1992, the HIV prevalence 
rate in antenatal clinics was already exceeding 15%, the same as in Mozambique in 
2000.89 It was clear at this point that WHO’s initial strategy was having little effect. 
As with most states in Africa, in Botswana the Western (technical) message of
89 In the early 90s, the number o f  HTV infections among pregnant women in Botswana’s urban areas 
was escalating rapidly. In the localities o f  Lobatse and Serowe, the prevalence rates rose from 17.8% 
and 19.9% respectively to over 30% in both places in 1997 (UNDP, 2000:42).
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prevention through condoms and mass education did not make a significant impact 
in controlling the fast-growing epidemic. The scientific/rational approach of WHO 
was proved insensitive to the pre-existing cultural and social complexities of their 
target states.
As already seen, given the widespread frustration with W HO’s narrow 
(medical) approach to HIV/AIDS in the early to mid 90s, international discourses 
concerning HIV/AIDS started to shift again. Now, the epidemic was not seen any 
longer as solely a medical problem that could be addressed through preventive 
measures such as public education and mass distribution of condoms. The African 
epidemic had shown that risky sexual behaviour is also about gender vulnerability, 
deep-rooted cultural traditions and extreme poverty. In this sense, chapter 2 
demonstrated that the first half of the 90s was a period of redefinitions in the global 
HIV/AIDS response. An inter-paradigmatic conflict took place between WHO and 
other multilateral actors and state donors over the definition of HIV/AIDS policies 
and principles.
This stalemate in the HIV/AIDS global response was reflected in 
Botswana’s domestic initiatives. From 1993 to 1997, the period between the first and 
second medium-term plans, the Botswanan government lost most of the energy 
displayed in the late 80s. Throughout the 90s, and following the initial line of WHO, 
HIV/AIDS was still seen by most officials in the government as solely a medical 
condition which should be dealt with by the Ministry of Health. In this respect, a 
high-ranked official at the National AIDS Coordinating Agency (NACA) asserts that,
Until the early 90s we were still in the stage of denial. People in the government 
thought that it was not a real problem that the Ministry of Health was just trying to 
make us cautious about HIV/AIDS. But then came the time, around the mid 90s, 
when we realised how big the problem was and if we did not aggressively react it 
could be it; we would have a whole generation wiped out [...] It only really cascaded
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though from 1999 when Mogae took office. His leadership was fundamental in this 
respect (Interview Tselayakgosi 16.02.2006).
An interesting thing about the Botswana case is that at the time when the 
epidemic was spreading most quickly in the country (in the early 90s), the 
government slowed down the response. Despite the alarming progression of 
HIV/AIDS, state officials seemed unconvinced about the seriousness of the 
problem. According to the Ministry of Health’s review of the MTP I, one major 
constraint on implementation was the ‘‘minimal involvement of Ministries and senior 
management as well as inadequate involvement of local government structures” 
(Ministry of Health, 1997:31). In this respect, the above remark from the NACA’s 
official suggests that the definitional moment or the tipping point in which a 
securitisation move became widely accepted by a target audience came only with the 
assertive leadership of Festus Mogae, after 1998.
By this time, the authoritative presence in Botswana of the newly formed 
UNAIDS also gave a new impulse in the securitisation attempts of international 
norm leaders. As already noted, the creation of this multilateral agency was the result 
of a revamped global initiative for tackling HIV/AIDS. Thus, the emergence of a 
revitalised and more unified (security) discourse among global HIV/AIDS actors 
coupled with the election of a new (open-minded) president in Botswana, brought 
crucial momentum to Botswana’s HIV/AIDS response. As demonstrated next, 
Mogae’s discursive interactions with (reformed) sources of HASN diffusion 
transformed him into a key norm leader who aggressively pushed for the 
securitisation of the epidemic.
From the mid-90s, the Botswanan government slowly began to realise that 
the Ministry of Health alone would not be able to face the challenges posed by the 
fast expanding epidemic. It was by then that the identification of HIV/AIDS as an
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emergency and an exceptional kind of problem began to become more salient in the 
discourses of local and international stakeholders. Under the presidency of Ketumile 
Masire, the government formulated the Presidential Directive of a National AIDS 
Policy (NAP). This policy document articulated for the first time the government’s 
concerns about the impact of the epidemic on the country’s development. It 
acknowledged the multi-dimensional impact of HIV/ AIDS and mobilised a variety 
of sectors to collaborate on the national response. NAP represented a significant 
change in the policy debates on HIV/AIDS in Botswana. Its portrayal of 
HIV/AIDS as a development issue had a significant impact on how the epidemic 
would be presented in public debates in subsequent years. NAP defined new policy 
standards that were further consolidated with the adoption of the second Medium 
Term Plan for the period 1997-2002 (MTP II). This revised strategic plan 
substantially changed the focus of HIV/AIDS interventions from a health-based 
approach to a comprehensive multisectoral response.90
The adoption of the MTP II was illustrative of the evolving nature of 
normative understandings of the HIV/AIDS epidemic at the global level. The 
preparation of the MTP II coincided with the emergence of policy studies and 
academic reports addressing the epidemic in non-conventional terms. In 1996, the
90 MTP II also introduced an important institutional innovation. With the adoption o f  the plan, the 
Ministry o f  Local Government (MLG) became a key institution in the national H IV /A ID S response. 
It is in charge o f  managing, sustaining and coordinating strategic actions at the district level. The idea 
was to adapt the HTV/AIDS bureaucratic structures in the national government to the Ministry’s 
divisions at the local level. It was charged with the administration o f  the District Multi-Sectoral Aids 
Committees (DMSAC). MTP II established the DMSACs to coordinate all the local stakeholders’ 
inputs. Basically, it was designed to become the sole HTV/AIDS local authority recognised by the 
central government. The relevance given to the MLG is due to the fact that the Botswanan 
government has found enormous difficulties in addressing demands at the grassroots level (Ministry 
o f Health, 1997). As noted earlier, traditional forms o f  authority still play an important role in local 
administration. In addition to elected committees, who report directly to higher officials in the 
Botswanan government, villages have also maintained their hereditary chiefdom structure. The elected 
representatives have to report to the village chief and council. Nevertheless, chiefs cannot act 
independendy o f  higher authorities in the Botswanan government (Allen and Heald, 2004:1147).
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launching of the MTP II also corresponded at the multilateral level with the creation 
of UNAIDS. As shown in chapter 2, during this period, a growing number of 
analysts, think-tanks, international organisations and state agencies began to explore 
the links between human/national security and HIV/AIDS.
The transfer of power from Ketumile Masire to Festus Mogae in April 
1999 represented a watershed event in Botswana’s HIV/AIDS national response. 
Mogae’s proactive role at the National Aids Council (NAC) gave new impetus to 
Botswana’s HIV/AIDS response. In the first year of the new administration, the 
government of Botswana, under the directive of the President’s office, put in place 
the National AIDS Coordinating Agency (NACA). This new organ replaced the 
outdated National Aids Control Programme (NACP) of the Ministry of Health. In 
terms of the political management of HIV/AIDS, the most important institutional 
change brought by NACA was the shift in the locus of leadership from the Ministry 
of Health to the Presidency. Chaired by Mogae, NACA became responsible for 
mobilising material and human resources and coordinating the national response at 
all levels of decision-making. In collaboration with many national and international 
partners, NACA set up a national committee to revise the MTP II and formulate a 
new strategic framework to facilitate its further implementation. This new framework 
aimed to provide clear guidance for ministries, NGOs and the private sector as well 
as to enable them to work in a collaborative manner under the centralised authority 
of NACA (NACA, 2002a).
Additionally, in 2001, during the preparation of the national strategic 
framework, and following the advice of UNAIDS, the Botswanan government 
incorporated the idea of mainstreaming HIV/AIDS into all its ministries’ 
bureaucracies and levels of decision-making. It was done through the establishment 
of Ministry AIDS Coordinators (MACs), which were focal point units within the
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Ministries. They act as infiltrated agents of sorts, spreading the securitisation message of the 
HIV/AIDS national response.91 MACs target both the internal and external domains. 
Internally, in the workplace, they address the needs and vulnerabilities of the staff 
and formulate internal policies and guidelines. Those guidelines were taught to civil 
servants in seminars and workshops organised by MACs. Externally, they assess the 
comparative advantages of the specific bureaucracy in contributing to the 
coordinated national response to the epidemic. Simply put, MACs are responsible for 
adapting the Ministries normal functions and businesses to the needs of the national 
multisectoral response to HIV/AIDS (NACA, 2003a:57).
In September 2002, Mogae launched the Strategic Framework for 
HIV/AIDS (2003-2009). It represented the most inclusive and comprehensive 
HIV/AIDS action guide elaborated in Botswana to date. This revised strategy 
incorporated the new international developments concerning the conceptualisation 
of the HIV/AIDS epidemic as an emergencial threat. The language used by Mogae 
in the framework’s foreword is indicative of the more aggressive approach taken by 
the Botswanan government. He says,
Having declared HIV/AIDS a national emergency, this National Strategic 
Framework is my Government’s pronouncement on how we will continue to address 
this emergency [...] outlining an aggressive and determined response, this framework 
brings all the stakeholders together into the fight” (NACA, 2003a: 1).
A new feature of the strategic framework was its stronger emphasis on 
policies directed towards the provision of anti-retroviral drugs (ARVs). This renewed 
importance given to treatment was in conformity with the discovery of a more 
efficient and less harmful combination of HIV/AIDS drugs. As part of the domestic
91 By the time o f  the production o f  this chapter, only the Ministry o f  Health and Local Government
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incorporation of these new global developments, in 2001, the Botswanan 
government, under the leadership of Mogae, put in place a bold plan to roll out ARV 
drugs nationwide. Botswana was the first state on the African continent to put in 
place a plan aiming to provide antiretroviral drugs to all its AIDS patients. The 
possibility of delivering ARVs on a mass scale helped to reactivate policy-makers, 
health workers and NGOs of people living with HIV/AIDS.
In January 2002, the national ARVs programme, named Masa (‘new dawn’ 
in Tswana), was launched. The objective of Masa is to provide treatment to everyone 
in need of it. By 2005, with financial and technical assistance from a public/private 
experiment, the African Comprehensive HIV/AIDS Partnerships (ACHAP)92, the 
government had set up 20 operational ARV sites all over the country, covering 
something like 40,000 patients through the public health system (Ministry of Health, 
2005a). The Infectious Diseases Care Clinic, at the Princess Marina Hospital, in 
Gaborone, is currently the largest ARV treatment site in Africa. In April 2004, it had 
9,000 patients enrolled for AIDS treatment (Interview Tselayakgosi 16.02.2006). As 
further explored later, the Masa programme was a unique initiative in Southern 
Africa. While most countries in the region invested in the provision of generic AIDS 
drugs, the Botswanan government chose to ally with the US pharmaceutical Merck to 
provide branded drugs in the public health system. The introduction of treatment in 
2002 gave renewed urgency to other areas of the HIV/AIDS national plan. As 
shown later, the launching of several Voluntary HIV/AIDS Counselling and Testing 
(VCT) centres and the introduction of routine testing in public health clinics were 
corollaries of the Masa programme (Ministry of Health, 2005a).
had already set up operational MACs within their bureaucracies (Interview NACA official 30.08.2004).
92 The role played by ACHAP in Botswana will be addressed later in this chapter.
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Likewise, the re-engagement of the government in prevention campaigns 
was due to the realisation that “giving antiretroviral drugs without stopping new 
infections would be akin to trying to mop up a floor without first switching off the 
tap responsible for the flood” (Interview Tselayakgosi 16.02.2006). Yet, concerning 
the prevention of HIV infection, Mogae’s administration invested strongly in the 
(alternative) securitisation ideas promoted by the US government. From 2003/2004, 
Bush’s PEPFAR initiative sponsored prevention campaigns with a new strategic 
focus on abstinence and faithfulness instead of the previous emphasis on the use of 
condoms. As seen later, because of PEPFAR, large amounts of money became 
available in Botswana to implement these kinds of prevention strategies.
At this later stage of Botswana’s HIV/AIDS response, Mogae was leading 
a massive national effort to slow down the epidemic with most Ministries, 
international partners and other HIV/AIDS actors engaged in the fight. The 
following section elucidates how his strong personal leadership gave a unified 
direction to the national HIV/AIDS response amidst conflicting normative precepts 
and practices of securitising actors. Similar to the cases of Mozambique and South 
Africa, in Botswana the particular perceptions and beliefs of key decision-makers 
were decisive elements in understanding the domestic assimilation of HASN.
4. Leadership Perceptions and the Domestic Recognition of HASN
This section argues that Mogae’s security language with regard to 
HIV/AIDS was influenced by the appearance of a more extreme international view 
of the threat the global epidemic represented. It suggests that he was successfully 
persuaded by international and national advisers (securitising actors/norm leaders) 
that HIV/AIDS should be securitised. Then, Mogae himself became a key
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securitising actor in Botswana. In fact, he was a crucial actor in promoting the 
cascading of HASN domestically.
Mogae’s strong securitisation language after 1999 had a significant impact on 
the national response to HIV/AIDS. He seized on the epidemic as the most urgent 
challenge facing Botswana, even going so far as saying that the epidemic was a threat 
to the very survival of Botswana as a viable nation.93 At this point, Mogae officially 
declared HIV/AIDS a national emergency, giving high priority and strong political 
support to the fight against it. The vocabulary of securitisation became recurrent in 
the language Mogae used to describe the threat posed by the epidemic. The use of 
discursive metaphors that translated the epidemic in terms of an enemy to be 
defeated became commonplace in his speeches.94 The president cast himself as the 
commander-in-chief of the nation in the war against the spread of the virus and its 
impact. His aggressive pronouncements marked a change in the manner the 
Botswanan government rhetorically framed HIV/AIDS.
As Risse-Kappen notes, “ideas do not flow freely” (1994:185). This means 
that ideas are attached to particular carriers (or norm leaders) who try to spread them 
widely. Indeed, the idea of securitising HIV/AIDS was embraced by Mogae at a time 
when powerful epistemic communities and donor states were also framing the 
epidemic on those terms. If one compares the extract below of Mogae’s speech in
2000 with UNAIDS assertion about the impact of the epidemic in Botswana, 
released in the same year, one will clearly identify the similarity in the use of a specific
93 President Festus Mogae stated in 2000 that "half, if  not more, o f  today's natural deaths are caused 
by AIDS [...] We stand at the crossroads o f  a threat to the annihilation o f  our nation" (.BBC News 
7.11.2000).
94 See, for example, President Mogae’s State o f the nation address to the Parliament, in 29 October
2001 and his pronouncement at the US’ Congress during the H IV /A ID S Task Force Conference, in 
12/11/2003. On this occasion, he stated that “[...] we have spoken o f  the H IV/AIDS pandemic as a 
war that needs to be won [...]”. For more on this, see also “Africa’s Success Story, Botswana Gears up 
for Elections”, Agence France Press, 24 October 2004.
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terminology to assess the threat the epidemic symbolises and therefore how it should 
be dealt with.
“ [...] Let us as Africa take responsibility for ourselves and be true leaders in fighting 
the greatest threat to our development and security. Let us deal with the HIV/AIDS 
epidemic as an emergeny and respond with measures that a crisis deserves. Let us 
divert resources from military expenditure to fighting the HIV epidemic [my 
emphasis]” (UNECA, 2000: internet source).
“ [...] The HIV/AIDS epidemic in Botswana is the deadliest emergency and the biggest 
social and economic crisis facing the country today. After three decades of sustained 
economic growth, HIV is threatening to wipe out hard-won gains in social 
development [my emphasis]” (UNAIDS, 2000:8)
Similarly, Mogae’s emphasis on words such as “threat”, “emergency”, 
“war” came about just at the same time as the Clinton administration formally 
declared HIV/AIDS a “threat” to US National Security. In this respect, it is 
interesting to note the very influential role played by the US government’s agencies 
and the private sector in assisting Botswana’s response to the HIV/AIDS epidemic. 
As shown later, the US is the most important donor state in the country, sponsoring 
various HIV/AIDS projects through the PEPFAR programme and the private 
sector. These institutional and financial bounds facilitated the harmonisation of 
national discourses on the epidemic and its consequent impact on the definition of 
policy directions.
The domestic salience of HASN in Botswana was to a large extent due to 
Mogae’s openness to these transnational ideas. In this respect, his sympathetic stance 
towards Western-based knowledge of the epidemic, coupled with the need for 
coherent policy prescriptions in a perceived situation of emergencial crisis, are crucial 
elements in explaining the successful securitisation of HIV/AIDS in Botswana. 
Mogae’s particular beliefs and perceptions of externally defined HIV/AIDS
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principles deeply influenced his policy choices. As seen in the forthcoming case 
studies of South Afdca and Mozambique, when presented with similar external 
pressures to securitise HIV/AIDS, decision-makers can display quite distinct 
reactions. Acharya notes, for example, that “localization does not extinguish the 
cognitive prior of the norm-takers but leads to its mutual inflection with external 
norms” (2004:251). In the case of Botswana, key elements of Mogae’s belief system 
and decision-making style shaped his sensitivity to the securitisation demands of 
international actors.95
In contrast to the Marxist-Leninist and strong anti-colonial background of 
Thabo Mbeki, in South Africa, and Joaquim Chissano, in Mozambique, Mogae’s 
worldview was informed by knowledge, values and concepts originated in the 
Western liberal community as well as in the lessons learnt from his country’s smooth 
transition to independence. During his period abroad, Mogae was trained within the 
Western European tradition of political liberalism and welfare capitalism. He 
graduated in economics at Oxford University then served as governor for Botswana 
at the International Monetary Fund (IMF), African Development Bank and World 
Bank. From 1976 to 1980, he worked for the IMF in Washington DC. Mogae’s 
professional socialisation within these multilateral bodies helped to shape his political 
identity, which would influence his future behaviour as Botswana’s leader. His close 
links with these dominant Western institutions, which are often perceived as political 
instruments to legitimise and further perpetuate a type of global apartheid against
95 There is a robust body o f  academic literature on non-rational or psychological elements in processes 
o f  decision-making. This has been transplanted to the area o f  foreign policy analysis by a number o f  
authors. The most fruitful o f  those debates has been around the idea o f  “misperceptions” in foreign 
policy-making (Jervis, 1976). There is no space here for a comprehensive examination o f  this 
literature. A key point o f  this scholarship however is that decision-makers operate within a pre­
existent cultural and psychological environment that help them to interpret the world and respond to 
it. For more on this body o f  work, see, Janis (1982), Axelrod (1983), Little and Steve (1988), 
Vertzberger (1990).
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disempowered African societies (Bond, 2002), set him aside from other southern 
African leaders, namely Thabo Mbeki, in South Africa, and Robert Mugabe, in 
Zimbabwe. Unlike Mogae, these former liberation fighters frequently defy Western 
hegemonic orthodoxies, which they identify as forms of neo-colonial interference in 
Africa. As seen later, Mbeki’s combative stance towards mainstream knowledge 
about HIV/AIDS is an example of this.96
Building on the legacy and personal prestige of Seretse Khama, Mogae also 
shaped his political outlook in terms of continuity with his country’s past. A clear 
sign of Mogae’s commitment to the tradition of Botswana’s first leader, he chose Ian 
Khama, the son of Seretse Khama, as his vice president. As already seen, Khama was 
a pragmatic leader who challenged traditionalism and racism and unified the country 
under the banner of economic and social development (Holm, 1988).97 The 
importance given by Khama to the development of Botswana, during and after the 
colonial years, provided everlasting political capital to his successors. This is clearly 
demonstrated by the uninterrupted election victories of Khama’s BDP since 
independence (Wiseman, 1998).
In terms of leadership style, Mogae can be described as a kind of “task- 
oriented leader” (Keller, 2005:210). According to Keller, “task-oriented leaders 
exhibit a more directive management style, viewing others as tools to be used to 
accomplish the all-important mission rather than as actors with legitimate views that
96 In 1966, while pursuing a Masters Degree in Economics at Sussex University, Mbeki was very active 
in student politics, as one o f  the African National Congress’s (ANC) representatives in exile. As 
shown later, in 1970, he was sent to the Soviet Union for military training before returning to Africa 
to work as assistant secretary o f  the Revolutionary Council in Lusaka, Zambia (Jacobs and Calland, 
2002). Acting as South African president, despite being usually portrayed as a progressive leader, 
Mbeki has been accused o f  “talking left and walking right” while implementing macroeconomic and 
social reforms (Bond, 2004).
97 In a time when racial mixing was a serious social offence, Khama married a white woman, while 
studying in Britain, provoking intense reactions as far afield as Apartheid South Africa. It seems 
unrealistic to imagine something similar happening in the high political ranks o f  either Frelimo, in
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must be respected and accommodated [my emphasis]” (2005:210). Despite Keller’s 
interesting definition of “task-oriented leaders”, he does not discuss the crucial issue 
of how an “all-important mission” is defined. It has been shown here that the 
process of securitising an issue (in other words, turning it into an “all-important 
mission”) depends on inter subjective linguistic processes which involve consultation 
and engagement with others. Mogae’s identification of HIV/AIDS as an “all- 
important mission” was the result of his interaction with various actors upholding a 
number of different views. In this respect, Mogae’s direct involvement with 
HIV/AIDS state bureaucracies, such as NACA, as well as his links with HIV/AIDS 
epistemic communities based in Botswana exposed him to a marketplace of ideas 
(Kaufmann, 2004) concerning the epidemic.98 In this sense, the features of a “task- 
oriented leader” only surfaced in Mogae’s leadership style after he was successfully 
persuaded of the emergency of the HIV/AIDS threat.
As shown later, Mogae’s decision to establish routine HIV testing in 
Botswana, at a time when it was not common practice among African states, was due 
to a long consultative process in which the US representation in the country played a 
key role (Interview Roels 13.02.2006). However, after the decision was made, Mogae 
simply ignored opposing views which defended the confidentiality of tests.99 To 
boost enrolment in HIV testing, he went further, trying to push forward a very 
controversial measure which would establish compulsory HIV testing for students 
applying for government’s scholarships. In this respect, he allegedly said that “I
Mozambique, or ANC, in South Africa, during their violent struggles against Portuguese colonialism 
and Apartheid respectively (Bauer and Taylor, 20.05:87).
98 The next section further explores the actual mechanisms by which transnational HASN leaders 
influenced decision-making in Botswana.
99 After substantial foreign pressure, Mogae reluctantly accommodated his critics by slightly changing 
HIV testing procedures (The Washington Times 10.04.2004).
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know it won’t be popular. But I think we are going to do it anyway” (The Washington 
Times 10.04.2004).
But how did Mogae’s rhetoric impact on the domestic political and social 
structure of Botswana? Chris Hill affirms that the leader’s political appeal depends 
upon “qualities of brilliance, strength and emotional insight, and then circumstances 
in which there is some kind of political or emotional vacuum to be filled [...]” 
(2004:110). Concerning Botswana, this meant that in a circumstance of (perceived) 
national emergency and uncertainty about the future, Mogae successfully conveyed 
his charismatic appeal with a security rhetoric that emphasised the perception of 
threat on the collective national imagination. The use of fear as a political tool to 
unite society under a set of principles and policy goals is not a novelty in politics 
(Mueller, 2005). In the case of Botswana, this task was further facilitated by a political 
culture of strong popular reliance on the personal guidance of the top leadership. As 
already noted, Mogae has constantly recited in speeches that if nothing is done, the 
people of Botswana are risking extinction from AIDS. For example, in a State of the 
Nation address, in Botswana’s parliament, he categorically asserted that,
The nation has been informed, and the message must be repeated from this rostrum 
that HIV/AIDS is the most serious challenge facing our nation, and a threat to our 
continued existence as a people. But we shall never surrender, we are fighting back 
and together we shall win (Ministry of State President, 2001:2).
This kind of sentiment coming from the nation’s leader had an important 
socialising effect on both the country’s political institutions and on people’s 
understandings about the security impact of the epidemic. The appeal of the leader is 
even stronger in domestic contexts which lack a vibrant civil society providing 
alternative views about issues. As analysed later, HIV/AIDS civil society groups in
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Botswana were successfully co-opted by the government and international partners 
to work within a common policy paradigm.
In personalist political systems such as in Botswana (as well as 
Mozambique and South Africa), individual (charismatic) leaders are fundamental 
target audiences of international securitising actors. The way they respond to (accept, 
adapt or reject) the securitisation claim will fundamentally determine the depth and 
form of securitisation. In the case of Botswana, Mogae’s leadership characteristics 
combined with Botswana’s enabling political culture have facilitated the persuasion work 
of the HASN leaders. In this sense, Mogae has successfully prioritised HIV/AIDS as 
an immediate threat and mobilised institutions, resources and citizens to deal with it. 
In what follows, the study turns to the analysis of the role of external actors in 
shaping Botswana’s HIV/AIDS structures and policies.
5. Norm leaders in Action: The role of Multilateral Institutions, the US and 
Transnational Non-State Actors
5.1. The Multilateral Approach
This section argues that, since the onset of the global securitisation of 
HIV/AIDS, around the mid 90s, policy structures in Botswana have been very 
receptive to the influence of international organisations. In this regard, the so-called 
“UN family”, especially UNDP and UNAIDS, have played a key role in helping 
ministries and other state agencies to develop policies and programmes and in 
assisting the government in their implementation.
As already shown, the setting up of the Second Medium Term Plan (MTP 
II) represented a transitional stage in the process of internalising a new (and more
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aggressive) transnational conceptualisation of the HIV/AIDS epidemic. The Plan, 
for the first time, recognised the multidimensional impact of the epidemic and the 
need for a comprehensive response that included a coalition of sectors working 
under a single authority. These changes commenced in 1994, in the same year 
UNDP released its report on human security, and came into force in 1997, one year 
after the UN had promoted a similar institutional shift with the creation of its own 
multisectoral co-coordinating agency, the Joint United Nations Programme on 
HIV/AIDS (UNAIDS). These new areas of international concern, particularly with 
regard to a more concerted response to the epidemic, guided the development of 
MTP II’s strategies.
During the preparation of the Plan, from 1994 to 1996, these transnational 
ideas were introduced in Botswana through an extensive consultative process 
involving a series of “programming workshops” (Ministry of Health, 1997). The 
activities were developed by the Botswanan government in concert with multilateral 
agencies. UNDP, for example, played a key role during the elaboration of MTP II.100 
In several of those workshops, UNDP brought together high ranked officials from 
several Ministries, the private sector, NGOs and international partners. In these 
meetings, UNDP and other UN agencies taught those actors how to fulfil their roles 
in the new HIV/AIDS policy machinery established by MTP II. 101 The knowledge- 
based authority of multilateral agencies has given them substantial leverage in
100 In addition to the collaboration with the government, the U N  agencies have worked closely with 
other sectors and actors. For example, UNICEF has been very active in HTV/AIDS civil society 
related projects since at least 1991. It has assisted various projects over the years developed by 
organisations such as the Botswana Network o f  AIDS Service Organisations (BONASO), the 
University o f  Botswana and the Association o f  Teachers Against Aids. (Ministry o f  Health, 
1997:28/29)
101 The chief economist o f  the U N D P’s H IV/AIDS Programme, Des Cohen, and the Director o f  the 
U N D P’s Regional project on H IV/AIDS, Roland Msiska, were directly involved in the discussions 
that preceded the launching o f  MTP II (Ministry o f  Health, 1997:xiii).
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persuading the government about the existential threat posed by HIV/AIDS and the 
urgent need for its securitisation. These organisations constantly examined the 
HIV/AIDS policy establishments of Botswana and provided ideas and models to 
improve them. For example, WHO (and then UNAIDS) has been in favour of 
greater bureaucratic centralisation in coordinating an expanded HIV/AIDS response 
which would include all international and domestic HIV/AIDS actors. During the 
formulation of MTP II, a WHO/UNDP-led team reviewed Botswana’s HIV/AIDS 
structures and policies and recommended the establishment of a supra-ministerial 
agency to coordinate the overall national response. NACA was set up in 1999 as a 
follow-up of this recommendation (Interview Tselayakgosi 16.02.2006).
From 2003, the Strategic Framework for H IV  I  A ID S  (2003-2009) further 
formalised the channels of communication between domestic and external 
HIV/AIDS actors. Currently, the institutional space in which the persuasion practices 
(or speech articulations) of these organisations take place are constituted by two main 
forums. These are the Botswana H IV )A D S  Partnership Forum, which is coordinated 
by NACA, and the Expanded Development Partner Forum, a group made up by the 
UNAIDS Theme Group and other bilateral and multilateral partners. The Botswana 
Partnership Forum is the main channel for international organisations and bilateral 
donors to interact with high-ranked government officials. The outcomes of their 
meetings are brought up at the National Aids Council and, thus, to its chairperson, 
the president himself. The Expanded Partner Forum is the common space whereby 
bilateral and multilateral actors coordinate their activities and harmonise policy 
positions. Since the emergence of PEPFAR, the collective work of this forum has 
been undermined by the “go-alone” approach o f the US as well as by the 
aforementioned incompatibilities over HIV/AIDS policies between the US and 
multilateral partners (Interview UNAIDS Programme Officer 15.02.2006).
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The UNAIDS and its co-sponsors produced a number of comprehensive 
studies on the dire implications of HIV/AIDS in Botswana which have had a 
significant impact on policy decision-making. One such an example is the Botswana 
Country Report on Women, Girls and H IV / A ID S . The study highlighted the specific 
challenges faced by young women in Botswana and their centrality in any effective 
intervention to halt the spread of HIV/AIDS (UNAIDS, 2004e).102 In 2004, the 
UNAIDS Theme Group played a major role in producing this report. Based on its 
findings and policy recommendations, a committee, chaired by the Minister of 
Health, developed a special national plan of action for women, girls and HIV/AIDS 
(Interview UNAIDS Programme Officer 15.02.2006). Usually, the release of these 
studies is followed by meetings with government officials, who would eventually 
propose the translation of the studies’ recommendations into policy (Interview 
UNAIDS Programme Officer 15.02.2006). As acknowledged by UNDP, “in going 
upstream on HIV and AIDS policy advocacy, UNDP relied on aggressive marketing 
of research output to sensitive policy makers as well as the general public” (UNDP, 
2001:4). For example, in 2000, UNDP developed a Botswana Human Development Report 
dedicated to the impact of HIV/AIDS on Botswana’s human development 
achievements since independence. This latter document showed a disquieting decline 
in Botswana’s human development index and a deteriorating performance in relation 
to other countries at the same level of economic development (UNDP, 2000:2).103 
The report had the intended effect of prompting the Botswanan government to 
further intensify the response to the epidemic.
102 In 2003, all district prevalence rates among women attending antenatal clinics were above 20% and 
some exceeded 50% (NACA, 2003b:21).
103 According to the report, high morbidity and mortality rates due to H IV/AIDS have caused 
Botswana to fall dramatically on the U N DP Human Development Index rankings from 71st place in 
1996 to 122nd in 1999/2000 (UNDP, 2000).
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The launch of the Botswana Human Development Report 2000 was in many 
respects the crowning moment of UNDP Botswana’s upstream policy impact, for it 
allowed UNDP to seal government policy and commitment in responding to the 
HIV and AIDS epidemic. (UNDP, 2001:4)
Since 2002, the UNAIDS has been a very strong advocate of “The Three 
Ones” framework in Botswana. Despite ongoing inter-bureaucratic feuds between 
NACA and the Ministry of Health, a consultative process led by the UNAIDS’ 
Theme Group has gradually established the primacy of NACA in Botswana’s 
HIV/AIDS institutional architecture - as recommended in the second key principle 
of the “Three Ones”. Botswana is also moving towards the achievement of the first 
and third principles. In this respect, a new comprehensive action framework for 
2003-2009 was created and it has been implemented and Botswana’s HIV/AIDS 
monitoring and evaluation systems are among the best in the whole African 
continent (Interview Tselayakgosi 16.02.2006).
These were outcomes of a robust securitisation move promoted by UNAIDS 
and its associated agencies, which aimed to persuade the Botswanan government to 
scale-up the epidemic’s response. Following the poor implementation of the first 
Medium Plan (1989-1997) and the very slow implementation of the second (1997- 
2002), those agencies decided to systematically engage in a more aggressive advocacy 
strategy. They focused on key social actors such as the president, leading politicians, 
the private sector and traditional leaders, “with a view of turning them into informed 
campaigners and decision-makers” (UNDP, 2001:2). Thus, from the outset of this 
revamped strategy the challenge was, to “[establish] through research and advocacy, a 
common consensus on the magnitude of the HIV and AIDS problem and the threat it
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posed to governance, the economy and the character and stability of society [my 
emphasis]” (UNDP, 2001:2).104
An important caveat at this point: Although the establishment of special 
bureaucracies and policies, which are in line with the HASN’s prescriptions, is strong 
evidence of norm penetration in Botswana, it is not a definitive confirmation of the 
actual cascading of HASN domestically. As noted later in the cases of Mozambique 
and South Africa, even when national governments formally agree in setting up those 
agencies and in adopting the recommended policies, they can find manners to 
perpetuate pre-existing understandings and forms of political action. The actual 
empirical measurement of the extent of HASN penetration into the domestic 
structure of a particular state is given by the assessment of the political leaders’ 
engagement in the implementation of national plans to fight the epidemic. In this 
sense, the acceptance by key leaders in the government of the necessity to securitise 
the epidemic will be conducive to a friendly environment for the activities of HASN 
leaders, leading to the cascading of the norm, as indeed is the case in Botswana.
In Botswana, the securitisation efforts of UNAIDS and UNDP have clearly 
paid off. In 2000, Mogae declared the HIV/AIDS epidemic a national emergency 
and the foremost threat to human security in Botswana. As already shown, Mogae 
now personally leads Botswana’s HIV/AIDS efforts as the chairman of NACA. Also 
a dividend of this more forcible approach, the implementation of MTP II was 
accelerated and currendy a new strategic framework is being implemented. In
104 This strong impetus from U N A ID S/U N D P to re-energise Botswana’s H IV/AIDS response also 
came as a result o f  two African initiatives aimed at intensifying coordinated action at national level and 
improving leadership to fight the epidemic. The International Partnership on AIDS in Africa, which 
was orchestrated by UNAIDS in collaboration with the World Bank, was established in September 
1999, during the 12th Conference on AIDS and Sexually Transmitted Diseases in Africa (ICASA), held 
in Lusaka, Zambia. In 2003, UNAIDS promoted the Three Ones Framework at the 13th ICASA, in 
Nairobi, Kenya. Through the establishment o f  the Partnership and the endorsement o f the Three Ones,
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addition to this, since the late 90s, the government has dramatically increased funding 
for health and gone further to de-link the HIV/AIDS budget from the exclusive 
control of the Ministry of Health so that funding can be made available more 
efficiently for other sectors involved in the multi-sectoral national response 
(Interview Tselayakgosi 16.02.2006).
In July 2004, Botswana has also started to receive financial support from 
the Global Fund. The Ministries of Finance and Development Planning were the 
recipients of the first grant of US$ 18 million to be invested in scaling-up Botswana’s 
response to HIV/AIDS (Global Fund, 2004: internet source). NACA is the Global 
Fund’s Country Coordinating Mechanism in the country. It is responsible for 
managing the funds according to the requirements established in the grant 
agreement. The Botswana Network of AIDS Services Organisations (BONASO) was 
the main beneficiary of the Global Fund resources in the civil society sector 
(DailyNews 16.05.2006). As further demonstrated later, local NGOs are very strictly 
constrained in their capacity to manage funds and develop programmes 
independently. NACA have complete control over the disimbursement of the Global 
Fund’s money to local NGOs which are subjected to periodic assessments by the 
government on the development of their activities (Interview Tselayakgosi
16.02.2006).
The close involvement between multilateral bodies, notably UNAIDS, and 
the Botswanan government was rebalanced in 2003 with the introduction of the US 
government’s PEPFAR in the country. The different securitising views of the US and 
UNAIDS provoked a certain degree of polarisation over policy priorities, concerning 
prevention, treatment, and HIV testing. The chapter turns now to the examination of
UNAIDS and its associate agencies made significant headway in increasing their involvement in AIDS 
policy-making in Africa in general, and in Botswana, in particular.
137
the involvement of the US in promoting its own securitisation of HIV/AIDS in 
Botswana.
5.2. Bilateral Approach: The United States Involvement in Botswana
US participation in Botswana’s HIV/AIDS response began later than that 
of the above mentioned international organisations.105 Contrary to the multilateral 
approach of these agencies, the US has invested in the bilateral route. In some cases, 
it develops its own policies without strong involvement in states’ institutions and 
coordination forums. In accessing Botswana’s domestic structure, the US 
government has also built winning coalitions with faith-based organisations at the civil 
society level. As noted in the upcoming section, these networks of religious groups 
are useful transmission belts, spreading the US securitisation message throughout the 
country.
The most important collaboration between the US and Botswanan 
governments in the area of HIV/AIDS has been the partnership between the 
Ministry of Health and the US’ CDC, named the BOTUSA project. At its beginning, 
the focus of this project was on programmes exclusively directed at medical research 
on tuberculosis. Since the late 90s, however, when the HIV/AIDS epidemic became 
a very serious problem in Botswana, BOTUSA has expanded its mandate to also 
develop HIV/AIDS programmes (Interview Roels 13.02.2006). In 2000, BOTUSA
105 Besides the US, the British Department for International Development (DFID), the Swedish 
International Development Agency (SIDA), the European Commission and the World University 
Service o f  Canada (WUSC) are also important bilateral development partners working and financing 
HTV/AIDS projects in Botswana. Along with many embassies, these agencies have been intensively 
working with both the government o f Botswana and local organisations in several projects (NACA, 
2003a:81/82). Due to the disproportional magnitude o f  the US influence, the present and following 
chapters will concentrate on the role o f the US government and its PEPFAR programme and other
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began a period of rapid growth with the advent of the CDC’s Global AIDS 
Programme to support prevention, treatment, care, and surveillance of HIV/AIDS. 
The securitisation move made by the Clinton administration by this time had a 
significant impact on BOTUSA’s mission as well as on its relationship with the 
Botswanan government. Clinton’s global HIV/AIDS initiative substantially increased 
funding to BOTUSA. It also became more involved with the formulation and 
implementation of plans rather than only with HIV/AIDS research and financial 
support. By this time, BOTUSA had initiated a bold project called Tebelopele to 
develop Voluntary Counselling and Testing Centres (VCTs). Since 1999, BOTUSA 
has built and staffed 16 Tebelopele centres throughout Botswana. One interesting 
characteristic of the Tebelopeles is that they are not integrated into the normal public 
health facilities of the Ministry of Health. Until 2004, the network of Tebelopeles was 
completely run and funded by BOTUSA.106
In 2004, the US government stepped up its involvement in Botswana’s 
national response. The US Embassy took a strategic role after Botswana was chosen 
as one of the 15 countries to benefit from Bush’s PEPFAR initiative. It formed an 
interagency team comprising BOTUSA, the US Embassy’s Emergency Plan Team 
and the USAID’s Regional Center for Southern Africa (RCSA).107 They are joindy in 
charge of the strategic planning and implementation of PEPFAR in the country. 
With the introduction of PEPFAR, much more funding became available to the 
HIV/AIDS activities run by those agencies (IRINNews 09.03.2005). These funds are
US based N G O s and foundations on the H IV/AIDS national responses o f  Botswana, Mozambique 
and South Africa.
106 Since 2004, BOTUSA has tried to give more autonomy to the Tebelopele centres by transforming it 
into a N GO. It already has an independent board o f  directors which is encouraged to diminish its 
dependency on BOTUSA’s funding by attracting other sponsors to come onboard (Interview Roels 
13.02.2006).
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allocated to new or underway HIV/AIDS projects that maximise the domestic 
implementation of PEPFAR’s principles.
In Botswana, most of the money from PEPFAR is directed at HIV 
prevention efforts with a focus on abstinence and faithfulness projects (the “AB” 
side of the “ABC” paradigm).108 It supports Botswana’s Ministry of Education in 
developing abstinence curricula in schools as well as other similar programmes 
targeting vulnerable young people. The US government is funding, for example, the 
radio soap opera known as Makgabaneng. The logic behind the radio programme is 
that listeners will identify with characters in the drama and emulate their behaviour. 
Prior to the arrival of PEPFAR in 2003, it had a strong message for young people to 
condomise. However, given the new approach of Bush’s administration, the show’s 
producers adapted dialogues and scenes to emphasise more “AB” and less “C” 
(Interview Letshwiti 14.02.2006).
Another strategy of the US mission is to support the activities developed 
by local faith-based organisations. As will be shown in more detail, the US 
government through BOTUSA has strengthened the capacity of those groups to 
deliver the “AB” message across Botswana. Additionally, at the district level, the US 
Embassy coordinates the work of American Peace Corps trainees who help to build 
capacity and evaluate the response within DMSACs. The US Peace Corps were 
reintroduced in Botswana in 2003 after their withdrawal six years previously on the 
grounds that Botswana was no longer in the group of least developed countries. The
107 Like the US Peace Corps, the USAID mission in Botswana was phased out in 1996. After USAID’s 
dismissal, the US Embassy in Botswana and USAID’s regional mission took over all the ongoing and 
future development assistance projects in the country (USAID, 1996).
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reactivation of the Peace Corps programme in Botswana was part of the expansion 
of the US global response to HIV/AIDS.109 They are very important norm leaders at 
the grass-roots level since, as part of their work, they interact with local authorities, 
school teachers and other members of the community to educate them about 
HIV/AIDS prevention as well as to encourage them to be tested at the local 
Tebelopele center (Interview Roels 13.02.2006).110 The securitising work of the US Peace 
Corps in Botswana can also be understood as a functioning mechanism of the wider 
process of controlling and modifying human life on a global scale. This corresponds 
to Foucault’s concept of biopolitics, or what I referred to in chapter 2 as the first 
(structural) dimension of HASN.
The US government has also been, with the Ministry of Health, developing 
treatment activities which include training medical staff in the public health system 
on ARV management and treatment quality assurance. It also provides technical and 
financial support to laboratorial facilities and to the Ministry of Health’s monitoring 
and evaluation systems. The US government also collaborates with the African 
Comprehensive HIV/AIDS Partnership (ACHAP). ACHAP is a partnership of the 
US pharmaceutical, Merck, the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation and the 
Botswanan government. It was established in 2000 to help the government to 
achieve the goals set up in the National Plan. ACHAP develops several programmes 
with a large number of partners in both the public and civil society sectors. The
108 In the fiscal year 2005, o f  the $ 50 million budget allocated to H IV /A ID S activities in Botswana, 
the US government allocated US$ 12 million to HIV prevention programmes (US Department o f  
State, 2005).
109 Other states highly-hit by H IV/AIDS in Southern Africa, like Swaziland, for example, have also 
rehosted Peace Corps operatives after years o f  their departure. These young volunteers spend around 
two years in these countries, living in rural districts and villages. See, for example, “New  Volunteers 
Arrive in Swaziland with HIV/AIDS Focus”. Peace Corps Press Release, 17 September 2003.
110 In 2004, 38 new Peace Corps Trainees arrived in Botswana. After a training period in which they 
learn local customs and basic language skills, the trainees move to their bases all over Botswana 
(Interview Roels 13.02.2006).
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partnership played a major role in devising and implementing the above mentioned 
Masa Programme. The Bill and Melinda Gates and Merck Foundations have each 
allocated US$ 50 million to the initiative for the period of 5 years (2000-2005). In 
2004, they agreed to extend their involvement in Botswana until at least 2008 
(Interview Rajamaran 28.01.2006).
The Merck Foundation is a very active participant in the formulation and 
implementation of the projects it supports in Botswana. The first chairman of 
ACHAP was Dr. Donald de Korte, a physician and former director of Merck’s 
subsidiary in South Africa. In this respect, the ACWAP-Masa framework provides 
strong empirical evidence of the successful process of amalgamation between 
Botswana’s domestic HIV/AIDS structures and international sources of norm 
diffusion. ACHAP has shown the possibility of successfully harmonising national 
and international interests and ideas through the creation of a shared public-private 
institutional structure with a single raison d'etre, and guided under the framework 
given by HASN. In effect, it was the first time that a pharmaceutical company had 
involved itself directly in ARV distribution in a developing state (Interview 
Rajamaran 28.01.2006).
The fact that Merck chose Botswana as the beneficiary of this programme 
was not accidental. Botswana is a country in dire need of HIV/AIDS treatment and 
possesses a stable government, which is friendly to Western institutions. While 
donating its branded AIDS drugs, Merck’s initiative avoided the problem of local 
manufacture or importation of generics. This is a key issue in other developing 
countries which have vigorously campaigned for increased access to generic drugs. 
As further analysed in the upcoming chapters, Mozambique and South Africa have 
rejected the US approach to HIV/AIDS treatment based on expansive patented 
drugs. Conversely, the Botswanan government accepted the terms and conditions
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imposed by the US pharmaceutical giant. Merck’s and Gates’ US$ 100 million 
donation is attached to very strict limitations on the Botswanan government’s 
autonomy to pursue its own policies on AIDS treatment.
As noted later, the Mozambican and South African governments, albeit for 
different reasons, have been more suspicious of the “generosity” of pharmaceutical 
companies backed by the US government. Currendy, Botswana uses mosdy branded 
AIDS drugs for its ARV programme. The two ARVs donated by Merck, Stocrin and 
Crixivan, are still under patent rights in their main markets in Europe and the US. 
Unlike Mozambique and South Africa where patents for many ARVs have been 
issued, by 2005 the Botswanan government has not registered the generic substitutes 
of Nevirapine nor the fixed dose combination of Zidovudine and Lamiduvine that 
are currendy manufactured by pharmaceutical companies based in India (Druce, 
Kgadwane, Mosime and Ramiah, 2004:17).
Notwithstanding the close involvement of the US government in the Masa 
programme, there have been constant frictions between PEPFAR and the Ministry 
of Health/ACHAP concerning the ownership of the national ARV treatment 
programme.111 The former claims that because they are actively involved in the 
national government’s ARV therapy programme, in terms of financing, training and 
capacity-building activities, they could claim that the growing number of patients 
under treatment in Botswana is also an accomplishment of PEPFAR. The 
Botswanan government and its partners at ACHAP have a different opinion. They 
think Masa is their exclusive initiative since ACHAP is planning, managing and 
financing the entire process on the ground in terms of building clinics, paying
111 For more on this, see, for example, “Botswana’s Gains Against AIDS Put U.S. Claims to Test”. The 
Washington Post, 01 July 2005.
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physicians and nurses and providing the actual medicines to patients as well as 
monitoring their adherence to them (Interview Roels 13.02.2006).
Despite these differences of opinion between PEPFAR and the Ministry of 
Health/ACHAP, the US government has been quite effective in pushing its agenda 
into Botswana’s HIV/AIDS policies. The above mentioned US Center for Disease 
Control has used the BOTUSA partnership as an entiy point into the decision-making 
structure of the Botswanan government. The US staff based in Gaborone works very 
close to the Ministry of Health’s officials as well as other HIV/AIDS specialists at 
NACA. Although the US government has not been very keen on large cooperative 
groupings, it also participates in the coordination structures that NACA has created 
to harmonise the activities of international partners (Interview Rajamaran
28.01.2006). BOTUSA/CDC was an influential actor behind Mogae’s 2003 decision 
to implement routine testing in all Botswana’s VCT clinics.
Botswana was the first country that introduced this policy in Africa at a 
time when it was not recommended by UNAIDS. Before 2003, the government had 
favoured the “opt-in’ approach. This is basically the idea that the patient, after a pre- 
HIV test counselling, must specifically consent for an HIV test while visiting a health 
facility. This is in line with the human rights perspective of the W HO/GPA tradition 
that was preserved by UNAIDS. The US government’s CDC, on the other hand, 
pressured its Botswana counterpart to change its testing policy to the “opt-out’ 
system. By this approach, the pre-test counselling is eliminated and the patient is 
notified that an HIV test will be conducted unless he/she openly refuses it. This
144
serves to diminish the “agency role” of patients by introducing a semi-compulsory 
testing system in which patients are routinely tested if they do not say otherwise.112
Since 2002, the CDC has strongly pushed for the Botswanan government’s 
adoption of the “opt-out” approach. It brought to the country several foreign 
specialists to give talks about the system, produced and promoted a number of policy 
papers and hosted technical meetings on the subject (Interview Rajamaran
28.01.2006). CDC’s longstanding experience in dealing with HIV/AIDS in the US 
and its high institutional stature among officials within the Ministry of Health were 
also important factors in building domestic consensus (Interview Rajamaran
28.01.2006). The issue was also brought up at meetings between NACA, the Ministry 
of Health and international partners. In this regard, one of the associate-directors of 
BOTUSA/CDC in Gaborone attests that,
There were a number of forums and meetings where the issue [routine testing] was 
brought up [...] I remember that in one particular meeting the whole issue of the 
different paradigms was brought to the table [...] maybe these meetings have helped 
to win over the technical people of the Ministry of Health and they approached the 
people in the National Aids Council and then officers close to the president realised 
that it was time for us to radically shift this approach by introducing routine testing 
(Interview Roels 13.02.2006).
After a period of intense consultative processes, Mogae announced in 
October 2003 that he wanted routine testing fully operational in the public health 
system until January of the following year. ACHAP was very supportive of 
introducing routine testing in Botswana. According to an official in the Ministry of 
Health, the Masa programme would benefit significantly from a system that 
“encourages” patients to get tested. Since the beginning of Masa, a major issue has
112 The “opt-out” approach has been CDC’s policy in the US since 2003. In 17th April 2003, it 
announced this new prevention initiative entitled Advancing H IV  Prevention: New Strategj.es for a Changing 
Epidemic. It recommended all health care providers in the US to include HIV testing, when indicated,
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been to identify the people who are HIV-positive and need ARV treatment 
(Interview 14.02.2006). Mogae’s decision raised concerns among UNAIDS officials 
and human rights advocates who have been sensitive to the rights of people living 
with HIV/AIDS (PLWHA). Under the new programme, health workers can record 
the flames of patients who have been tested positive. The new plan has been 
denounced by global HIV/AIDS activists as an infringement on the rights of 
patients to confidentiality and to refuse medical care (The Boston Globe 24.10.2003).
At the time of the writing of this thesis, neither Mozambique nor South 
Africa had adopted similar measures. It is not the official policy of the SADC’s 
HIV/AIDS structures. They still work within the UNAIDS/W HO voluntary testing 
paradigm, as designed by Jonathan Mann’s W HO/GPA in the mid 80s for 
preventing discrimination against people infected by HIV. In spite of the strong 
presence of US agencies in those countries, their governments resisted the pressure 
to adopt routine testing. In this sense, the Botswana case shows the more pervasive 
(as wells as persuasive) character of US securitising actors within Botswana’s domestic 
structure. The next section explores how those actors link up with civil society 
groups and transnational networks of NGOs to further inculcate the idea that the 
epidemic should be securitised.
5.3. The Transnational Community of HASN Seeking Domestic legitimacy: 
The Role of Civil Society HIV/AIDS Organisations
Botswana does not have a long history of a strong civil society movement. 
It dates back to after its independence, in 1966, but since then civil society has grown
as part o f  routine medical care by promoting removal o f real and perceived barriers to routine testing
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very timidly in the country (Good, 1996; Tsie, 1996, Holm and Damolf, 2000; 
Stegling and Mosima, 2002). Bauer and Taylor, for example, assert that “the general 
consensus around civil society in Botswana seems to be that it has been “historically 
absent” in the country, only showing some signs of life from the early 90s onwards” 
(2005:99). Botswana’s model of democracy, based on a strong state bureaucracy 
driven by a well-established political elite, has undermined the thriving of an 
autonomous and vibrant civil society sector. Since independence, the government 
has controlled the growth of civil society organisations through incorporating them 
into the state’s bureaucratic structures. According to Holm and Damolf, “civil 
society exists as an extension of the bureaucracy rather than as a set of independent 
actors confronting politicians and civil servants” (2000:99). In this respect, the 
relationship between state and civil society actors in Botswana can be characterised 
as a top-down process in which the latter has become highly reliant on the 
paternalistic approach of the former.113
This also applies to the HIVAIDS civil society sector. In Botswana, the 
challenges posed by the HIV/AIDS epidemic were conducive to the development 
and rapid growth of several local NGOs. However, due to Botswana’s characteristic 
state-dominated domestic structure, they have had limited impact in policy-making. 
These organisations face challenges similar to those of other countries in Southern 
Africa. These include lack of resources, high staff mobility and shortage of technical
(CDC, 2003).
113 There are important exceptions nonetheless. Women’s N G O s have been particularly active in 
Botswana. They were very vocal during the 1994 election campaign, having reportedly been able to 
influence the programmes o f  the main political parties (Good, 1996:57). The Human Rights group 
Ditshwanelo has also engaged in a number o f  campaigns to pressure the Botswanan government to 
ratify several international human rights conventions and comply with them. In this respect, one o f  
the most prominent issues raised by Dishwanelo and other national and international human rights 
activists has been the treatment given by the government to the Basarwa (also known as Bushmen) 
people from the Kalahari region. The dispossession o f  the Bushmen’s land, allegedly to explore 
untouched deposits o f  valuable minerals, has reached wider audiences worldwide and became an 
embarrassment to the Botswanan government (The Economist 16.02.2006).
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and management professionals. Given these shortcomings, local HIV/AIDS NGOs 
have been either co-opted by the state agencies they seek to influence or absorbed by 
transnational norm leaders with an interest in shaping HIV/AIDS policies. In both 
cases, local NGOs find themselves deeply constrained in their ability to 
independently affect the process and outcomes of decision-making.
These groups co-ordinate their activities at several interdependent levels: 
Firsdy, HIV/AIDS NGOs organise themselves through four umbrella organisations 
which assist the varied individual groups. The Botswana Network of People Living 
with HIV/AIDS (BONEPWA) supports organisations of people living with 
HIV/AIDS (PLWHA). It runs 17 support groups and also works as the 
representative and spokesperson for PLWHA at NACA. BONASO is the umbrella 
organisation for most NGOs working with HIV/AIDS activities. Its main objective 
is to support HIV/AIDS NGOs in terms of capacity building, information sharing, 
advocacy, lobbying the government, and promoting a unified approach among them 
(BONASO, 2004). There is also the Botswana Network on Ethics, Law and 
HIV/AIDS (BONELA), which addresses issues related to human rights of PLWHA 
and their protection against discrimination.114 Finally, there is the most developed 
and organised of them, the Botswana Christian AIDS Intervention Programme 
(BOCAIP). This network of faith-based organisations was created in 1997 to 
coordinate the work of the religious sector in the government’s multi-sectoral 
response.
At the state level, these umbrella organisations co-ordinate actions with the 
government's national HIV/AIDS response. Unlike the highly politicised stance
114 There are some other important organisations o f  this type in the country that are worth mentioning 
here. They are the Botswana Business Coalition on AIDS (BBCA) and the Botswana Confederation 
on Commerce, Industry and Manpower (BOCCIM) that serve the private sectors in undertaking
148
taken by their counterparts in South Africa, the relationship between these 
organisations and the Botswanan government is fairly collaborative.115 The projects 
and sources of funding of local HIV/AIDS NGOs are strictly regulated by the 
Botswanan government. In contrast to resource poor Mozambique, for example, the 
government of Botswana has its own bilateral channels for financing the activities of 
local NGOs working with HIV/AIDS, which has tightened state control over the 
policy agenda of those groups (Interview Tselayakgosi 16.02.2006). As already seen, 
NACA also mediates the allocation of funds from the Global Fund to local NGOs. 
In this regard, BONASO’s Executive Secretary, Daniel Motsatsing, has complained 
that NACA does not fully involve NGOs in the management of the Global Fund’s 
money. Usually, BONASO plays a larger role at the level of implementation, at the 
receiving end of policy-making, without further engagement in the elaboration and 
management of programmes.
The NGO sector formally participates in the NACA framework through a 
discussion forum. These meetings provide them with the opportunity to regularly 
assess their collective capacities and discuss their progresses and constraints in 
specific areas (Interview Tselayakgosi 16.02.2006). Simply put, this forum is a semi­
institutionalised space within NACA in which civil society groups synchronise and 
direct their agendas and projects towards the principles and objectives set up by the 
generally agreed National Strategy to HIV/AIDS. There is also civil society 
representation at the National AIDS Council. At the local level, HIVAIDS civil 
society groups harmonise their activities with the local DMSACs. They provide
H IV /A ID S projects, and The Coping Centre for People Living with H IV/AIDS (COCEPWA) 
(NACA, 2002a: 6).
115 For example, the Chairperson o f  BONEPWA’s Executive Board, Mr. David Ngele, while asked 
about the role o f  Botswana’s government in supporting people living with AIDS, affirmed that, “[...] 
President Festus Mogae has shown a good example o f  leadership with regard to the fight against
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quarterly reports of the development of their projects that will afterwards be 
submitted to NACA and other stakeholders in the central government and 
international partners (Interview Tselayakgosi 16.02.2006).
Notwithstanding their formal participation in these HIV/AIDS structures, 
NGOs work more as facilitators among international partners and the government 
than as actual agenda setters. As already said, their influence in decision-making is 
very limited. They react to the decisions of their sponsors rather than influence the 
actual process of decision-making. Even at the level of policy implementation, these 
groups lack capacity. Due to their irregular funding, NGOs dealing with HIV/AIDS 
have to dedicate most of their time to resource mobilisation. As a result, they have to 
adapt their activities to the policy priorities of their changing donors. This creates 
confusion and impairs the continuing commitment with any set of principles 
(Interview Letshwiti 14.02.2006). For example, the Youth Health Organization 
(YOHO), a local HIV/AIDS NGO, uses money from PEPFAR to develop a 
number of HIV/AIDS projects, including educational campaigns promoting 
abstinence and fidelity among youth. Before the advent of PEPFAR, YOHO was 
funded by a US based NGO, called Advocates for Youth, which promoted HIV 
prevention policies more in line with the secular view of UNAIDS. In 2006, 
YOHO’s contract with Advocates for Youth ended and it was not renewed. In this 
respect, an officer from YOHO suggested that Advocates for Youth “did not get 
enough money in the US to continue our partnership because they are an anti­
abstinence organization [...] so we now have to adhere to “ABC” to stay in 
business” (Interview Letshwiti 14.02.2006).
HIV/AIDS. We are proud to be participants at the National AIDS Council, and we are getting moral, 
financial as well as technical support.” (NACA, 2003c:21).
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In contrast with its secular counterparts, BOCAIP (the umbrella framework 
for faith-based organisations) has a more established role in Botswana. It is the key 
partner of ACHAP and BOTUSA in the civil society sector. In line with the 
PEPFAR guidelines, BOCAIP offers a morally-centred approach to HIV/AIDS 
based on abstinence and faithfulness. BOTUSA has assisted the efforts of BOCAIP 
to establish various counselling centres for PLWHA throughout Botswana. It has a 
network of 125 churches which provides volunteers to work as HIV/AIDS 
counsellors and educators. It runs eleven fully-operational centres which have trained 
up to 450 counsellors. Their counselling and prevention programme claims to have 
reached 500,000 people since it started in 1997 (Interview Letshwiti 14.02.2006).
With the support of the US, faith-based organisations became the main 
HIV/AIDS NGOs in Botswana. Christian HIV/AIDS Groups have a two-tiered 
strategy to reach out to people and spread their particular securitisation message. Firstly, 
those faith-based groups participate in the coordination mechanisms described 
above. This ensures that their voice is heard at the highest levels of decision-making, 
therefore allowing them to exert significant influence over the government and other 
international and national partners. Secondly, these organisations explore the bilateral 
route. They undertake intensive campaigns on absenteeism and faithfulness at the 
community level and develop their own counselling services that are not always 
integrated in the broader national plan. These are autonomous initiatives, which are 
closely linked with the strategies of transnational Christian associations for 
combating the global epidemic. Despite the government’s efforts to maintain a tight 
grip on the activities of HIV/AIDS NGOs, it has been incapable to effectively 
monitor the massive flux of resources and the connections established between local 
and international faith-based organisations, which often bypass the government’s 
structures (Interview Tselayakgosi 16.02.2006).
There are also a large group of transnational NGOs and HIV/AIDS 
foundations operating in Botswana which align more closely with the secular 
principles of the UNAIDS and its partners. These are, for instance, the Bill Clinton 
Foundation, the International Council of Aids Services Organizations (ICASO), and 
the International HIV/AIDS Alliance (IHAA), among others. For example, in 
December 2004, ICASO and IHAA elaborated a discussion paper about the role of 
civil society groups in the development of the “Three Ones” (ICASO and IHAA, 
2005c). While promoting this paper worldwide, they sought to improve awareness 
and increase the involvement of local NGOs in the promotion of the “Three Ones” 
principles at the national level. BONASO was the focal point in Botswana for 
involving local HIV/AIDS groups in this project. Unlike US-backed religious 
groups, these secular INGOs in general operate exclusively within the parameters 
and goals established by the national plan. They also link up with local umbrella 
organisations such as BONASO to facilitate coordination and to share information 
between and among local and international NGOs as well as with the government. 
ICASO is a good example of a transnational HIV/AIDS network which built very 
complex mechanisms (or transmission belts of norms) linking global, regional and local 
HIV/AIDS groups based in the capital, Gaborone. At the regional level, 
BONEPWA and BONASO are affiliated to the Southern Africa Network of Aids 
Services Organizations (SANASO) which is, in turn, part of both the SADC 
institutional structure and the global advocacy network formed by ICASO. As 
already shown, ICASO is one of the five NGO representatives at the UNAIDS’ 
Programme Coordinating Board, in charge of guiding this organ’s response to the 
worldwide HIV/AIDS epidemic.
At their respective levels of political engagement, these advocacy bodies 
perform similar institutional missions and share the same (secular) values and policy
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concepts of the epidemic. This allows them to establish channels for the penetration 
of ideas on Botswana’s political structure. As already noted, ICASO has been 
working as an unofficial supervisory body of the national governments’ commitment 
to UNGASS. In Botswana, it receives periodic reports from BONASO on the 
progress and problems faced by the government in implementing the principles 
agreed during the UN special meeting of 2001 (Interview Letshwiti 14.02.2006). By 
deploying those tactics of norm advocacy, the above mentioned transnational 
networks helped to embed into the domestic structure of Botswana the principles 
that have been manifested and agreed upon at the UN’s global meetings on 
HIV/AIDS.
5. Conclusions
This chapter established that the particular features of Botswana’s domestic 
structure favoured the development of a strong political commitment to implement 
the transnational prescriptions of HASN. In this respect, the study focused on 
domestic factors that explained the high domestic salience of this international norm 
in the country. Firsdy, it focused on the distinctive features of Botswana’s political 
culture and system. It showed that the combination of a centralised and top-down 
system of decision making, a culturally and ethnically homogeneous society, and the 
strong political guidance of a Westernised political elite favoured the assimilation of 
HASN in the country.
Secondly, the study explored the intricate process of HASN adaptation in 
Botswana. It showed that the agenda of debates and the decision-making process in 
Botswana were, from the very beginning, set by the international evolution of
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HASN. In this regard, the establishment of national plans for action and the 
introduction of new policy concepts in the internal arena of deliberation were deeply 
influenced by developments outside Botswana. It was shown that the crisis in the 
global response to the epidemic, which eventually led to the creation of the UNAIDS 
in 1996, slowed down the pace of Botswana’s response and promoted a domestic 
reformulation on its HIV/AIDS policy priorities and goals.
Thirdly, at the level of individual leadership, the consolidation of HASN 
came during the presidency of President Mogae after 1998. His contribution has 
been mosdy in terms of giving a strong sense of authority and engaging both state 
bureaucracies and society through the use of a strong securitisation language. It was 
claimed, in this respect, that the successful convincement of the highest authority in 
the country that HIV/AIDS should be securitised represented the tipping point after 
which the cascading of HASN occurred in Botswana. As noted later, political leaders 
in Mozambique and South Africa were subjected to similar external pressures from 
HIV/AIDS securitising actors. Yet, in those domestic contexts the persuasion efforts 
of international actors were challenged/mitigated by individuals with very distinct 
worldviews and personal beliefs concerning the epidemic.
Fourthly, the chapter outlined institutional mechanisms of norm 
incorporation, policy principles, and modes of operation of international HASN 
leaders in Botswana. Despite their shared securitisation cause, these actors displayed 
quite distinctive (and at times conflicting) views on the epidemic and how to react to 
it. The analysis concentrated on the role of multilateral organisations, namely 
UNAIDS and its associate agencies, and how these international bodies intervened in 
the formulation of national HIV/AIDS plans and in the constitution and outlook of 
HIV/AIDS bureaucracies. It also looked at the independent role played by the US 
government and how it pushed forward its own moral understandings about how to
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prevent the spread of HIV in Botswana. Moreover, and contrasting to the other case 
studies, it was demonstrated here that the issue of pharmaceutical patents was not a 
source of conflict between the governments of the US and Botswana. Unlike the 
generic-based ARV programmes in other states in Southern Africa, Botswana 
adopted a unique plan for the roll-out of (mosdy branded) first-line AIDS drugs, 
which was highly supported by the US government, the US pharmaceutical giant, 
Merck, and the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation.116
Finally, the chapter explored the role of civil society organisations working 
with HIV/AIDS in Botswana. It examined how these organisations were moulded 
by and reacted to dynamics of norm diffusion in their relations with government 
structures and international partners. Given the corporativist model of state-society 
relations in Botswana, local HIV/AIDS groups were more like extensions of the 
government’s bureaucratic apparatus than independent actors in the civil society 
sector. Except from the more autonomous role played by faith-based organisations 
backed by powerful transnational partners, local HIV/AIDS NGOs worked mostly 
as implementing agencies, supporting pre-determined priorities set up in the national 
HIV/AIDS plan. On the other hand, transnational NGOs, such as ICASO, managed 
to penetrate Botswana’s domestic structure by linking up with their local 
counterparts, namely BONASO. As already seen, BONASO’s participation in formal 
structures of policy-making served as an entry point to the (secular) ideas of 
transnational advocacy networks.
As further elaborated later, Botswana can be seen as a success story of 
HIV/AIDS securitisation, if compared with South Africa’s ideological reservations
116 The later inclusion o f  generic ARVs into Botswana’s Masa programme was dependent on their 
previous approval by the US’ FDA (Interview Rajamaran 29.08.2004).
towards international (norm) interference and the Mozambican political elites’ 
conditional delegation of power to the international actors promoting HASN. Unlike 
the cases of South Africa and Mozambique, where domestic recognition of HASN 
was sometimes likened to colonial and racial legacies, in Botswana those issues have 
not created domestic resistance or rejection to it. In this respect, Botswana’s early 
definition of a non-racial national identity, without experiencing a destructive civil 
war and lacking a strong anti-colonial feeling, contributed significandy to the 
definition of a domestic structure friendly ter Western sources of HASN 
transmission. The thesis turns now to the analysis of these processes of norm 
incorporation in Mozambique.
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Chapter 5
Mozambique: The Model of Instrumental Acceptance
1. Introduction
This chapter examines how the characteristics of Mozambique’s political 
culture and system conditioned the domestic adaptation of the policy prescriptions 
promoted by H A S N  transnational leaders. It shows that, contrasting with this thesis’ 
other case studies, in Mozambique the unparalleled level of international intervention 
since the mid-eighties, but particularly from the outset of the UN's peacekeeping 
operation in 1992, coupled with its distinct colonial and postcolonial legacies, are 
fundamental factors in understanding processes of norm incorporation in the country. 
As demonstrated later, rather than an actual internalisation of the norm, conformity 
to HASN should be situated in the larger context of Mozambique’s dependency on 
donors. It is claimed here that, notwithstanding their lack of effective sovereignty117, 
Mozambique's elites have instrumentally used the country's HIV/AIDS crisis to 
skilfully influence people in the international community.
In this sense, the present chapter argues that the international proponents 
of HASN were not able to entirely convince the Mozambican government that 
HIV/AIDS should be seen as an exceptional kind of problem. Rather, their 
securitisation claims were reframed domestically according to the Mozambican elites’
117 The Mozambican state resembles Jackson’s definition o f  quasi-states, which “[...] possess the same 
external rights and responsibilities as all other states [...]” even though “[...] they disclose limited 
empirical statehood: their populations do not enjoy many o f  the advantages traditionally associated 
with independent statehood. Their governments are often deficient in the political will, institutional 
authority, and organised power to protect human rights or provide socioeconomic welfare [...]” 
(1990:21).
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deep-rooted practices of dependency politics. Thus, a shallow and instrumental securitisation 
process was launched by Mozambique’s ruling elites as a means to please the 
international community of HIV/AIDS donors and international NGOs, 
perpetuating and further improving traditional patterns of foreign assistance to the 
government’s agencies. The chapter also investigates the role of transnational and 
national civil society actors in the national response to HIV/AIDS. It shows that the 
HIV/AIDS civil society sector in Mozambique is almost completely formed by all 
types of transnational/international NGOs that are not actual manifestations of 
Mozambican society. The growing deterioration of public institutions during 
Mozambique’s prolonged civil war further increased the importance and influence of 
those organisations. Their allegiances to powerful Western states and multilateral 
institutions worked in favour of the penetration of HASN into Mozambique’s 
domestic system.
2. Setting the Stage: (In)dependence, Civil War, International Reconstruction 
and HIV/AIDS
This section illuminates the historical processes that led to the creation (and 
then re-creation) of the Mozambican state. As shown next, the failure of the post­
colonial project destroyed an incipient sense of national unity/identity and led the 
political elites to engage in neo-patrimonial politics to survive and stay in power. 
Moreover, the ensuing dependency on the international community and the massive 
presence of foreign agencies and international NGOs, which literally replaced 
governmental institutions, further weakened the government’s authority. In this 
sense, the dynamics of HASN’s penetration into Mozambique’s domestic structure 
resembles more general understandings of African politics and society that regard the
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state as being deprived of effective sovereignty and functioning as a kind of 
“incubator” (Harsch, 1997) for developing the dominant social group.118 While 
arguing more generally about Africa, Bayart described this kind of strategic 
connection between internal and external political forces in terms of the “politics of 
extraversion”.
The leading actors in Sub-Saharan societies have tended to compensate for their 
difficulties in the autonomization of their power and in intensifying the exploitation 
of their dependents by deliberate recourse to the strategies of extraversion, 
mobilizing resources derived from their (possibly unequal) relationship with the 
external environment (Bayart, 2000:218).
In Mozambique, the use of tactics of extraversion for private gain accelerated in 
the mid 90s with the increase in international aid for reconstruction. Given the 
strong international intervention in all aspects of Mozambican economic and political 
life, the government has not been able to exert its sovereignty rights and make 
independent decisions about the state’s future. In Mozambique, external dependence 
became a mode of political action. The institutional apparatus engineered (and for 
some time run) by the UN peacekeeping force was superimposed on traditional 
notions of power relations and authority. To maintain its hold on power and 
maximise wealth, Mozambique’s weakened political elites had to manage their 
external dependency and adapt to Western views and values of democracy and 
liberalism. These dynamics of extraversion were also reflected in the relationship 
between transnational HASN leaders and the Mozambican government.
118 A good number o f  analysts (Fatton, 1992; Bayart, 1993; Reno, 1995; Mandani, 1996; Chabal and 
Daloz, 1999) tried to understand the functioning o f  patronage networks and corruption in post­
colonial African states. According to Bayart’s view, for example, these phenomena are deeply woven 
into the social fabric o f  many o f those states. For him, in these political contexts “the struggle for 
power is chiefly a struggle for wealth” (Bayart, 1993:89).
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Mozambique is a particular case in Southern Africa. Its colonial and post­
colonial experiences were quite distinct from those of its regional neighbours.119 
While in Botswana, for example, the transition to independence was peaceful and 
marked by the formation of a stable and representative political system, in the 
Mozambican case the Portuguese left behind a country destroyed by war and with a 
burdensome colonial legacy. In the nineteenth century, the Portuguese colonial 
administration lacked both the inclination and the resources to firmly establish itself 
in the colony. It sought to fill its administrative deficiencies through issuing large 
concessionary grants to foreign companies (mosdy British). In return for a small 
share of less than 10% of the profits, Portugal granted these companies 
administrative powers and near-complete control over the territories in which they 
operated.120 As a result, the colony was divided into three semi-autonomous regions: 
north, central and south.121 This early fragmentation of the country by the 
Portuguese contributed to the formation of different “nations” inside Mozambique, 
which impaired the constitution of a single Mozambican national identity after 
independence (Newitt, 2002).
119 However, despite the distinctive character o f the Portuguese colonial rule in Southern Africa, the 
Mozambican case bears some resemblance to other colonies in the region, such as South Africa, 
Zimbabwe and Namibia, where emergent independence movements encountered resistance from 
white settlers, which eventually led to violent struggles for liberation (Bauer and Taylor, 2005:114).
120 From the 1850’s, South Africa also started to play an important role in the economy o f  
Mozambique, as a result o f  the massive flux o f  workers moving to the gold and diamond mines in the 
neighbouring country. The country’s economy became largely dependent on the remittances from 
workers in South Africa and on the transport fees from rail traffic paid by it. Mozambique also 
provided transport infrastructures for Rhodesia (present-day Zimbabwe) and Nyasaland (now 
Malawi). Railways were built to link these countries to the ports o f  Beira and Lourentp Marques 
(Maputo). Most white settlements took place around these coastal cities and it was there that an 
emergent middle class and the modem sector o f  Mozambique’s economy flourished (Newitt, 2002).
121 The country was divided between three enterprises: the Niasa Company, which controlled the 
northern third o f  the colony, the Mozambique’s Company, with a strong hold in the central region, 
and the Zambezia Company, which took advantage o f the fertile lands o f  the southern territories 
(Newitt, 2002:187).
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Moreover, in contrast to British colonies in Southern Africa, in 
Mozambique the colonial power did not undertake any effort to educate an 
indigenous elite. The modem sector was supported by an embryonic educational and 
cultural structure only in the coastal cities of Louren$o Marques (Maputo) and Beira. 
In the early twentieth century, liberal-minded Portuguese governments made 
attempts to improve educational standards in the colonies. By this time, a class of 
mestizo intellectuals had managed to establish their own political and cultural 
associations and newspapers (Newitt, 2002:187). In 1933, this process was reversed 
with the instauration of a fascist regime in Portugal led by Antonio Salazar, the 
Estado Novo. Under Salazar (1933-1974), political organisation and freedom of 
expression became virtually impossible in Mozambique. Dissident movements were 
either persecuted by Salazar’s secret police (the infamous Policia International de 
Defesa do Estado - PIDE) or forced into exile (Sousa, 1977).
Given Salazar’s stranglehold on Mozambique, there was never any attempt 
to set up a transitional political structure or to prepare an indigenous elite for the task 
of government (Chabal, 2002:43). The curtailment of the indigenous people from 
any kind of political representation or from the expression of native views had an 
important influence in the political evolution of Mozambique after independence. 
The authoritarian legacy of the Estado Novo contributed to the formation of an 
unrepresentative form of political leadership in the post-colonial state based on an 
imported ideology, Marxism-Leninism (Chabal, 2002:42). By the time of 
independence, the idea of a Mozambican nation was alien to the majority of 
Mozambique’s population (90% illiterate and 97% rural) who were integrated in 
ethnic clans as their universe of social and political allegiances (Abrahamsson and 
Nilsson, 1988:23).
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During the period around 1964, the Frente de Liberta^o de Mo9ambique 
(Frelimo) launched its guerrilla warfare against the Portuguese. Frelimo was 
composed of different ethnic groups from both northern and southern provinces, 
the central area being more marginal to the movement. The insurgence was initially 
led by Eduardo Chivambo Mondlane, who ■ was later killed in a bomb blast 
orchestrated by the Portuguese secret services. Following a long negotiation period, 
marked by infighting, intrigue and defection, Mondlane managed to unify a loose 
grouping of exiled nationalist organisations to fight together against the Portuguese 
colonialists (Hanlon, 1990:25). Armed by the Soviet Union, Frelimo inflicted heavy 
losses upon Portuguese forces. The ten years from 1964 to 1974 witnessed a bloody 
war with enormous human and material costs for both sides that culminated in the 
Cravos Revolution in Portugal and the subsequent opening of independence 
negotiations with the African insurgents. In 25 June 1975, Frelimo became the 
country’s single party and its leader, Samora Machel, the first president of the new 
independent state of Mozambique.
From 1975 to 1984, Mozambique embarked on a radical socialist 
experiment. Following the Soviet model, Machel introduced a rigid one-party system, 
nationalisation of key sectors of the economy, state management of social services, 
banning of religious activities as well as curtailment of strikes and collectivisation of 
agricultural production (Alden, 2001:5). The Frelimo leadership believed that the 
newly independent state of Mozambique needed to break free from the socio­
economic inheritance of colonialism and establish a regime under a revolutionary and 
emancipatory model.122
122 Frelimo was strongly influenced by the political ideas o f  Amflcar Cabral. Cabral was a freedom 
fighter and a native o f  the former Portuguese colony o f Guinea-Bissau. He was one o f  the founders 
o f  the Partido Africano da Independencia da Guine (-Bissau) e Cabo Verde (PAIGC), in 1956. His
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Short of resources, the government set up inefficient state-run farms at the 
expense of peasant farmers, who were traditionally the major producers in the 
country. It also engaged in a process of social engineering with resettlement projects 
intended to improve the management of resources and facilitate the socialist 
indoctrination of the rural populations. Those measures encountered resistance from 
the already economically strained peasant farmers who reacted by reducing 
production output and turning to the black market (Alden, 2001:7). Hostility towards 
the radical changes promoted by Frelimo assumed a regional and ethnic character, 
something unusual up until this point in Mozambique. Populations in the central 
parts o f Mozambique became very suspicious of Frelimo and its modernising 
policies.123
Internationally, Frelimo launched a series of policies that would further 
aggravate its security and economic situation. In 1976, it introduced sanctions against 
Rhodesia by cutting its vital link to the port of Beira. Additionally, in the strategic 
province of Tete, Frelimo provided a safe haven for the Zanu guerrillas fighting the 
Rhodesian government. In response, Ian Smith’s regime authorised military 
incursions into Mozambican territory and sponsored the establishment of a guerrilla 
movement in central Mozambique, the Mozambican National Resistance (Renamo). 
Despite being largely an external creation of the Rhodesian government, Renamo 
built a strong support base among the growing numbers of unsatisfied groups in the 
central and northern provinces (Alden, 2001:7).
political ideas influenced many revolutionary movements in the lusophone colonies o f  Africa. He was 
assassinated in 1973 by Portuguese “commando” troops and immediately became a martyr for the 
struggle against Portuguese colonialism (Simpson, 1993).
123 Frelimo also targeted the Catholic Church, imposing measures to take over church property, 
cancelling religious festivities and curbing its influence on education and marriage. Similar hostilities 
were taken against Muslims, denounced by the regime as a force against modernisation (Newitt, 
2002:200).
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Frelimo’s modernisation project was incapable of replacing traditional 
values and economic structures with a new system of social norms and economic 
relations. Renamo exploited the disillusionment among the local population over the 
failures of the central government by offering a new vision based on ethnic lines. 
According to Abrahamsson and Nilsson, Renamo’s strategy of popular mobilisation 
took the form of a “politicisation of ethnicity” (1988:94). The traditionally 
marginalised Ndau people from central Mozambique formed the power base of 
Renamo whereas Frelimo was seen as representing the rival group of Shangaan 
(Tsonga) people living in the Southern provinces of Gaza and Maputo (Vines, 
1996:130).
By the early 80s, Renamo, with the logistic and financial backing of the 
South African government, unleashed a series of violent and orchestrated actions in 
the countryside, attacking the state’s infrastructure, intimidating entire populations, 
and further crippling the economy (Vines, 1991:57). At the same time, the South 
African Defence Force (SADF) launched several raids into Mozambique's capital, 
Maputo, in retaliation for Frelimo’s sheltering of ANC members. The destabilisation 
strategy unleashed by Renamo and sponsored by the Apartheid regime was proved 
very effective.
In 1983, during its Fourth Party Congress, Frelimo reckoned that a radical 
turn in its domestic and foreign policies was necessary to avoid the full collapse of 
the post-colonial state (Ebata, 1999: 142-145).124 However, Frelimo was unable to 
take decisions as a united front. The crisis provoked deep divisions within its political 
ranks. According to Hanlon, “this became particularly serious in the early 80s, when
124 During this period, a series o f  meetings were held between the governments o f  South Africa and 
Mozambique envisaging the settlement o f crucial issues between the two countries. The discussions 
eventually led to the signing o f  the Nkomati Accord, in 1984, by which Frelimo agreed to curb ANC
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the Politburo seemed paralysed and unable to act on the war and the economy” 
(1991:26). It was also at this time that ideological shifts within the party became more 
apparent. Instead of the grandiose post-colonial project of creating a socialist society 
in Mozambique, Frelimo engaged in a daily struggle to maintain control of the state 
as well as its own survival as a coherent political entity. “Nine years of war and 
hardship have smashed not only the economy, but also the early enthusiasm, ideals 
and good political intentions” (Hanlon, 1990:263). Faced with this resource-sapping 
struggle, an impoverished Frelimo turned to the West for assistance. It joined the 
IMF and accepted the conditions of the Western powers, opening itself to drastic 
economic reforms.
In the late 80s, Joaquim Chissano, the successor of Samora Machel (who 
was killed in a plane crash in 1986)125 promoted a drastic move away from scientific 
socialism. Frelimo sought the technical and financial support of the IMF and the 
World Bank to put in place a bold strategy of economic liberalisation and structural 
reforms, aiming at the revitalisation of Mozambique’s economy.126 In 1989, Chissano 
formally renounced Frelimo’s loyalty to Marxism-Leninism, opening party 
membership and committing himself to democratic rule. On 30 November 1990, a 
new liberal constitution was promulgated, establishing direct presidential elections, 
separation of powers, limited presidential terms and a free press (Newitt, 2002:201). 
Frelimo’s sudden move towards Western democracy and economic liberalism further 
complicated its internal coherence and domestic legitimacy. The failure of the 
socialist project undermined much of the Frelimo leaders’ moral authority and
activities in Mozambique in return for the cessation o f  South African support for Renamo (Alden, 
2001:9).
125 Although bad weather was blamed for the accident, many Mozambicans are convinced that the 
Apartheid regime was involved in Machel’s death (Interview Negrao 09.08.2004).
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credibility, forcing them to reinvent themselves as committed neo-liberal capitalists. 
In this instance, the destruction of Frelimo’s early post-colonial project remoulded 
Mozambique in the image of many other (failed) states in Africa. A class of aspirant 
bourgeoisie grew within Frelimo. After 1990, party members were allowed to engage 
in private businesses while holding office, which set the stage for rampant corruption 
and the plunder of states’ assets (Alden, 2001:12).127
In 1992, after the conclusion of peace talks between Frelimo and Renamo, 
the UN began to play a central role in Mozambique as the organisation in charge of 
facilitating the implementation of the General Peace Agreement and rebuilding the 
Mozambican state in the image of a Western liberal democracy. The signature of the 
peace agreement coincided with a unique period in international history. The end of 
the Cold War triggered a liberal euphoria in Western societies. A humanitarian 
normative project took hold with transnational activists, governments and 
multilateral institutions, giving renewed priority to the provision of international 
norms based on human rights and democracy. The UN, which since its creation had 
been constantly overshadowed by the geo-strategic game played by the two super­
powers, captured the opportunity to redefine its role in the international system. The 
UN Secretary-General, Boutros Boutros-Ghali’s landmark document, A n  Agenda for 
Peace, was one attempt to fully engage the organisation in its original mission as a 
promoter of enduring international peace.
This revised doctrine of military humanitarianism (Slim, 2002), no longer 
eclipsed by the need to respond to the threat posed by the two Cold War contenders,
126 The Economic Recovery Programme (PRE) was officially launched by the Mozambican Prime 
Minister, Mario Machungo, on 14 January 1987 (Alden, 2001:10).
127 On November 2002, for example, Carlos Cardoso, a journalist from Beira, was killed by gunmen 
while investigating the theft o f  US$ 11.5 million by Frelimo officials from the Commercial Bank o f  
Mozambique (The Economist 21.11.2002).
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legitimised action against regimes in places as far apart as Somalia, Kosovo, Haiti and 
Afghanistan. Boutros-Ghali’s A n  Agenda for Peace set out the guiding principles for 
the UN’s peacekeeping operations in the post-Cold War international context. The 
document sketched the UN’s new instruments for peace and security, emphasising 
not only traditional policing of cease-fires and organisation of elections but also the 
whole process of nationrbuilding, including powers to create interim governments 
and setting up reformed state institutions (Boutros-Ghali, 1992). As a result, the UN 
peacekeeping operations became more comprehensive, longer and greater in number 
than during the Cold War era.128
Mozambique represents a particular case in which the application of this 
post-Cold War peacekeeping doctrine became a fundamental factor for 
understanding the reconstitution of the Mozambican state after the end of the civil 
war. After partial successes, as in the case of Cambodia, and total failures, as seen in 
Angola, the UN operation in Mozambique (ONUMOZ) emerged as the decisive 
case for testing and confirming the revised formulas of peacekeeping and state 
reconstruction in situations of complex emergencies. Frelimo was aware of the UN’s 
setback in Angola and its pressing need to succeed in Mozambique. Due to its 
particular ability to play by the international rules at the same time as envisaging clear 
economic and political advantages in the process of doing so, Frelimo accepted and 
fully collaborated with the peacekeeping mission. Although taking on a secondary 
role in the process of rebuilding the state, Frelimo’s leadership knew that they would 
almost certainly come out victorious from the 1994 presidential elections and inherit 
a fairly stable, institutionally reformed, and internationally legitimate sovereign state,
128 It is interesting to note that in forty years, from 1948 to 1988, the U N  launched 13 peacekeeping 
operations. However, in the six years from 1988 to 1994, there have been an impressive number o f 21 
new peacekeeping operations under the auspices o f  the UN. Also striking is the fact that in 1992 there
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ready for a fresh start after 25 years of failed socialism and civil war (Interview 
Negrao 09.08.2004).
Since the advent of democracy, Mozambique has experienced enduring 
political stability, impressive economic growth rates of around 9% a year, and a 
consistent influx of generous foreign assistance/investment. Over the five year 
period from 1997 to 2002, the former interventionist power, South Africa, became 
the largest foreign investor, accounting for an impressive 49% of Mozambique’s 
Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) (Grobelaar, 2004:83). However, Mozambique is 
still enormously dependent on foreign assistance. Nearly 50% of the country’s GDP 
is based on external aid (Castelo-Branco, 2002:5). International technical assistance 
(even ten years after the conclusion of the UN peacekeeping mission) is central to 
the functioning of most state institutions.
This reality also applies to HIV/AIDS policies. In Mozambique, the 
international commitment to helping the government face the epidemic is just one 
aspect of the extensive international involvement already in place in the country. 
Compared to this thesis’ other case studies, Mozambique felt the impact of 
HIV /AIDS later. Curiously, the civil war was an important factor in explaining the 
belated development of the epidemic in the country. During the 80s, most of the 
population was isolated and inaccessible, with many refugees in neighbouring 
countries. Moreover, Mozambican ports and railways had been substantially damaged 
by Renamo’s sabotage attacks, which further hindered the free movement of peoples 
and goods. As soon as this war-induced isolation ended in 1992 and the levels of 
population mobility increased, HIV spread rapidly all over the country (Interview 
Palha de Sousa 09.08.2004). UNAIDS estimates that in Mozambique, nearly 200,000
were around 12,000 military personnel working as U N peacekeepers. By the end o f  1994, this number
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new HIV infections occur every year, of which 30,000 are among children. 
Mozambique’s National Institute of Statistics (INE) revised its life expectancy 
projections for 2010 downward from 50.3 to 36.4 years, allowing for the impact of 
the epidemic (INE, 2002). Over 500 infections occur daily and an estimated 220 
people die of AIDS each day (UNAIDS, 2004d).
The massive securitisation move of the late 90s presented Mozambique 
with an opportunity to benefit from the huge amounts of money being pledged by 
international donors and multilateral institutions to fight the global epidemic. The 
Mozambican government appeared to fully embrace the securitisation prescriptions 
of HASN and be moving towards their institutionalisation. However, Frelimo’s 
adherence to international HIV/AIDS norms should be understood against the 
backdrop of its long-term dependency on international financing. The creation of a 
particular political culture in Mozambique, characterised by the use of the country’s 
many crises to influence the international community, also framed the manner by 
which Frelimo absorbed the proposed securitisation of HIV/AIDS. As shown in 
more detail later, in the minds of the most experienced leaders who in many ways 
personified the Mozambican state, the HIV/AIDS epidemic was just another chapter 
in Mozambique’s long history of disaster followed by international relief. The 
challenge for Frelimo would be to adapt to the securitisation language of the global 
response, therefore gaining the sympathy (and money) of HASN leaders.
3. Institutional Strategies and HIV/AIDS Policies in Mozambique
had jumped to something like 80,000 (IISS, 1994).
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The incorporation of HASN in Mozambique, and its impact on the 
government’s response to HIV/AIDS should be situated within the context of a 
profoundly weakened state. In the aftermath of the civil war, Frelimo had to deal 
with the impact of the growing epidemic alongside the huge task of rebuilding the 
state.129 In the early 90s, while many countries in the region were experiencing strong 
development gains and economic growth, Mozambique’s population was on the 
brink of starvation, the economy in ruins and the government completely disrupted. 
The HIV/AIDS epidemic took hold in Mozambique against this backdrop of civil 
war, economic and political reconstruction, weak state institutions, erratic leadership 
and natural disasters.130
From the mid 80s until the signing of the peace agreement with Renamo in 
1992, Mozambique saw a slow expansion of the epidemic with no clear unified 
response from the government. In 1986, at the apex of the civil war, Frelimo first 
identified HIV/AIDS as a potentially serious health problem. Health officials 
observed the rapid expansion of HIV/AIDS in neighbouring countries and realised 
that they had to start doing something because "it will come to us soon" (Interview 
Palha de Sousa 09.08.2004). However, by this time, the spreading disease was 
eclipsed by the more prominent threat posed by Renamo (Interview Palha de Sousa
09.08.2004).
129 As shown in the next chapter, during the early 90s, South Africa was also going through a process 
o f political transition to democracy after almost 50 years o f  Apartheid, which was reflected in the 
government's response to the HTV/AIDS epidemic.
13° Floocis in February 2000 caused overwhelming damage, pushing the country back into levels o f  
poverty not seen since the civil war. A massive relief operation was launched by the international 
community that succeeded in avoiding what could have represented the total collapse o f  the hard-won 
development gains experienced in the years following the end o f the civil war. Around 700 people lost 
their lives and something like 700,000 displaced people were in need o f  emergency aid. Virtually all 
food production was destroyed, leaving an estimated number o f  220,000 people on the brink o f  
starvation (The Economist 02.03.2000).
170
During this early period, the government’s response to HIV/AIDS was 
extremely limited. In 1988, it set up Mozambique’s first National HIV/AIDS 
Commission. Two years later, the Ministry of Health, under the technical assistance 
of W HO’s Global Programme, put in place an HIV/AIDS Epidemic Alert System 
(Centre for the Study of AIDS and the Centre for Human Rights, 2004b: 19). These 
early initiatives were nevertheless hampered by the incapacity of the government to 
cope with a multitude of other problems that demanded more urgent action than the 
newly discovered disease.131 Renamo’s more brutal and destructive form of warfare 
after 1980 forced Frelimo to divert further resources to fund defence at the expense 
of health, education and other social services (Andersson, 1992).
By this time, Renamo was engaged in a campaign to destroy Frelimo’s 
support base by targeting public infrastructures and intimidating NGOs and 
international organisations working in the field. As a result of Renamo’s campaign, 
by the early 90s, “about half of the nation’s schools and a third of its health clinics 
had been damaged or destroyed” (World Bank, 1997:1). The activities of the Ministry 
of Health were circumscribed to the areas under Frelimo’s control. In the central 
provinces, where Renamo established its own provisional government, Frelimo’s 
state was completely absent. In those areas, basic social services were delivered by 
Catholic organisations and a few other religious NGOs, which were seen by Renamo 
as either neutral in the conflict or as opposing Frelimo’s anti-religious bias (Newitt, 
2002:217).
After 1993, the situation began to change due to a more stable environment 
after the General Peace Agreement. By then, international NGOs, donor states and
131 During the war, diseases such as cholera and measles reached epidemic proportions in 
Mozambique. To give an idea o f  the seriousness o f  the problem, concerning cholera, for instance,
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multilateral organisations began to arrive in the country with HIV/AIDS projects 
and activities. Lacking central coordination and national guidelines from the Ministry 
of Health, many of these foreign actors acted unilaterally, bypassing the government. 
They were free to set up comfortable offices in Maputo and develop their own 
programmes with different priorities and principles. Their activities further weakened 
the government’s institutional capacity as many ill-paid health workers left for the 
much better-resourced private (non-profit) sector (Interview Palha de Sousa
09.08.2004).
Internationally, the leadership crisis experienced by W HO’s Global 
Programme also contributed to the organisational confusion that took place in 
Mozambique in the 90s. Mozambique’s increasing dependence on international 
actors undermined the government’s autonomy to define national HIV/AIDS 
policies as well as its ability to implement an effective national strategy.132 Foreign 
NGOs and donor states virtually took over the national response to the epidemic 
without any coherent centralised control from the government. In fact, during this 
period, the government’s institutional apparatus was still being restructured by 
ONUMOZ.133
International NGOs’ preference for concentrating their health-related, and other, 
resources in specific provinces, for example, the Danish in Tete, the Dutch in 
Nampula, the European Union in Zambezia, the Italians in Sofala, helped undermine 
both national and local control and coherence of health programmes (Collins, 
2006:17).
without immediate medical intervention, someone diagnosed with the disease in the morning can 
easily die in the evening o f  the same day (Interview Palha de Sousa 09.08.2004).
132 For example, in 1992, foreign aid covered almost 60 per cent o f  all Mozambique’s public health 
care expenditure (Cliff, 1998).
133 The U N  was the organ responsible for coordinating and monitoring all humanitarian activities in 
the country (Synge, 1997:35). In this respect, given the more immediate humanitarian needs o f  more 
than 5 million people displaced by war, the peacekeeping mission did not develop any special 
mechanism to coordinate H IV/AIDS activities during the period o f  its mandate (Interview Palha de 
Sousa 09.08.2004).
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The actual “national” response to the epidemic began only in 1998 through 
the National Programme to Combat HIV/AIDS set up by the Ministry of Health in 
collaboration with UNAIDS. This was followed by the creation of an Inter 
Ministerial AIDS Commission comprised of eight ministers. The government revised 
the early National Programme to Fight AIDS and agreed to implement a short-term 
plan and three medium-term plans in the following years (Centre for the Study of 
AIDS and the Centre for Human Rights, 2004b: 19/20). This period corresponded 
at the international level to the advent of the global securitisation of HIV/AIDS. 
UNAIDS arrived in Mozambique in 1997 and immediately engaged with the Ministry 
of Health to devise and implement policies in line with a more aggressive response to 
the epidemic.
In March 2000, the Ministry of Health launched Mozambique's first 
comprehensive and National Strategic Plan to Combat STDs/HIV/AIDS (PEN) for 
the period 2000-2002. As part of the Three Ones’ prescriptions, the plan adopted a 
multisectoral approach to the epidemic, attempting to involve a greater number of 
state and non-state actors at all levels. Also following the international formula, in 
May 2000, a new bureaucracy, chaired by the Prime Minister, was established to 
coordinate the multisectoral response, the Conselho National de Combate ao Sida 
(CNCS). The CNCS had the responsibility for coordinating all governmental and 
non-governmental HIV/AIDS activities (Ministerio da Saude, 2000).
In 2001, a transnational NGO, the Medetins Sans Fmntieres (MSF), became 
the first organisation to introduce AIDS treatment sites in Mozambique. MSF was 
followed by a Roman Catholic group, the Sant’Egidio Community, which in 2004 
was providing treatment in the non-governmental sector to around 3,000 people 
(Interview Bortolot 05.08.2004). The Mozambican government launched its own
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ARV programme in 2002 under the control of the Ministry of Health. The Clinton 
Foundation helped the Ministry develop a five-year operating plan for scaling-up 
HIV/AIDS care and treatment (Ministerio da Saude and Clinton Foundation, 
2003a).134 The provision of free ARVs is a fairly recent development in Mozambique. 
It coincided, on a global level, with the UNGASS declaration of commitment on 
HIV/AIDS, in which state leaders agreed to fight the epidemic by investing in a dual 
strategy of prevention and treatment (UNGASS, 2001). Up to 2002, there was no 
mention given to ARVs in Mozambique’s national response. It has only been 
prioritised in the latest Strategic Plan (2004-2008) and the Global Fund is providing 
the first significant funding for ARV therapy in the country (Ministerio da Saude, 
2003b).135 The government’s treatment plan has nonetheless progressed very slowly. 
By 2005, only 16,000 patients were on ARV treatment in the public health system 
out of the 210,000 in urgent need of it (Ministerio da Saude, 2005).
Additionally, in 2003 Mozambique became one of the fifteen countries to 
benefit from PEPFAR funds. The introduction of PEPFAR in Mozambique’s 
national response added complexity to the coordination initiatives of the government 
and its international partners. The US government pledged U$ 27 million to be 
applied in HIV/AIDS prevention and care projects for a period of 5 years (US 
Department of State, 2005:67). The first instalment of U$ 11 million only became
134 The Clinton Foundation is an interesting example o f  a very vocal organisation with regard to the 
securitisation o f  HIV/AIDS. Health security is at the core o f  the Foundation’s mission and it has 
actively engaged with both its global partners and the government o f  Mozambique in promoting good 
practices and policies towards the combat against the epidemic. More information about the work o f  
the Clinton Foundation in Mozambique is available at http://www.clintonfoundation.org/programs- 
hs-countries6.htm.
135 In February 2004, the governments o f  Mozambique and Brazil signed a memorandum o f  
understanding to build a factory in the country to produce cheap generic AIDS drugs. The plan 
consists o f  the construction by the Brazilian government o f  a plant with sufficient capacity to produce 
drugs to supply all the 14 SADC member states. Nevertheless, as o f  2005, the bilateral protocol was 
still going through technical evaluations regarding the economic viability o f  the project (Noticias, 
18.08.2004).
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available 18 months after the launch of the programme by George Bush. As shown 
in more detail later, the delay was caused by disputes concerning the procurement of 
AIDS drugs as well as by US insistence on abstinence and faithfulness approaches to 
HIV prevention (Interview Saide 11.08.2004).
As of 2004, Mozambique’s national response to HIV/AIDS had shown a 
certain amount of progress. Despite the slow implementation of the ARV treatment 
plan, an increasing number of people were accessing AIDS drugs in the public health 
system. Financial assistance from the Global Fund and PEPFAR was finally having a 
positive impact at the grassroots levels with the setting up of treatment clinics and 
HIV testing and counselling centres. However, outside the capital city, Maputo, the 
reality was not so reassuring. Most of the multilateral agencies and NGOs were based 
in Maputo, resourced with new cars and well-paid employees.136 In the rural areas, 
just a few religious groups, local NGOs and a handful of government’s health 
workers struggled to maintain rural hospitals and health units, which were in general 
falling to pieces.137 In most of the cases, development agencies did not set up offices 
in the rural areas to monitor the application of their funds in HIV/AIDS projects. 
Moreover, as a result of Renamo’s political control of many parts of Mozambique’s 
central and northern provinces, which are currently badly affected by the epidemic, 
the Ministry of Health is scarcely present in these areas and the population is left 
unassisted by the government (Interview Johannsen 18.08.2004).
136 Philip Johannsen affirmed that at least half o f  the international funds applied to HIV/AIDS  
projects in Mozambique stays in Maputo, paying for the government’s, IN G O s’, international donor 
agencies’ and other international organisations’ offices, employees’ salaries, cars, travel expenses, 
among other maintenance costs (Interview Johannsen 18.08.2004).
137 In this respect, it is interesting to note that newly-trained doctors, nurses and other health workers 
struggle to keep positions in the Ministry o f  Health in Maputo, not willing to work in the 
professionally unpromising provincial hospital and health units (Interview Saide 11.08.2004).
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The problem in Mozambique is the lack of national ownership of 
HIV/AIDS initiatives. The role of the government is to (poorly) manage the projects 
devised and funded by international actors. In this respect, the government is just an 
intermediary between the (dominant) externally defined policies of international 
donors and the needs of the Mozambican population suffering from the epidemic. 
The actual denationalised character of the CNCS (which is the supposedly national 
structure created to strengthen the government’s response to the epidemic) is a clear 
illustration of this fact. Due to the shortage of skilled people in the country, many 
middle-level positions in the bureaucracy are filled by foreigners.
According to the Director of the AIDS programme in the Ministry of 
Health, Dr. Mouzinho Saide, Mozambicans were marginalised by foreign partners 
when, in a prolonged initial stage, the CNCS meetings were conducted in English 
instead of Portuguese (Interview 11.08.2004). In one of those meetings, held in the 
CNCS headquarters in Maputo, in August 2004, the author witnessed the central role 
played by the so-called Group of Partners (GP) (see section 5.1) in setting "the agenda 
for discussions. On this occasion, under the leadership of UNAIDS, the GP 
bypassed both the Ministry of Health and the CNCS’ executive board in leading the 
debates about the further implementation of the national ARVs programme and on 
the definition of priorities concerning the establishment of new VCT centres in rural 
areas.
The uneven and asymmetrical character of the relationship between the 
government of Mozambique on the one hand, and the international HASN leaders 
on the other, did not prevent the former from playing an active role in negotiating 
the domestic recognition of HASN. Rather, as the next section demonstrates, 
Mozambique’s political elites used their privileged position as the principal securitising 
audiences in the country to exert political agency. They talked the language of
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securitisation as “a make-believe” claim which was used to keep international donors 
(securitising actors) onboard. In this sense, political leaders in Mozambique perceived 
the domestic incorporation of HASN as an opportunity to enhance and consolidate 
traditional patterns of their relationship with international actors rather than a 
genuine convincement of the intrinsic validity of this norm.
4. Leadership perceptions and the domestic recognition of HASN
This section maintains that in Mozambique the vigorous securitisation move of 
HASN leaders towards the end of the 90s was only translated in terms of strong 
political leadership by the government’s political elites at the level of rhetoric. It 
appears that their actions were often intended to please an international audience of 
donors without an effective engagement in the actual implementation of plans. On 
the surface, the policy outcomes coming up from the dealings between the 
government and its international partners seemed very encouraging, with the 
elaboration of comprehensive national plans to tackle the epidemic and the financing 
of fully-staffed and well-equipped bureaucracies, such as the CNCS. However, 
beneath the apparent positive engagement of Frelimo’s policy-makers, the politics of 
HIV/AIDS revolved around state leaders’ other concerns with power and state 
control.
As demonstrated in more detail below, Mozambique’s HIV/AIDS 
institutional structures run in parallel, and are sometimes superimposed on (or even 
merged with), international bureaucracies of bilateral donors, international NGOs 
and multilateral agencies. Frelimo’s political stability depends largely on the 
maintenance of good relations with these international sources of financing which, in 
turn, sustain the government’s dominant position vis-a-vis domestic opposition
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groups (namely Renamo). In institutionally weak states such as this, political leaders’ 
perceptions about the nature of security threats differ greatly from the security 
concerns of well-established polities.138
The traditional “security dilemma” logic assumes that security threats are 
external to states and that one state can counter the aggressive action of others by 
using military dissuasion. The realist conceptualisation of the “security dilemma” is 
rooted in the Cold War period, during which the continuous balance of power 
between the United States and the Soviet Union defined the general parameters for 
international security relations. However, the “(insecurity dilemma” that affects 
weak states like Mozambique is of a different nature. In general, the prevailing 
security threats in states lacking institutional capacity and social cohesion are 
domestically oriented rather than internationally motivated. In the case of 
Mozambique, Frelimo defined “national security” in terms of how to acquire 
financial resources to perpetuate long-term patterns of state control given the 
constant threat posed by the growing power of Renamo.
This particular trend in the country’s political culture was reflected in 
Frelimo’s particular ideas and actions towards the HIV/AIDS epidemic. Rather than 
being seen as a security threat, the potential seriousness o f the HIV/AIDS problem 
has been perceived by top leaders in the government as a comparative advantage, 
and used by the government to benefit from the massive global mobilisation of 
resources to fight the epidemic. In this sense, the imported ideas about the security 
implications of HIV/AIDS were reconstructed by Frelimo’s elites to fit with pre- 
existing patterns of their relationship with external actors. In this way, it can be seen
138 Patrick Chabal gave the name “neo-patrimonial polities” to political systems in which the state 
stability is characterised by the ability o f  “patrons [...] to meet the expectations o f  their followers 
according to well-established norms o f  reciprocity” (Chabal, 2002:89).
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that the adoption of HASN's prescriptions by Mozambique’s leaders was aimed at 
gaining outside support and relieving the state from both domestic and international 
pressure.
One example of this is how the government used the resources of powerful 
international partners to gain more leverage in relation to Renamo. This is clearly 
illustrated by the unbalanced regional allocation of money and development of 
HIV/AIDS activities in the country. Traditional Renamo strongholds in the central 
and northern parts of Mozambique are marginalised by the Frelimo state, whereas 
most of the HIV/AIDS action is concentrated in the Frelimo-dominated south, 
especially in the Maputo area. The central provinces of Sofala and Manica, which 
showed in 2002 the worst HIV prevalence rates in the country (21.1% and 19.8% 
respectively), are particularly neglected by the government.139 Not coincidentally, 
these areas were also the sites of great activity by the Portuguese while fighting 
Frelimo as well as being the place where the Rhodesian government first established 
Renamo (De Brito, 1996:472). The fact that President Chissano, as well as his 
successor in the 2004 elections, Armando Guebuza, represent the “old guard” of 
Frelimo is also illustrative of the government’s regional bias against Renamo (Vines, 
1996:130).
Despite Chissano’s background as a guerrilla fighter and as a radical socialist 
leader, he has shown an impressive capacity to adapt to new political circumstances 
over the years while simultaneously maintaining (or even improving) levels of 
international cooperation. A former devotee of Marxism-Leninism, Chissano has 
turned himself into a promoter of market liberalism in Southern Africa. This extreme
139 The central region o f  Mozambique is the worst affected with a prevalence rate in 2002 o f  16.7%, 
followed by the south region with 14.8% and the north with 8.4% (INE, 2004).
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ideological conversion is an interesting illustration of the pragmatism driving 
Frelimo’s leadership since the socialist dream collapsed in the mid 80s. Mozambique’s 
accession to the exclusive group of Commonwealth states is a clear example of 
Chissano’s political/ideological malleability. Despite Mozambique’s Portuguese colonial 
heritage, Chissano successfully claimed Mozambique’s membership in this 
Anglophone club of Commonwealth nations. It was mosdy justified on the grounds 
that Mozambique had historically cooperated with the Commonwealth states against 
both the Rhodesian and Apartheid regimes and had paid a huge political cost as a 
result. In fact, Chissano believed that joining this prestigious organisation would 
bring economic benefits and significantly raise Mozambique’s international profile 
(Newitt, 2002:233). Similarly, while referring to Frelimo’s close cooperation with the 
international community in the aftermath of the dramatic floods that reached 
Mozambique in 2000, Newitt argued that,140
Once again Frelimo had been caught unprepared by the magnitude of the challenge 
it faced, though with some skill the party leadership used the catastrophe to do what 
it had always done best, to win friends and influence people in the international 
community [...] This was confirmed by Chissano himself who, in a television 
interview during the flood crisis, renewed his call for the cancellation of 
Mozambique’s foreign debt, so that Mozambique could raise fresh loans (Newitt, 
2002:235).
140 An interesting parallel can be drawn between the severe floods that hit Mozambique in 2000 and 
the H IV /A ID S epidemic. In both cases, an overwhelming securitisation process was launched under the 
auspices o f  the international community to face a serious humanitarian crisis. In response, the 
government o f  Mozambique instrumentally accepted the international prescriptions for action and 
used the sympathy and concern o f  the external donors to renew claims for foreign assistance and 
external debt relief. Finally, in both cases, the massive managerial and financial interference o f  
international agencies in the country extended Mozambique’s dependency on foreign donors’ money 
and administrative capacity. The author is aware o f  the obvious differences between the two cases, 
especially concerning the understanding o f  the HTV/AIDS epidemic as a long-term crisis whereas the 
flooding was a time-bounded emergency. However, in both situations there was a substantial 
allocation o f  international and national resources, the implementation o f  special managerial 
procedures to face the crisis, and the identification o f  an emergencial situation posed by a clearly 
defined threat.
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The political astuteness of Chissano and his ability to fit into different 
ideological/normative frames was also reflected in his government’s commitment to 
international normative frameworks to combat HIV/AIDS. For example, during the 
UNGASS meeting in June 2001, the Mozambican Prime Minister, Pascoal Manuel 
Mocumbi, declared the government’s full adherence to the Declaration of 
Commitment and urged other states to engage in a coordinated global fight against 
the epidemic,
My Government believes that the Declaration we are about to adopt at this historic 
meeting should ensure a global commitment towards coordinating and strengthening 
of national, regional and international efforts to combat the epidemic in an integrated 
manner. We urge the international community to show the necessary political will to 
relieve the unprecedented sorrow and pain the pandemic is causing to humanity (UN 
General Assembly, 2001: internet source).
Accordingly, in April 2004, Mocumbi’s successor, Luisa Diogo, addressed 
the international community of donors at the Second African Partnership Forum of 
NEPAD in Maputo. Diogo mentioned the devastating impact of HIV/AIDS in 
Africa and the urgent need for vigorous measures to be taken by African leaders 
because,
Thousands upon thousands of teachers, health professionals, engineers, and 
agronomists, among other cadres, are losing their lives [...] They are leaving orphans 
behind and are wiping out the investment that was made in training them [...] It is 
thus urgent that Africa and its cooperation partners strengthen their strategic 
partnership in the struggle against this evil [...] So we don't see H IV jA ID S  just as a 
public health problem, but as a question of strategic and development security [my emphasis] 
(Panapress, 2004: internet source).
The Prime Minister’s public commitment to the securitisation of 
HIV/ AIDS was aimed at a particular international audience of bilateral donors. By 
saying that African countries needed to “strengthen their strategic partnership with
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its cooperation partners”, Diogo meant that donors should increase the influx of 
foreign resources to face an alleged “question of strategic and development security”. 
Chissano himself has also used the multilateral stage to reinforce Mozambique’s 
acceptance of international understandings of the security impact of HIV/AIDS. In 
September 2003, during the UN General Assembly’s Informal Panel Discussion on 
HIV/AIDS, he affirmed that,
The HIV/AIDS pandemic is reversing the developmental gains made in the past 
decades and is posing the greatest threat to sustainable development of the region 
[...] We are committed to fight HIV/AIDS and other diseases as contained in the 
United Nations Millennium Declaration and the United Nations General Assembly 
Special Session on HIV/AIDS [...] Our commitment is also reflected in the Abuja 
Declaration on HIV/AIDS issued in 2001 (UN General Assembly, 2003:16).
At the level of the government’s interactions with its domestic audiences, 
however, the acknowledgement of HIV/AIDS as the greatest threat to development 
and security has not been as straightforward as it appears in the above quotations. In 
2004, for example, the Minister of Health, Francisco Sogane, while addressing a 
domestic audience of public health workers, admitted the special magnitude and 
impact of HIV/AIDS, but mentioned that malaria (the number one cause of death in 
Mozambique) was the Ministry’s main public health target.141 Similarly, during the 
run-up to the 2004 elections, HIV/AIDS was an issue that did not strongly galvanise 
the electoral campaigns of either Renamo’s or Frelimo’s presidential candidates 
(Interview Negrao 09.08.2004). The new Mozambican President, Armando Guebuza, 
the winner in the 2004 election, maintained Frelimo’s traditional line of high-profile 
declarations of commitment to FIASN followed by discrete leadership.
141 His commitment seemed logical given the deadly impact o f  malaria in Mozambique. The 
government’s health authorities recorded 4,478,215 cases o f  the disease in 2003, with 3,212 deaths 
(Ministerio da Saude, 2003).
As noted above, the framing of HIV/AIDS as a security issue is alien to 
the traditional understandings of the Mozambican elite about what a security threat is 
(or should be). While the epidemic may impact on political stability and economic 
development in the long-term, it poses litde immediate threat to Frelimo’s hold on 
power. In fact, the viewpoint of key political leaders in the government is that the 
epidemic is an opportunity to create new (and to improve old) channels of 
international humanitarian assistance. In this sense, while depicting HIV/AIDS in 
terms of an emergencial security problem, the government is just speaking the language 
of the international community of donors and multilateral organisations. Behind the 
scenes, nonetheless, the epidemic is perceived by Mozambican policymakers as a 
serious public health concern along with a number of other diseases badly afflicting 
the country (Interview Saide 11.08.2004).142 In Mozambique, the global securitisation 
of HIV/AIDS became an important source of international revenue in a country 
badly dependent on foreign aid. It is thus important to Frelimo’s leadership to play 
along with the securitisation game, therefore keeping wealthy international sponsors 
engaged in the national response to the epidemic.
5. Norm Entrepreneurs in Action: The role of Multilateral Institutions, the US 
and Transnational Non-State Actors
142 The externally-induced securitisation o f the epidemic encountered in Mozambique a political 
leadership struggling with a number o f  serious public health problems. Diseases such as malaria, 
cholera, tuberculosis, diarrhoea, among others, are widespread in the country. Policymakers perceive 
H IV/AIDS therefore as just another very serious public health crisis that the government should 
prioritise and respond to (Interview Saide 11.08.2004).
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5.1. The Multilateral Approach
This section examines the role of multilateral agencies in Mozambique’s 
national response to HIV/AIDS. It is argued that UNAIDS and its associate UN 
agencies maintained and further reinforced the patterns of institutional influence 
established during the period of the ONUMOZ mission. The particular 
interventionist character of the UN peacekeeping operation and its organisational 
format shaped the subsequent configuration of the relationship between 
international agencies and the Mozambican government. The UN’s entrenched 
presence in (and actual reconstruction of) Mozambique’s political system turned this 
multilateral body into a powerful transnational source of HASN transmission in the 
country.
The provisional institutional structures created by the General Peace 
Agreement gave the UN’s Special Representative in Mozambique, Aldo Ajello, 
extensive powers to lead Mozambique’s reconstruction process. Synge, in effect, 
quoted a Frelimo official referring to ONUMOZ as a “state within a state” 
(1997:36). Ajello established a Supervisory and Monitoring Commission (CSC) as the 
central authority in the country in charge of the implementation of the Peace 
Agreement’s provisions. The commission was chaired by Ajello and was composed 
of Frelimo’s and Renamo’s members along with the governments of Italy, France, 
the United Kingdom, Portugal and the United States. The relationship between the 
CSC and the international community of donors was further institutionalised 
through the creation of an alternative committee to discuss the development of the 
mission’s projects. In this regard, Chris Alden affirms that,
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The Committee Structures created by the General Peace Agreement gave the 
international donor community an unprecedented and direct role in the conduct, 
management and policy-making of the country. Their voice increasingly influenced 
aspects of the peace process as they - the financiers of the various projects 
undertaken by ONUMOZ - scrutinized the budgetary implications of committee 
decisions (Alden, 2001:51).
Besides its direct participation in policymaking, the UN provided many 
foreign (mostly white) middle-level staff to fill essential gaps in the Mozambican state 
institutions. In most of these organs, English, instead of the locally spoken 
Portuguese, became the “working language” among high-ranked civil servants. The 
UN’s departure after the 1994 elections did not bring to an end the international 
interference in Mozambique’s political and economic spheres. During this early 
period, the consolidation of democratic and independent political institutions was 
still far from being concluded. In fact, Mozambique’s deep-rooted economic and 
administrative dependency on state donors, international NGOs and multilateral 
agencies was further deepened during the reconstruction period, hampering any 
prospect of effective sovereignty.
Likewise, under the leadership of UNAIDS, the UN agencies have 
profoundly influenced the process of decision-making towards HIV/AIDS policies 
from the very beginning of the government’s response in. the late 90s. It was done 
through their intensive participation in the formulation, funding and implementation 
of National Plans and HIV/AIDS activities. Contrary to other states in Southern 
Africa, which responded earlier to the epidemic, Mozambique had not developed 
institutional mechanisms to monitor the penetration of global securitising actors that 
occurred in the late 90s. During this period, the high number of international 
partners involved with all kinds of activities and sources of financing made it almost 
impossible for the government to assess the progress of the national response in the 
country (Interview Saide 11.08.2004). By this time, UNAIDS took responsibility for
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coordinating national action against the epidemic. In this respect, UNAIDS’ first 
important intervention was towards devising a coordination structure for channelling 
funds through the Ministry of Health. As already noted, in 1998, it also helped the 
government to set up its first unified national programme to fight HIV/ AIDS.
In 2000, UNAIDS and fifteen donor states commenced a joint articulation 
of their efforts through a Group of Partners (Grupo de Parceiros - GP). The GP was 
an attempt to harmonise the efforts of the international community of donors within 
a single action framework.143 It works as an advocacy group that links what are 
considered the best international practices with regard to the management of the 
epidemic with national partners in the government and civil society (Interview Uane 
17.08.2004). It also facilitates the exchange of HIV/AIDS information and builds 
consensus among all bilateral and multilateral partners (Ministerio da Saude, 2004). 
While acting as a single actor, the GP is neither directly involved in the 
implementation of the National Plan nor in monitoring the application of 
HIV/AIDS funds.144 UNAIDS, on the other hand, plays a more direct role in the 
process of decision-making. It channels funds to the Ministry of Health and CNCS 
and participates very actively in the process of implementing and managing the 
National Plan (Interview Chambule 13.08.2004). UNAIDS is one of the GP’s leading 
interlocutors at the CNCS’ meetings. In fact, it closely assisted the government in the 
setting up of the CNCS’ bureaucratic structure as well as in the definition of its
143 It is worth noting that all donors involved with the Group o f  Partners have assumed international 
commitments to improve harmonisation and mutual collaboration at the national level. These 
commitments include: coordinating aid delivery, working closely with the government’s financing, 
planning and monitoring systems, and reducing transactional costs between them (Interview Milagres
18.08.2004).
144 The GP has a first contact partner (focal donor) with an annual mandate which represents the 
bilateral and multilateral components o f  the group. The Embassy o f  Finland was the focal point 
during the author’s visit to Mozambique.
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working relationship with other state institutions and international partners 
(Interview Baggio 11.08.2004).
One of the statutory aims of the GP is to improve the CNCS’ institutional 
capacity and management capacity as well as to collaborate on the definition of its 
mandate and policy priorities (Interview Uane 17.08.2004). Especially important is its 
role as a bilateral transmission belt between the HASN global community and the 
Mozambican government. The GP, with the Ministry of Health and the CNCS, 
established mechanisms of consultation to discuss the prioritisation and allocation of 
resources to particular projects. In this respect, the main coordination framework 
between donors and the government is the Health Sector Wide Approach (SWAP). 
SWAP was created in 1997 to coordinate the external financing of the National 
Health System as a whole. Backed by major multilateral actors, such as the World 
Bank, SWAP has also been used as the formal mechanism to coordinate HIV/AIDS 
external assistance in Mozambique (Ministerio da Saude, 2004). Although funds are 
also provided bilaterally by donors for the implementation of the national 
HIV/AIDS plan, the logic behind using SWAP is to include the HIV/AIDS 
response in the context of the overall needs of the public health system (Ministerio 
da Saude, 2004). The creation of a parallel health structure to deal exclusively with 
HIV/AIDS at the expense of the wider health system has been a recurrent concern 
of the Mozambican government (Interview Saide 11.08.2004). Despite the 
government’s concerns with its ownership of HIV/ AIDS programmes, the inclusion 
of HIV/ AIDS in the SWAP system further increased foreign participation in policy 
decision-making (Interview Saide 11.08.2004).
In its current shape, SWAP has two operational mechanisms to manage the 
funding of the National HIV/AIDS Plan: 1) the Sectorial Organisation Committee 
(SOC) is formed by the GP, Ministry of Health, and international NGOs. It hosts
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high profile bi-annual meetings, chaired by the Minister of Health, to assess the 
development of programmes and to decide on financial allocations and the feasibility 
of projects; 2) the SWAP’s Technical Group (SWAP-TG) is made up of middle- 
ranked bureaucrats in the government and technical professionals working for 
bilateral and multilateral partners. They meet on a bi-weekly basis under the 
leadership of the CNCS’ executive to discuss technical details concerning the 
implementation of projects.
The money allocated to HIV/AIDS programmes takes a fundamental share 
of SWAP’s overall budget for the national health system. In the context of the global 
securitisation of HIV/AIDS, three large funds (the Global Fund, the World Bank’s 
Multi-Country AIDS Programme (MAP) and the Bill Clinton Foundation) have 
committed more than US$ 300 million for the period 2004-2008 (Ministerio da 
Saude, 2004). The Global Fund, for example, is a major financier of HIV/AIDS 
activities in Mozambique. The total five year value of the grants awarded to 
Mozambique is US$ 153 million (Global Fund, 2006). It has its own operative liaison 
with health authorities in the government, a Global Fund Portfolio manager, who 
keeps the Global Fund staff in Geneva up to date on key policy developments in the 
country (Interview Saide 11.08.2004).
The CNCS is the official recipient of the Global Fund’s money through 
SWAP. However, it is the Ministry of Health that actually manages the funds. 
UNAIDS works very closely with the Ministry, which gives special leverage to this 
agency in influencing the government’s positions. This lack of centralised control 
created intense inter-bureaucratic politics and poor coordination of the activities of 
international partners. After 1998, institutional conflicts intensified over HIV/AIDS 
policy control, particularly between the Ministry of Health and the CNCS. These 
were power struggles over the management of the resources coming from abroad
188
(Interview Milagres 18.08.2004). The CNCS leadership is severely disadvantaged in 
this respect. The highest ranked civil servants within the CNCS’s organisational 
hierarchy have virtually no executive power, being subordinated to the decisions 
made by the Minister of Health. According to its mandate, the CNCS is in charge of 
coordinating the work of all state bureaucracies, being, therefore, hierarchically above 
them. However, inside the political structure of the CNCS, the Ministry of Health 
absorbs almost all activities. The actual institutional format of decision-making sets 
the Ministry of Health at the top of the CNCS Council, whereas other Ministries and 
Agencies are allocated to secondary positions (Interview Saide 11.08.2004). Although 
statutorily the Prime Minister is the chair of the CNCS, he does not participate 
direcdy in the decision-making process. The Minister of Health is the agenda-setter and 
the main source of leadership.
The international partners have access to the process of decision-making 
through the formal mechanisms described above and also by their direct 
participation in the institutional structure of the Ministry of Health.145 With the 
weakening of the state’s structures in the context of the civil war, international 
NGOs and the UN’s agencies working on the ground filled the gap left by the 
Ministry, virtually becoming the only organisations able to deliver health services in 
the many areas inaccessible to the government. This created a kind of permanent 
synergetic relationship in which the Ministry, even though it is the only recognised 
institution to lead the process of responding to HIV/AIDS, lacks autonomous 
capacity to effectively do so, and therefore must rely on the international
145 This concentration o f  power on the Ministry o f Health is due to its traditional role as the only player 
in the game. After independence from Portugal, all health infrastructures were nationalised under the 
control o f  the Ministry o f  Health, giving no space to the development o f  alternative sources for the 
provision o f  health services. Religious institutions run a few hospitals in the Mozambican countryside 
and the emergence o f  private clinics in the main cities is quite a recent development (Interview Saide
11.08.2004).
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organisations established in the country.146 Moreover, coordination problems within 
the CNCS structure and between this organisation and other state agencies left 
plenty of manoeuvring space for the far better prepared international partners to take 
the position of agenda-setters at the CNCS. In theory, the CNCS’ role would be one of 
elaborating, approving and implementing the strategies established by the National 
Strategic Plan. However, in practice all these steps are indirectly controlled by both 
the GP and by the direct intervention of UNAIDS and other UN agencies. The 
former has the budgetary power to influence decision-making options whereas the 
latter relies on its knowledge claims about the epidemic to influence the government’s 
decisions. Similarly to the international interference during the ONUMOZ period, 
Frelimo’s leadership delegated extensive powers to the multilateral components of 
the GP within the CNCS, frequently staying on the backbench in the course of the 
decision-making process.
The CNCS’s institutional fragility was also manifested in the Ministry of 
Health, which allowed international agencies, such as the UNAIDS, for example, to 
fill the gaps in the bureaucratic structure of the Ministry. The Ministry of Health’s 
self-governing mandate is heavily constrained by the GP. In the view of top officials 
within its structure, the Ministry has become more like an agency that manages a 
wide array of independent projects led by international NGOs and multilateral 
institutions than the repository of leadership and centralised planning (Interview 
Saide 11.08.2004). The interference of these external actors divides the bureaucratic 
structure of the Ministry since donors often invest in separate programmes,
146 Georg Nachtigal, from GTZ, mentioned that the Ministry o f  Health's financial and technical 
dependency on foreign agencies and donors is extremely high. He illustrated this point through the
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capturing important segments of the Ministry’s qualified staff. These civil servants 
become loyal to donors, receiving differential incentives and resources. This is an 
issue of symbolic importance since the authority of the government is clearly 
undermined and the sense of nationhood weakened.147
This should nonetheless not be understood as an actual transfer of political 
power from the government to a foreign authority, but rather as the indirect impact 
of a group of powerful international actors with dispropottional material resources and 
strong knowledge/scientific claims about how to best organise an efficient national 
response to the epidemic. In this respect it is interesting to note that, in contrast to 
the cases of South Africa and Botswana where the boundaries separating the state 
institutions from the international bureaucracies are clear, in Mozambique there is a 
sort of blending between the two. This kind of decision-making structure, highly 
infused by international actors, served the interests of Mozambique’s political elite 
well. The collaboration between the government, on the one hand, and international 
HASN leaders, on the other, helped to perpetuate long-term patterns of internal 
control by Frelimo’s leading actors. As already noted, the external environment has 
traditionally been a major source of political legitimacy and economic power to 
Frelimo. In this sense, the government’s engagement in skilful argumentative 
practices (or speech-acts) with donors and multilateral agencies compensated for the 
disproportional international interference on domestic HIV/AIDS policies and 
structures.
example o f  the assistance GTZ provides to the government's health officials on the most basic issues 
as in the case o f  grants for transport and food (Interview Nachtigal 12.08.2004).
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5.2. The Bilateral Approach: The US Involvement in Mozambique
The participation of the US government in Mozambique’s response to 
HIV/AIDS began in 2000 with Bill Clinton’s global HIV/AIDS initiative. The 
programme was run by USAID and focused on prevention and care projects along 
the Maputo Corridor and the Beira region, two areas with high levels of HIV/AIDS 
prevalence. By this time, the US government’s perception of HIV/AIDS as a health 
problem had already been replaced by a more holistic view based on the security and 
developmental implications of the epidemic. In Mozambique, this was manifested by 
the USAID’s substantial expansion of its HIV/AIDS programmes and areas of 
interventions. It invested heavily in projects with an emphasis on the 
multidimensional impact of the epidemic. For example, the US government under 
Clinton significantly contributed technical and financial resources in setting up the 
CNCS and in ensuring the fulfilment of its role of coordinating the various aspects 
of a comprehensive national response (USAID, 2003).
In 2004, US involvement in Mozambique dramatically increased with the 
launching of Bush’s HIV/AIDS initiative. The sudden arrival of PEPFAR’s 
securitisation machineiy raised the profile of the US Embassy in the national fight 
against the epidemic. Following the launching of Bush’s Plan, the epidemic was 
immediately fast-tracked to the top of the policy priorities of the US representation 
in Maputo. The US Ambassador, Helen La Lime, became the “commander-in-chief’ 
of all PEPFAR efforts in the country. Under La Lime’s leadership, the US Embassy 
hosted a team of senior officials from USAID, US Human Services Center for
147 The SWAP is the mechanism that will manage the disbursement o f  the two major successful 
applications for H IV /A ID S funds: the World Bank’s Multi-sectoral AIDS Program (MAP) and the 
Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria (Interview Saide 11.082004).
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Disease Control and Prevention (CDC), the Department of Defense and the Peace 
Corps. This sort of “war operation” against HIV/AIDS triggered by PEPFAR was 
not harmonised with previous securitising strategies and coordination structures that 
were put in place by other international actors. (Interview Baggio 11.08.2004)
The US does not participate in any of the multilateral mechanisms 
described above. They negotiate the allocation of funds either through the 
intermediation of the USAID and some US based NGOs or by bilateral talks 
between Ministry of Health and the US Embassy. PEPFAR was neither integrated in 
the SWAP nor in the Group of Partners, USAID and the US Embassy being the 
main policy and finance managers in the country. In this respect, the UNAIDS-led 
GP feared that the PEPFAR approach could further dilute the government’s 
leadership role in the national response by creating an alternative policy arena outside 
the official mechanisms of collective decision-making (Interview Baggio 11.08.2004). 
PEPFAR arrived in Mozambique at a time when institutional mechanisms had 
already been created by UNAIDS and its co-sponsors to articulate the work of 
international partners. Moreover, the securitisation attempts of UNAIDS and its co­
associates had also been absorbed and HIV/AIDS policies and practices defined. In 
this respect, the coordination of the activities of international HIV/AIDS actors was 
made more difficult by the parallel system created by the US. As a high-ranking 
official at CNCS noted - ‘TEPFAR was parachuted inside Mozambique in an 
advanced stage of our partnership with other multilateral and bilateral donors. It was 
definitely a source of disruption in the overall national response” (Interview Milagres
18.08.2004).
As in Botswana, PEPFAR exclusively sponsors government initiatives, as 
well as NGOs based in Mozambique, which closely follow the principles and policies 
supported by the Bush administration. However, in Mozambique the securitisation
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message of the US was not as compelling as it was in its diamond-rich neighbour. For 
example, the US pressure on the Botswana government for the adoption of a more 
aggressive policy towards HIV testing has not had the same impact in Mozambique. 
Whereas Botswana’s policy makers firmly embraced the advice of US pundits 
concerning the implementation of a semi-compulsory HIV testing system, their 
counterparts in Mozambique aligned closer with the voluntary testing model of 
UNAIDS/W HO (Interview Baggio 11.08.2004).
As a general case, the strong influence of the UN in Mozambique has 
considerably constrained the autonomous role of US agencies (Interview Baggio
11.08.2004).148 As already seen, the UN played a fundamental role in the rebuilding 
of Mozambique’s bureaucracies. For many years, Mozambique was virtually a 
protectorate of the UN peacekeeping mission. Its influence and legitimacy in the 
country are reflected in the special position of UNAIDS inside the government’s 
decision-making structures. On the other hand, the US has only firmly arrived in 
Mozambique at an advanced stage of the national response. The different policy 
orientations of the US government and UNAIDS were transposed to the 
Mozambican context which led to a certain degree of conflict over the definition of 
their respective roles in the broader national response to the epidemic. The 
Mozambican government, in turn, was not a passive observer between the UN and 
the US. It played a mediating role while trying to accommodate the policy 
agendas/interests of both sides within the national strategic framework.
The triangular relationship between the government of Mozambique, the 
UNAIDS-led GP and the US government has been particularly difficult in two
148 The European Union (EU) has also played an important role during and after the reconstruction 
period. Its delegation was established in the country in 1985 and since then, the EU Delegation has 
developed and financed a number o f  projects in conjunction (and in parallel to) the U N  and the 
Mozambican government (Interview Pinto 18.08.2004).
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policy-areas: HIV prevention and the procurement of ARV drugs. Concerning the 
latter, the controversy is related to the US Government’s resistance to support for 
the use of a generic fixed-dose combination of nevirapine and two other anti­
retroviral drugs (lamivudine and stavudine), which are widely used in Africa to 
prevent mother-to-child transmission (MTCT) of HIV. As already shown, PEPFAR 
does not allow the purchase of drugs that are not approved by the US Food and 
Drug Administration (FDA), even if they are approved by W HO’s qualification 
system, as in the case of the “3 in 1” generic combination.149
During a visit to Mozambique, in April 2004, Randall Tobias, the man in 
charge of leading PEPFAR globally, reaffirmed that because of quality concerns it 
was not US policy to use this generic AIDS drug (Kaiser Daily 29.04.2004).150 Despite 
PEPFAR’s unwillingness to accept the fixed-dose combination, funding systems 
were available for such treatment from the Global Fund, World Bank and Clinton 
Foundation, among others.151 With the financial support of those agencies, the 
generic combination has been widely adopted by treatment clinics in Mozambique. 
Aside from the much cheaper cost of the generic drug, it consists of a single pill and 
single dose medication, which facilitates adherence to treatment. Mozambican health 
officials claimed that a multiplicity of drug regimes would further burden a rundown 
public health system (Interview Saide 11.08.2004). Furthermore, the duplication of
149 See, for example, “US Rule on AIDS Drugs Criticised: Ban on Using Aid to Buy Foreign Generics 
Hinders Treatment, Experts Say”. The Washington Post, 14 July 2004.
150 As head o f  a pharmaceutical firm during the 90s, Tobias has been accused by global H IV/AIDS  
activists o f  protecting drug companies’ economic interests in poor countries by preventing them from 
using generics. For more on this, see, for example, “Bush administration AIDS czar fails to win over 
critics”, Los Angeles Tim s, 11 July 2004.
151 The Clinton Foundation, for example, set up a trilateral partnership, in which they negotiate 
directly with the manufacturers o f  generic anti-retroviral drags to ensure that the government o f  
Mozambique can acquire the drags at the cheapest possible price. Then the Irish government, again 
through the mediation o f  the Clinton Foundation, provides the Ministry o f  Health with the funds for 
the drags. From 2003 to 2007, the Irish support to this specific project will be US$ 50 million 
(Interview Chambule 13.08.2004).
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efforts in drug procurement is seen by both the government and UNAIDS as 
overwhelmingly complicated in a poor country like Mozambique (Interview Milagres
18.08.2004). In fact, Mozambique was at an advanced stage of establishing 
mechanisms to fund and implement AIDS treatment based on WHO’s 3 by 5 model, 
which has endorsed the use of low-cost and high-quality generics to achieve the goal 
of 3 million patients under treatment by 2005.
The difficult task for the Mozambican government was to find a way to 
include the massive financial support of PEPFAR without disrupting the existing 
system for scaling-up access to treatment. During 2004, the Ministry of Health 
conducted skilful negotiations with PEPFAR representatives in which the position of 
the government eventually prevailed (Interview Milagres 18.08.2004). Currendy, 
PEPFAR funds projects in Mozambique involving the use of generic drugs. 
However, until 2005 it only supported initiatives related to the non-pharmaceutical 
part of ARV treatment, such as the expansion of treatment sites, the improvement of 
laboratories and the training of health personnel (Interview Saide 11.08.2004). The 
government was backed by UNAIDS, which by this time was engaged in the 
promotion of “The Three Ones” in Mozambique. The avoidance of overlapping 
activities of donors was precisely what motivated the creation of this action 
framework. Besides, WHO and UNAIDS were also involved in the global 
promotion of the “3 by 5” program (WHO and UNAIDS, 2006). The US 
government was also under intense pressure from transnational HIV/AIDS activists 
and NGOs of doctors (namely the MSF) who advocated for a single system of drug 
evaluation based on WHO’s widely regarded qualification process.
In May 2004, the US Government announced that it would revise 
procedures to fast-track the assessment of the fixed-dose combination for use in 
programmes financed by PEPFAR. However, it reaffirmed the centrality of FDA as
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the only recognised agency responsible for evaluating and approving the use of drugs 
in the US government’s HIV/AIDS assistance programmes. One year later, FDA 
issued the first tentative approval for the generic combination of three AIDS drugs 
manufactured by an Indian firm and soon after, the US administration allowed its 
purchase and distribution in the 15 target countries under PEPFAR (FDA, 2004). 
Although those negotiations were conducted at an international level, the 
Mozambican government played an important role while convincing the US 
representation in the country of the damaging impact of its approach towards AIDS 
treatment. Even before the US government’s decision of 2005, the CNCS and the 
Ministry of Health managed to persuade PEPFAR to accept the terms of the 
agreement by which AIDS treatment in Mozambique would be centred on generic 
drugs (Interview Saide 11.08.2004).
With regard to HIV prevention, the Strategic Plan (2000-2002) established 
that the principal prevention strategy of the national response should be the 
promotion and massive distribution of condoms (CNCS, 2000:4). The revised 
Strategic Plan for 2004-2009 conceded that abstinence and faithfulness should be 
included but the key message was still that “the use of condoms must be promoted 
when abstinence and fidelity are not practiced” (CNCS, 2005:12). This slight change 
in the Mozambican government’s approach to HIV prevention can be attributed to 
its (economic) interest in firmly establishing the US in the wider group of 
international donors. Mozambique received US$ 25 million of PEPFAR funds in 
2004, and US$ 48 million in 2005 (US Department of State, 2005:21). This is 
significandy more money than any other donor state and multilateral organisation has 
given in the same period of time. Despite the Mozambican government’s 
compromise with the demands of PEPFAR, in practice, however, it maintained its
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traditional approach of massive condom distribution and education as the most 
effective form of HIV prevention.
Given the lack of engagement with the “AB” strategy by the Mozambican 
government, the US sought to bypass the CNCS and the Ministry of Health by 
directly linking up with transnational and religious groups based in Mozambique. In 
2004, the US government granted US$ 100 million in PEPFAR funds to eleven 
organisations to conduct HIV/AIDS prevention through abstinence and faithfulness 
in all the fifteen PEPFAR focus countries, including Mozambique. Although the 
individual grant amount to each organisation in each country is mostly unknown, the 
CNCS estimates that the US government has given at least US$ 100,000 to small 
local based NGOs that followed PEPFAR5s predicaments (Interview Milagres
18.08.2004).
These two particular cases are interesting illustrations of the actual role of 
the government of Mozambique in the national response to HIV/AIDS. Rather than 
being an agenda setter and policy implementer, it functions as a manager between the 
international/transnational sources of funding and their particular policy priorities.152 
The above also suggests that, despite its lack of central control and domestic 
ownership, the government has played the securitisation game with sufficient ability to 
maintain and further increase bilateral and multilateral sources of revenue for 
HIV/AIDS related programmes. Notwithstanding the huge economic gains offered 
by the US, Mozambican decision-makers managed to accommodate opposing 
international views without jeopardising Mozambique’s relationship with any of its 
international partners.
152 On 11 August 2004, the author attended one o f  the CNCS’ working sessions in Maputo to discuss 
the components o f  CNCS’ plan. The international participants included representatives o f  the US 
Embassy, UNAIDS, UNICEF and the GP. During the debates, it became clear that the government,
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5.3. The Transnational Community of HANS Seeking Domestic Legitimacy: 
The Role of Civil Society HIV/AIDS Organisations
In Mozambique, the period after 1984 saw a substantial increase in 
development assistance from international NGOs backed by the Western powers, 
such as Britain and the US.153 With the end of the civil war, this process was 
enormously accentuated by the establishment of a wide range of international NGOs 
in the country.154 This unprecedented period of NGO growth promoted a 
revolutionary change in Mozambique’s civil society sector. The constitution of a 
post-conflict civil society sector in Mozambique is, to a large extent, the result of this 
foreign invasion.
In Mozambique, the model of state corporativism inherited from Portugal 
and preserved by Frelimo hampered the establishment of strong local civil society 
groups in urban areas with autonomous political agendas. In rural areas, informal 
social networks based on kinship and traditional authorities have usually served as 
either intermediate institutions between state and society or as the sole form of 
socio-political organisation in the absence of the central government. After 1980, by 
the time the war had begun to spread throughout the country, an incipient informal 
civil society sector filled the public spaces left by the government. The virtual 
collapse of the state, particularly in rural areas, accentuated the role played by 
traditional community networks as alternative providers of public services and as the 
guarantors of social rules and political organisation (Negrao, 2003:4).
which was represented by the Minister o f  Health, Francisco Sogane, was attempting to ease tensions 
between the GP and the US.
153 CARE and Save the Children are two examples o f private agencies which established themselves in 
Mozambique during this period to manage development assistance from the United States and Britain 
(Alden, 2001:94).
154 In the period from 1987 to 1990 alone, more than 100 N G O s set up local offices in Maputo 
(Barnes, 1995:5).
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The previous traditional social networks, which informally organised 
themselves to cope with community needs in the absence of the state, were 
profoundly transformed by the imported organisational model and political agendas 
introduced by Western NGOs and financed by donor states and multilateral 
institutions. A number of foreign voices that were motivated by interests ranging 
from ideology/religion to technical support shaped a new social environment in 
Mozambique. These organisations had in general strong constituencies in their 
support basis in donor states and multilateral institutions and sought to build local 
linkages with groups having similar concerns at the national level (Alden, 2001).
This reality of benign international interventions after the end of the Cold War 
was well-known by Mozambique’s political elite and civil society alike. As analysed 
before, the ONUMOZ operation was one remarkable attempt to rebuild an African 
state following the political and economic assumptions supported by the Western 
liberal democracies. A fundamental part of Mozambique’s process of nation- 
building, NGOs have exercised considerable influence over the government’s 
definition of policies and programmes. In fact, the NGOs’ and multilateral agencies’ 
effective monopoly of professional skills as well as material, logistic and technical 
resources has prevented the government’s institutions and local civil society groups 
from pursuing any alternative to their imported programmatic agendas (Santos,
2003).
The role of NGOs as HASN entrepreneurs is not easy to empirically assess. 
The multitude of organisations with different ideological motivations and areas of 
interest added further complexity to the Mozambican case. In 1993, the Mozambican 
Network of Organisations Against AIDS (MONASO) was created to improve 
coordination among HIV/AIDS NGOs. Currently, it has 360 members working on 
a wide range of different HIV/AIDS activities. MONASO is also the official
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representative of the civil society sector at the CNCS. However, notwithstanding its 
attempts to create an environment more conducive to coordination, MONASO 
operates in a domestic system dominated by powerful international NGOs with 
competing policy priorities (Interview Magaia 16.08.2004).
Local HIV/AIDS NGOs have had a very modest impact in comparison 
with their international counterparts. In fact, the type of Western Non- 
Governmental Organisation that arrived in great numbers in the country after 1992 
was completely alien to the Mozambican society. Even today local people refer to 
these NGOs as a foreign thing (Interview Negrao 09.08.2004). Local NGOs working 
with HIV/AIDS were usually either formed or co-opted by international NGOs to 
direct the implementation of projects as if they were their "local partners" (Interview 
Magaia 16.08.2004). They were merely local reproductions of the institutional 
formats, methodologies, and mandates of their international counterparts, which 
were totally unknown to the traditional forms of civil society organisation in 
Mozambique. According to Negrao, for example, “the language used in meetings is 
English, the funds come from abroad, and the recruitment of staff was detrimental 
to the local productive and administrative fabric” (2003:3). The corrosion of state 
institutions during the civil war and the weak development of a native and 
independent civil society favoured the growth of countless similar organisations. 
Given the almost total destruction of the social infrastructure of the state, 
international aid NGOs, alongside the UN, have been the only working institutions in 
the country for a long time (Interview Negrao 09.08.2004).
In Mozambique, many international HIV/AIDS NGOs are simply business 
organisations which turned to HIV/AIDS projects precisely because of the 
securitisation of the epidemic and the resulting substantial increase of funds coming 
from multilateral organisations and donor states. Some organisations even included
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HIV/AIDS activities on their institutional missions just to gain access to this money 
(Interview Baggio 11.08.2004). Many of these NGOs have no ideology of their own. 
Their financial dependency on key donor states and multilateral agencies conditioned 
their conceptions about HIV/AIDS interventions.155 Given this reliance on 
international sources of funding, these groups find themselves serving as 
intermediary institutions that facilitate the entry of HASN’s prescriptions in 
Mozambique according to the preferences of their powerful sponsors. Due to the 
financial impact of securitising actors and the lack of effective state control, NGOs 
that were (or became) involved with HIV/AIDS found a fertile environment to 
expand their activities and funding sources in Mozambique.
The INGOs operating in Mozambique are nonetheless not homogenous. 
They differ in many important aspects, such as their distinct sources of financing 
(particularly important in this respect are their different levels of autonomy from 
donor states and multilateral organisations), whether they are exclusively working 
with HIV/AIDS or have the epidemic as one of many other areas of intervention, 
the short or long-term scope of their programmes, and how they link up with other 
domestic HIV/AIDS actors in the government and civil society.
There is a large group of very active organisations that work either 
autonomously as health service providers in emergency situations or directly link up 
with government agencies through joint initiatives. They are faith-based groups, 
transnational networks of HIV/AIDS activists, and development assistance 
organisations, which are financially backed by their own fundraising campaigns 
(sometimes in the streets of European cities), by religious institutions, such as the
155 Most o f  the money allocated to these NG O s stays in the capital city, Maputo. They have usually 
high operational costs with European standard salaries, fully equipped offices, transport, expansive 
accommodation, etc. (Interview Johannsen 18.08.2004).
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Roman Catholic church, as well as by Western governments and their development 
agencies, such as USAID. They are well-established transnational groups with a clear 
institutional mission and significant funds at their disposal. In this respect, it is worth 
mentioning OXFAM, MSF, CARE, GOAL, Handicap International, and Health 
Alliance International among others. There are also international foundations that 
lobby foreign governments and pharmaceutical companies, direct funds to specific 
HIV/AIDS projects and establish partnerships between national and international 
agencies. The Bill Clinton Foundation is an important example in this regard.
As in Botswana, faith-based organisations are the most organised and well- 
established HIV/AIDS NGOs in Mozambique. The Roman Catholic Church and 
Christian transnational NGOs, largely backed by the US government, are very 
important in this respect. Catholicism is well rooted within Mozambican society. In 
the late 80s, after many years of government-led persecution of religious activities, 
the Catholic Church regained its influential status in Mozambique. An interesting 
measure of its reasserted position in Mozambique was the prominent mediating role 
the Roman Catholic’s Sant’Egidio Community played during the peace talks in Rome 
and subsequendy during the electoral process. Similarly, the Comunidade de SantTigidio 
is very active in HIV/AIDS related activities. They promote key aspects of the 
proposed securitisation of HIV/AIDS as, for example, with regards to their strong 
support to the UNAIDS’ “The Three Ones" framework (Interview Bortolot
05.08.2004).
Additionally, since February 2002, around 1,000 people in Maputo, and 
another 1,400 distributed between 6 regions, began to benefit from the Drug 
Resource Enhancement Against AIDS and Malnutrition (DREAM) (Interview 
Bortolot 05.08.2004). The project works in tandem with the Ministry of Health 
through the Sistema Nacional de Saude (National Health System). HIV/AIDS
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patients are directed to the DREAM centres, after been tested and counselled in the 
Gabinetes de Atendimento e Testagem Voluntaria (Voluntary Testing and Assistance 
Cabinets), based in public hospitals (Interview Bortolot 05.08.2004). Although it has 
proven efficient in providing complementary treatment and care without 
overstretching public resources, the DREAM Project has focused largely on 
communities in the province of Maputo (Noticias 09.08.2004). The lack of 
laboratories outside the capital city to check CD4 levels, an essential procedure for 
the accurate prescription of drugs, and the irregular presence of counselling and 
testing units in the countryside, has held back nationwide expansion of DREAM 
(Interview Bortolot 05.08.2004).
Despite the important role played by religious-based organisations within 
the Global H IV jA ID S  Polity, these groups are not seen as belonging to the same 
identity group as other secular international partners. As already shown, this is 
because their religious dogmas are often at odds with the pragmatic prescriptions of 
HASN entrepreneurs, such as its support for government policies which promote 
sexual education and mass condom distribution. Moral reformists, such as protestant 
and Catholic groups, emphasise de-securitising initiatives, such as long-term changes in 
sexual behaviour and the reinforcement of family and community values. Evangelical 
groups based in Mozambique, such as the very influential Igreja Universal do Reino 
de Deus (Universal Church of the Kingdom of God), follow a similar line, providing 
essential health and counselling assistance, but also stimulating stigmatisation while 
linking the disease to divine punishment of sexually depraved sinners. On the other 
hand, multilateral institutions such as UNAIDS, and INGOS such as the MSF, 
which in the main part work in unison with faith-based groups, stress the short-term 
emergency that demands effective and immediate measures against the security threat 
posed by the epidemic.
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The Washington D.C. based NGO, Population Services International (PSI), 
is also very active in Mozambique. PSI was founded in 1970 and since then has 
expanded its social marketing projects to over 70 low-income countries. PSI's first 
HIV/AIDS prevention project in Mozambique, focusing on the promotion of 
abstinence, fidelity and condoms, began in 1994. Their major sponsor in the country 
is the US government through USAID. Its stated institutional mission is to set out 
commercial strategies to promote health products and services that make it easier for 
low-income and other vulnerable people to engage in healthier behaviour (PSI,
2004). PSI is currendy involved in many HIV/AIDS programs in the country. It 
assists the Ministry of Health in the implementation of counselling and testing at 16 
sites, all of which are located within or nearby the existing health clinics and 
hospitals. PSI is also behind Mozambique's very popular JeitO brand condoms, which 
were introduced in 1995 and sell an average of 10 million units a year. The condom 
project is implemented by PSI as a component of the National Strategic Plan to 
Combat STDs/HIV/AIDS, with funding from USAID and the Dutch Embassy 
(PSI, 2004). Their campaigns are based on the above mentioned “ABC” principles; 
abstinence and delaying sexual relations among young people not yet sexually active, 
mutual fidelity and condom use to high-risk groups and members of the general 
population exhibiting high risk behaviour (Interview Milagres 18.08.2004).
PSPs long-term project to combat the epidemic in Mozambique is rooted in 
a strong moral foundation which is supported by powerful evangelical Christian 
lobbies in the US. However, contrary to the Sant’Egidio Community, PSI is formally 
a secular organisation which also promotes the use of condoms as a mean to curb 
the spread of HIV among high-risk groups, such as commercial sex workers and 
their clients, migrant workers, truckers and intravenous drug users. In this respect, 
PSI displays an interesting combination of short-term pragmatic action, while
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promoting the use of condoms, and moral principled-beliefs linked with abstinence 
and faithfulness. This double strategy combining the different approaches to HIV 
prevention of UNAIDS and the US would not be achievable in a purely faith-based 
organisation such as, for example, the Sant’Egidio Community.
Given the characteristics of the HIV/AIDS NGO sector in Mozambique, it 
is fair to say that the idea of a boomerang effect (Keck and Sikkink, 1998; Risse and 
Sikkink, 1999), whereby local groups link up with transnational partners to pressure 
national governments from above, does not apply to the Mozambican case. In the 
Mozambican political context, the distinctive transnational and national identities of 
civil society actors are not clearly defined. The civil society sector in Mozambique is 
mostly dominated by foreign actors who act transnationally and have their 
headquarters abroad, usually in the US and Europe. The government is highly 
dependent on the services they provide and on the capacity they have to attract funds 
and qualified personnel to the country. Domestic normative change is negotiated 
between those actors and the government without the actual mediation of indigenous 
domestic groups. In this respect, INGOs play simultaneously the combined roles of 
international development partners and domestic pressure groups, lobbying the 
government to adopt their preferred HIV/AIDS policies and principles.
6. Conclusions
This chapter sought to understand the HIV/AIDS political process 
emanating from the dynamics of HASN incorporation in Mozambique. In doing so, 
it assessed the particular features of Mozambique's political culture and how they 
greatly influenced the manner by which international HIV/AIDS actors and norms 
were received by state and civil society actors alike.
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Firstly, the chapter highlighted the characteristics of Mozambique’s 
political system in a historical perspective. It was established that, due to its singular 
colonial legacy and post-colonial experience, Mozambican political elites turned into 
intermediary agents (or managers) between international donors and the domestic 
interests of the dominant class. This was mainly the result of the failed socialist 
experience and the resulting dependency on donors to maintain (and sometimes run) 
the country’s public institutions. It was also shown that, given the collapse o f the 
Marxist-Leninist national project, Frelimo lost its original raison d’etre and became 
solely concerned with keeping its hold on power. Thus, the HIV/AIDS epidemic 
and the massive flux of resources available at the global level were perceived by 
political leaders in Maputo as an opportunity to boost their dominant position rather 
than an actual threat to national/human security. In this regard, the chapter explored 
the political rhetoric of leaders and to what extent this reinforced the domestic 
validity/salience of the HASN’s prescriptions.
It was demonstrated that the securitisation claims of HASN leaders were 
adapted to traditional forms of dependency politics carried out by skilful leaders within 
Frelimo. Chissano’s administration (and later Guebuza’s) spoke the securitisation 
language, aiming to convince his international interlocutors (and sponsors) of 
Mozambique’s alleged engagement in the war against HIV/AIDS. However, the 
government’s apparent securitisation move did not reflect upon the actual cascading 
of HASN into Mozambique’s domestic structure. As already seen, even by 2005, the 
CNCS and the Ministry of Health were still struggling to lead Mozambique’s 
response to HIV/AIDS given the lack of clear and centralised leadership from top 
leaders in the government.
Secondly, the chapter assessed the increasing impact of the epidemic in the 
country from the late 80s and the resulting policies that were put in place by the
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government to face it. The aim here was twofold: to describe the special dynamics of 
the epidemic’s impact in Mozambique; and to explain the historical progression of 
the government’s response from the early politicisation of the epidemic to its current 
securitisation under the auspices of the international community. The analysis then 
turned to the role played by the international partners as H A SN  leaders and how they 
interacted with the government of Mozambique. This section described the 
institutional mechanisms put in place to facilitate political coordination between 
donor states, multilateral agencies and the government of Mozambique and how they 
functioned as transmission channels of norms from the international community to the 
Ministry of Health and the CNCS. The main point here was the actual analysis of the 
decision-making structure and the policy debates between the UNAIDS-led GP, the 
Mozambican government and the US representation in the country.
Finally, the argument focused on the mechanisms whereby INGOs 
participated in the overall national response to HIV/AIDS. Rather than building 
internal coalitions with local NGOs to advance their agendas, INGOs occupied the 
social vacuum left by an almost non-existent civil society sector in Mozambique. The 
destruction of the country’s social fabric due to war and the weight of its oppressive 
colonial and post-colonial history are behind Mozambique’s lack of truly indigenous 
social movements that could work as a counterweight to the state. Given that fact, 
INGOs involved with HIV/AIDS projects established themselves as the only 
recognised non-state actors representing the interests o f (and providing services to) 
people infected and affected by HIV/AIDS in Mozambique. In this sense, 
transnational groups, such as CARE International, PSI, MSF, the Sant’Egidio 
Community, among others, were the actual constituents of the HIV/AIDS NGO 
sector in the country. The agenda and ideologies of those transnational actors were
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conceived and developed outside Mozambique and were in the majority of cases 
influenced by the ideas and preferences of their Western sponsors.
One interesting thing about the Mozambican case is that, even surrounded 
and permeated by powerful foreign HIV/AIDS actors on all sides, the government 
was able to exert agency and negotiate the terms of HASN incorporation in the 
country. As already demonstrated, the Mozambican government was very assertive in 
the discussions with PEPFAR concerning the implementation of a plan for ARV 
treatment based on generic AIDS drugs. Similarly, the US government’s “AB” 
strategy was also challenged by Mozambican decision-makers who instead adopted 
UNAIDS’ approach to HIV prevention, with a much stronger emphasis on the use 
of condoms. Those examples are indicative of the far more influential role of 
UNAIDS in Mozambique when compared with, the US’ PEPFAR. It also reveals the 
argumentative capacity of Mozambican policy makers (audiences of securitisation) to 
receive, process and assertively respond to the demands of H IV /A ID S  securitising 
actors. As such, local audiences in Mozambique did not remain passive targets of their 
much more powerful transnational interlocutors.
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Chapter 6
South Africa: The Model of Ideological Resistance
1. Introduction
This chapter explores the dynamics of H A S N  incorporation in South Africa. 
It claims that the South African government (largely under Thabo Mbeki’s rule) has 
situated HIV/AIDS within its broader political agenda of opposing Western white 
domination in Africa. Although South Africa achieved a peaceful transition to a 
democratically elected black majority government in 1994, the unhealed wounds left 
by Apartheid are still influencing discourses and defining political action in the 
country. As noted later, this is also manifested in the South African government’s 
reaction to Western understandings of the HIV/AIDS epidemic. In this regard, the 
government’s rationale is primarily ideological and clashes with the established authority 
of international HASN leaders.
One of the key issues examined here is the politicised, divisive and 
racialised environment inherited from the Apartheid era and how it influenced the 
reception of international HIV/AIDS norms and actors in the country. The work 
also focuses on the role of political leadership in the fight against the epidemic and 
how individuals holding powerful positions within the South African government 
were deeply influenced in their decisions by their social and cultural contexts. It is 
argued that those in the higher echelons of the government have used HIV/AIDS as 
a political springboard to voice an alternative African view and develop their own 
understandings of the epidemic. This explains the government’s continuous
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adherence to a cautious (and sometimes combative) approach to HIV/AIDS 
prevention and treatment policies as devised by Western HIV/AIDS actors.156
Despite this, decision-maker’s orientations do not directly translate into 
policy outcomes. Individual preferences are tempered by many external and domestic 
constraints such as the institutional format of decision-making (more or less open to 
the participation of domestic and international political forces, for example), and the 
historical circumstances in which decision-makers find themselves. To analytically 
organise these trends, the present chapter focuses on three inter-related factors. 
These are 3) the institutional format of the decision-making process; 2) the 
international and domestic sources of H A SN  entrepreneurship in South Africa, mainly 
multilateral organisations, the US, and HIV/AIDS NGOs; and 3) the behavioural 
choices and deep-rooted values and ideologies embedded in South Africa’s political 
culture which have informed the decisions of key policymakers in the government.
2. Setting the Stage: The Ideological Construction of Apartheid, the New  
South Africa and HIV/AIDS
This section describes some historical processes that led to the formation of 
a particular political culture in South Africa. It explains the origins of white racism 
and how it created a country politically divided along racial lines. As shown next,
156 Nevertheless, in the area o f  economic policy, Mbeki has closely adhered to the Western (neoliberal) 
economic orthodoxy o f  the so-called “Washington Consensus”. Driven by the structural constraints 
o f globalisation, the pressure from the World Bank and IMF, and a strong capitalist lobby at home, 
the ANC administration abandoned the short-lived Reconstruction and Development Programme 
(RDP) and introduced a new macroeconomic policy framework, the Growth, Equity and 
Redistribution Programme (GEAR), adopted in 1996. It is basically a neoliberal structural adjustment 
plan as proposed/imposed by the international financial institutions (Taylor, 2002). It seems that, 
from the perspective o f the South African government, the HTV/AIDS epidemic was a less 
controversial policy area to devise and implement an African alternative to Western (hegemonic) 
paradigms.
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despite South Africa’s widely praised peaceful transition to democratic rule in 1994 
and the subsequent achievement of lasting political stability and sound economic 
growth, black economic alienation and resentment against the white population is 
still present and strong in South African society. In this respect, the leader of the 
government of national unity, and the principal liberation movement during 
Apartheid, the ANC, failed to live up to many expectations and promises. Given the 
huge social demands on the state and its budget and institutional constraints, 
poverty, crime and unemployment remain entrenched and have in fact worsened in 
many areas since 1994.
Therefore, South Africa’s controversial post-1994 HIV/AIDS policies 
should be situated against this broader backdrop of a profoundly divided society and 
a government searching for directions in the face of a growing domestic and 
international disenchantment with the post-Apartheid ideology of “African 
Renaissance”. Accordingly, the clashes between the government of President Thabo 
Mbeki and the international community of HASN leaders are indicative of a post- 
Apartheid political culture that rejects Western injunctions and hails uniquely African 
solutions to African problems, such as HIV/AIDS.
The present territorial contour of the South African state, as well as the 
collective perceptions of its national identity, is rooted in a long and conflictive 
history that goes back to the 17th century with the establishment of the first 
European colonial setdement in the Cape region. In 1652, the Dutch East India 
Company set up a commercial station on this strategic trade route. Initially, the 
company intended to use the station to restock its ships, so reducing the costs of its 
trade with the East Indies. As part of their policy of cost reduction, Dutch officials 
sought to produce supplies locally by stimulating permanent settlement of white 
farmers on the land seried from the indigenous inhabitants (Davies, O ’Meara and
212
Dlamini, 1988:4). Over the following 150 years of Dutch colonialism, these white 
farmers {vryboers - ‘free farmers) developed an autonomous identity and culture, 
including the gradual development of a new Dutch-derived language, later called 
Afrikaans (the Dutch word for ‘African’). The Boer (farmer) setders (predominandy 
Dutch but also French and German) brought the Southern tip of Africa a distinct set 
of principles and values predominandy based in the Calvinist faith. They developed a 
singular racist interpretation of religion, which justified the subjugation of the black 
population in biblical terms.157 These processes of identity formation were the basis 
for the later development of a strong Boer/Afrikaner nationalism and its corollary, 
the Apartheid system.
After expropriating their land, the white settlers subjugated the Khoi and 
San inhabitants of the Cape and other outlying areas. They grew into a large number 
of landowners producing wine, wheat and other crops. Conflict soon emerged 
between them and the Dutch colonial power. The settlers resented the corrupt and 
inefficient colonial administration. They were subjected to very strict controls, being 
obliged to sell what they produced to the Dutch East India Company at very low 
fixed prices (Davies, O ’Meara and Dlamini, 1988:4). Around the mid 18th century, in 
an attempt to escape the economic restrictions imposed by the Company, a large 
number of Boers moved deep into the unknown areas beyond the company’s 
jurisdiction. During these incursions, the settlers had to challenge the powerful 
Xhosa people (Thabo Mbeki, South Africa’s current president, is originally from a 
Xhosa tribe in Transkei (now Eastern Cape) which became later a “Bantustan” under 
the Apartheid regime). For approximately 50 years, they fought each other for
157 After lengthy theological discussions about the status o f  black people in the “Divine Hierarchy o f  
Being”, they arrived at the conclusion that African natives were skepsels, which means creatures in a 
higher position than animals but lower than (white) man (Davies, O ’Meara and Dlamini, 1988:5).
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control of grazing lands in the region of the Fish River without any clear conclusive 
outcome (Omer-Cooper, 1994:22).
The colonial conquest of what is now South Africa encountered fierce 
resistance from the culturally and ethnically diverse indigenous population. As late as 
the mid 19th century, the central and eastern areas of present-day South Africa were 
still occupied by five powerful African kingdoms (the Zulu, Ndebele, Swazi, 
Basotho, and Bapedi). After 1830, the expansion of the British and Boer colonialists 
to the hinterland of South Africa brought them into armed conflict with these 
various groups. Notwithstanding the far superior military power of both colonial 
powers, the majority of these native societies managed to remain economically and 
politically independent throughout the century (Davies, O ’Meara and Dlamini, 
1988:6).
During the 19th century, the Afrikaner identity was further strengthened as 
a result of British colonialism in South Africa. In 1806, the British crown seized the 
Cape from the Dutch. The British rulers initiated significant social and political 
changes in the region through introducing free trade policies and gradually abolishing 
slavery in the Cape colony. This policy of relaxing labour and market controls led to 
increasing antagonism with the Boer settlers. As a response, in the mid/late 1830s, 
they once again migrated in large numbers to the interior.158
In the 1860s, with the discovery of the world’s largest deposits of diamonds 
and then gold in Kimberley and Johannesburg, the British interest in South Africa 
grew substantially. In a matter of years, the previous expensive, unproductive and 
burdensome colony turned into the "golden pot" of the British Empire. In the
158 The Boers who took part in this large-scale exodus became known as the Voortnkkers (Afrikaans 
for ‘pioneers’).
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following decades, the British sought to reverse the independence of the Boer 
republics of Transvaal and the Orange Free State. It was only possible through the 
use of British military power against the Boers. Following the British victory in the 
Anglo-Boer War (1899-1902), the two republics were finally incorporated as part of 
the British colonies in South Africa.
In South Africa, the discovery of valuable minerals completely transformed 
the previous social systems and forged new forms of social relations, culture and 
modes of living. As a matter of fact, the final colonial conquest of the African 
societies was only completed in the late 19th century with the establishment of the 
mining industry. It drew a very large number of black workers from all over 
Southern Africa to the goldfields of Witwatersrand (Patan, 1965). African peasants 
left their land and families to join the hordes of people heading to the mines. Given 
the rapid industrialisation of South Africa, from 1910 to 1940 this system of migrant 
labour was adapted and further expanded to other economic sectors, such as 
agriculture and industry. Some authors (Benatar, 2001; Walker, Reid, and Cornell, 
2004) believe that the introduction of diamond and gold mining in South Africa in 
the late 19th century helped to create the right social and economic conditions for the 
subsequent spread of epidemic diseases, including HIV/AIDS.159
South Africa has traditionally had a strong dependency on migrant labour 
from rural areas and from other countries in Southern Africa. It has been the 
principal source of labour in mines, factories, offices and domestic services. Initially 
labour mobility was the result of economic opportunities in the diamond and gold 
fields which prompted entire populations to move to areas in which they could make
159 This was also the case in Botswana. However, the movement o f  migrant workers to Botswana only 
began 100 years later with the discovery o f  huge reserves o f  diamonds in the mid 1960s.
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a living. This later became the official policy of the Apartheid regime. It was in the 
mining industry that many institutions and forms of exploitation were first developed 
and later converted into their modem form with the institutionalisation of the 
Apartheid system. With the advent of Apartheid, this system was reinforced and 
formalised by the National Party government.160 South Africa’s black population was 
pushed into crowded and unsanitary homelands which led to the breakdown of 
traditional social structures. Apartheid's system of social engineering, with large-scale 
forced removals and relocations, further deteriorated the social conditions and 
economic viability of these black communities.161 Due to long hours working and 
periods away from home, many children were looked after by neighbours and adults 
other than their parents. This situation led to child abuse and prostitution. Health 
treatment was very scarce and diseases, including those of a sexually transmitted 
nature, went untreated.
Politically, notwithstanding the Boer's crushing defeat in the war against the 
British, the actual losers were black Africans whose interests were sacrificed in the 
pursuit of reconciliation between the British and Afrikaners (Dubow, 2000:1-2). In 
1907, Transvaal and the Orange Free State regained self-determination and in 1910 
they formed, with the provinces of Natal and Cape, the Union of South Africa. In 
the first decade of South Africa’s existence, the white rulers fully consolidated their 
power and gradually increased their regulatory control over the black populations.
160 As some sociological studies point out, in these aggressive and risky environments, individuals do 
not abide by the same set o f  moral prescriptions and social attitudes as if  they were in more stable 
social contexts. Therefore, prevention and awareness campaigns, which assumed individuals’ 
absorbing o f  crucial knowledge o f  the threat posed by H IV/A ID S and expected them to behave 
rationally upon requiring this information, had very little success in social environments as described 
above. See, for example, the study o f  Basotho migrants in the gold mines o f  Carletonville by 
Campbell (1997).
161 It is estimated that by the early 90s, somewhere in the order o f  seven million people were living in 
informal settlements in South Africa (Beinart, 2001:277).
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The new state, under the leadership of Louis Botha, sustained and reinforced laws of 
racial segregation that had already been in place in several provinces. For example, 
under Botha’s new draconian laws, African land ownership rights were stricdy 
controlled, turning self-sufficient peasants into wage workers for white farmers, 
mining companies and factory owners.162
In January 1912, a number of prominent men and women founded the 
South African Native National Congress (SANNC). This new organisation (which 
became the ANC ten years later) aimed to support and advance African civil and 
political rights at a time when a unitary white supremacist state appeared to crystallise 
in South Africa. Although elite Africans had engaged in political activism since at 
least the late 19th century, SANNC represented something new in the South African 
context. It was the first genuinely national organisation dedicated to overcoming 
racial divisions and extending citizenship rights in South Africa (Dubow, 2000:1-3). 
By this time, the constitutive ethos of the South African nation was beginning to be 
more clearly defined through the formal establishment of the political struggle 
between, on the one hand, the Afrikaner ideology of white supremacy, and, on the 
other, the SANNC/ANC’s African nationalism.
The four-decade history of Apartheid and the black resistance to it has 
been extraordinarily well-documented and analysed (e.g. Carter, 1980; ANC, 1988; 
Mandela, 1995; Dubow, 1995; O ’Meara, 1996; de Klerk, 1999). In short, resistance to 
Apartheid became more aggressive during the 60s when the ANC adopted a policy 
of armed struggle. During the 70s, the Apartheid state faced the black resistance with 
a more lethal and violent strategy. Mass protests against Apartheid policies were met
162 Under the provisions o f  the Natives Land Act (1913), African natives, who represented two-thirds 
o f South Africa’s population, were allowed to use just around 8% o f  the country’s land mass (Dubow, 
2000:5).
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with extreme brutality by the government’s security apparatus. This backfired against 
the regime by increasing mass mobilisation over the years. With many of the ANC’s 
leaders either in prison or exiled and all African nationalist movements banned, trade 
unions became more involved in the anti-Apartheid struggle. In the late 80s, the 
Congress of South African Trade Unions (COSATU) joined the United Democratic 
Front (UDF), an alliance of hundreds of civil society organisations, in a campaign of 
civil disobedience intended to weaken Pretoria’s regime (Du Toit, 1995).
In the early 90s, given the human and economic cost of state repression, 
regional and international political isolation, an economic crisis triggered by 
international sanctions, and almost unanimous condemnation by the international 
community, the government of Frederik de Klerk finally agreed to negotiate the end 
of Apartheid. The settlement culminated in the historic election of ANC’s leader 
Nelson Mandela in 1994 to the presidency of South Africa.
The constitutive features of South Africa’s society (burdened by social and 
political struggles, population mobility, racial exclusion, and characterised by drastic 
political transformation since the early 1990s) significandy contributed to the 
explosive expansion of HIV/AIDS in the country. During the early and mid 80s, at 
the time HIV started to appear in South Africa, state-sponsored violence against anti- 
Apartheid movements triggered political instability and social turmoil in 
overcrowded townships. In the final years of the Apartheid regime, the almost total 
disruption of civil society resulted in cycles of oppression and resistance in the 
townships. This volatile environment masked the progress of HIV/AIDS and 
created ideal conditions for its spread (Whiteside and Sunter, 2000:62). It has also 
helped the development of a system of values and social practices that was reflected 
in the manner in which both political leaders and South African society at large 
responded to the impact of the epidemic (Benatar, 2001).
South Africa has one of the fastest-growing HIV/AIDS epidemics in the 
world. From 1982 to 2003, the number of HIV infections in the country escalated 
from only 2 cases to around 5 million. The World Health Organi2 ation (WHO) 
estimates that, currently, South Africa has more people living with HIV than any 
other country in the world.163 AIDS is the major cause of death in South Africa. In 
2002 alone, it accounted for 40% of all deaths in the country, and over half of the 
deaths in the provinces of KwaZulu-Natal (52%) and Mpumalanga (51%) (Rensburg 
and Friedman, 2002:21-22). Average life expectancy is expected to fall from 
approximately 60 years to 40 years between 1998 and 2008. According to recent 
statistics by UNAIDS, around 1,000 people die from AIDS in the country every 
day.164 Initially, the disease primarily targeted white male homosexuals. However, as 
the virus spread throughout the 80s, the disease began to reach other groups. 
Currendy in South Africa, the HIV/AIDS epidemic is having a severe impact on the 
young, heterosexual, black, and economically poor populations. Young women aged 
20-30 have the highest prevalence rates. As some studies demonstrate, since a great 
percentage of South Africa’s population falls into this age group, HIV/AIDS can 
potentially have a very serious impact on socio-economic development (Whiteside 
and Sunter, 2000:58).
With the election of Nelson Mandela in 1994, Apartheid’s draconian 
controls on black South Africans were relaxed. However, more than ten years after 
the end of Apartheid, the lessening of structural inequalities in South African society 
is still far from being concluded. At the outset of the new government, everything
163 India may have surpassed South Africa in the total number o f  people infected with HIV. However, 
it was not confirmed by WHO given the lack o f  reliable and comprehensive data on the actual scope 
o f the H IV/AIDS epidemic in the country.
164 This is equivalent in terms o f  loss o f  life to one 9/11 terrorist attack every three days in South 
Africa (Fourie, 2005).
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had to be done from scratch. As a consequence of decades of racism, President 
Mandela inherited an unbalanced public health system. The healthcare facilities 
designated for whites in urban areas were fully equipped and very sophisticated, 
whereas health structures for black people, mostly in rural areas, were extremely 
poor. The challenge facing the ANC government was to move towards making 
healthcare accessible to all South Africans, irrespective of their colour or geographic 
location. This was not an easy task. Decades of unjust allocation of resources could 
not be reversed overnight. Another result of the impact of the political transition was 
that the state bureaucracies had to go through a process of procedural and staff 
rearrangement. The ensuing disputes between the new occupiers and the remaining 
representatives of the old regime as well as the redefinition of goals and 
organisational routines led to an extended period of bureaucratic semi-paralysis, 
which impacted the efficiency and availability of services in all public sectors (Strode 
and Grant, 2004).
The HIV/AIDS epidemic in South Africa did not appear in a vacuum. It 
became part of the ideological dynamics of change in South African society that 
helped shape the understanding of what this virus and the resulting illness 
represented. In the early 90s, the South African government had to cope with a 
significant rise in the levels of HIV prevalence in the context of a historic process of 
political change.165 Out of the challenges facing political leaders during the transition 
process, HIV/AIDS was perceived as the least problematic among a series of threats 
that seemed to hinder the success of the political transition. Impeding risks of
165 The Mozambican and South African cases have interesting similarities in this regard. In both 
states, H IV/AIDS appeared in the context o f  a major political transition. However, it is important to 
note that, although interrelated, the political struggle in the two countries had quite different 
ideological configurations. As this thesis demonstrates later, while in Mozambique the failure o f  the 
socialist experiment, coupled with significant international interference, led the country to civil war, in
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violence and uprising in KwaZulu-Natal and Witwatersrand, including even a 
potential civil war, concentrated the energies of the government’s decision-makers 
and ANC members alike (Marais, 2000:6). In terms of South Africa’s security 
environment, clearly HIV/AIDS was not an issue during this period. However, HIV 
silently took hold in South Africa’s society and rapidly proliferated.
The subjective influence of Apartheid on social interpretations o f the 
HIV/AIDS epidemic is also important. The racial stereotypes created in the context 
of the Apartheid regime are still present in the way South African people see and 
react to the epidemic. Issues taken for granted in the West, as matters of individual 
choice - such as the use of condoms, for example - are in South Africa part of 
complex social interpretations. In South Africa, the link between the promotion of 
the use of condoms and an allegedly Western (white) plot to control the growth of 
black populations is widespread. The urban legend that HIV was introduced by 
whites in the final years of Apartheid to exterminate blacks is not unusual among 
well-informed South Africans.166
In South Africa, the racial discourse, placing blame on a kind of neo­
colonialism, and a socio-political environment inherited from the white regime were 
internalised in the way people define causal relationships, and how they think they 
should respond to HIV/AIDS. In this respect, the stigma associated with 
HIV/AIDS is a result of, and at the same time reinforces, the social structure of 
South African society, characterised by deep-seated social divisions, exclusion, and
South Africa the internal conflict had its roots in the longstanding racial divisions o f  the Apartheid 
regime.
166 For an example o f  this, see the article entitled “Is AIDS a Conspiracy Against Blacks?” published 
in 1991, in the Johannesburg-based magazine Drum..
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racial prejudices.167 Therefore, a crucial difference between South Africa and the 
other cases discussed here is the legacy of the Apartheid regime and how 
social/racial fragmentation helped spread the virus as well as created huge ideological 
barriers to fight it (Interview Ala 23.07.2004). As demonstrated later, the defining 
impact of Apartheid in shaping the political culture of South African society is a key 
factor in understanding why some decision-makers, such as the President himself 
and the Minister of Health, have taken a rather deviant stance towards the 
HIV/AIDS epidemic. Those actors are embedded in social structures and norms 
that have a profound influence on their behavioural choices. In that sense, the 
examination of how the behaviour of individuals is influenced by their social milieu 
is fundamental in understanding the broader determinants of responses to the 
epidemic in the country.
3. Institutional Strategies and HIV/AIDS Policies in South Africa
This section argues that South African state responses to HIV/AIDS were 
characterised by politicisation/racialisation of the epidemic. Both the Apartheid 
regime and the post-1994 ANC governments framed HIV/AIDS in terms of the 
mindsets of their longstanding racial divisions. The former defined HIV/ AIDS as an 
epidemic of black people, whereas the latter perceived the disease as a legacy of the 
draconian white minority’s policies against the black population. The influence of 
international HANS leaders in South Africa was markedly distinctive in this respect. 
Despite the end of the international isolation of South Africa in the early 90s, and
167 Along the same lines, Jones suggests that “ [...] South Africa has been driven by a degree o f  over­
reaction to the more outlandish colonial, late Apartheid and racist discourses associated early on with 
the [HIV/AIDS] epidemic [...]” (2004:9).
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some notable changes in policy direction since 1994, the engagement of the global 
community of HASN in South Africa’s response to HIV/AIDS has been 
complicated by fiery domestic infighting and the personal sensitivities of high- 
ranking politicians in the government.
Since the late 80s, South African health professionals and many civil 
servants working in public health related areas seemed aware of the threat posed by 
HIV/AIDS. In 1985, the Department of Health (DoH) released its first report 
acknowledging the presence of HIV/AIDS in South Africa. By this time, the 
government's reaction was notoriously modest (Furlong and Ball, 2005). Botha's 
regime, and its conservative white electorate, saw AIDS as an illness limited to the 
black population, drug users, and/or homosexual men (Fourie, 2005). Moreover, at 
the top levels of decision-making, the nascent epidemic was overshadowed by more 
urgent threats, such as the economic sanctions against the regime, the political 
isolation imposed by the international community, the ever-present threat of hostile 
states in Southern Africa, widespread social unrest in black urban areas and the 
guerrilla campaign promoted by ANC (Furlong and Ball, 2005:131).
In 1987, disquieting reports from South Africa’s Medical Research Council 
(MRC) revealed a significant increase in heterosexual transmission among African 
miners and other black communities. By then, HIV/AIDS had begun to be more 
widely recognised as a real public health threat to the general black population. This 
increased the government’s discriminatory association of HIV/AIDS with black 
people. As Fourie puts it, “the “gay plague” had become the “black death” - an 
untimely addition to the greater National Party pathology of an “swart gevaar” [black 
danger]” (2005:96). Among ANC cadres, on the other hand, some influential voices 
blamed the white minority government as well as Western governments for
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artificially producing the HIV virus to decimate blacks (Fourie, 2005:96).168 During 
this early period, Botha’s administration was so concerned with the preservation of 
the Apartheid regime that few governmental efforts were directed at a disease that 
seemed to strike mostly the black population.
In 1989, the elaboration of a comprehensive policy response to HIV/AIDS 
was facilitated by the changing political landscape at the outset of de Klerk's 
administration. During this time, a more participative environment was established 
due to the legalisation of the liberation movements and their subsequent inclusion in 
public policy debates. In March 1990, the government met ANC leaders for the first 
time to debate the impact of HIV/AIDS in South Africa. They presented a joint 
request for funds and technical assistance to WHO’s HIV/AIDS Global Programme 
(Furlong and Ball, 2005:132). Additionally, by this time, the DoH was assisted by 
WHO in setting up eleven HIV/AIDS training, information, and counselling centres, 
known in South Africa by the acronym ATICCs.
It was only in October 1992, however, that the first clear attempt to devise 
a coherent national HIV/AIDS plan was developed through a consultative effort put 
in place by the ANC, the DoH, and a variety of representatives from civil society, 
such as labour, business, religious and other civic structures. The result was the 
establishment of a national body for HIV/AIDS activities, named the National 
AIDS Co-coordinating Committee of South Africa (NACOSA) (Schneider, 1998:7). 
For the first time since the onset of the epidemic in South Africa, the government 
allowed a truly inclusive body to discuss the national public response to HIV/AIDS. 
Despite these positive developments, by this point the government was still primarily
168 In fact, scientists working for the government in secret programmes to develop chemical and 
biological warfare saw in the HIV virus a potentially powerful weapon to defeat guerrillas based in 
neighbouring countries. For more on this, see, for example, Burger and Gould (2002).
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concerned with fundamental political negotiations with the ANC and other liberation 
movements that five years later led to the conclusion of the political transition to 
democratic rule. This meant that the government perceived HIV/AIDS as a less 
important issue compared with the major political challenges the National Party had 
to face in terms of preserving its political weight (even its survival as a force of 
significance) during and after the transitional period. Moreover, the racial bias of the 
National Party was strongly manifested in the way HIV/AIDS policies were 
implemented. Furlong and Ball, for example, noted that the ATICCs were 
strategically located “where they served almost exclusively whites; only in mid-1993 
was one for Soweto approved” (2005:133).
With the inauguration of democracy, and still at manageable levels, the new 
Mandela government seemed willing to engage in a broad effort to face the looming 
prospects posed by the epidemic. It was clear that the new government had a 
comprehensive knowledge of both the medical and socioeconomic effects that 
HIV/AIDS could have for the South African people (Schneider, 1998:6). In 1994, 
the ANC had robust and detailed projections showing that HIV/AIDS was emerging 
as a major public health issue in the country (Butler, 2005:593). Those predictions 
indicated, for example, that by 2005 something like 24% of South Africa’s adult 
population would be infected with HIV if effective prevention campaigns were not 
implemented (ANC, 1994).
The NACOSA plan was approved by the whole range of social actors: 
religious groups, trade unions, as well as locally-based organisations and the private 
sector, which helped in its elaboration (Scheneider, 1998:7). In June 1994, it became 
the first official South African National AIDS Plan (NAP). The Minister of Health, 
Dr. Nkosazana Zuma, fully endorsed NAP and committed the DoH to its 
implementation through the establishment of a Directorate of HIV/AIDS and
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Sexually Transmitted Diseases. The Plan recognised the multidimensional impact of 
the epidemic and the necessity for an intersectoral partnership to respond to it. 
Important factors that compounded the spread of the virus, such as, for example, 
unemployment, migration, civil and military mobility, gender, et cetera, were 
constitutive parts of South Africa's national strategy to face the HIV/AIDS 
epidemic. The conditions were in place for an effective response to the epidemic. 
However, this has still not happened. In the years following the set up of NACOSA, 
the HIV/AIDS epidemic spiralled out of control with an exponential increase in the 
number of people infected.169
UNAIDS arrived in South Africa in November 1996 to assist the 
government in the national response. It established a working group on HIV/AIDS 
surveillance that compiled and organised data on the epidemic in the country 
(UNAIDS, 2002:2). Since then, UNAIDS has produced a number of epidemiological 
and policy reports that were subjected to close scrutiny by the top-leadership in the 
country.170 By the end of the 90s, divisions between two competing paradigms were 
already visible in the public policy debates on HIV/AIDS. The non-governmental 
sector and parts of the health bureaucracy aligned more closely with the views and 
prescriptions of the epistemic community of HASN leaders, such as UNAIDS. 
Conversely, the ANC leadership began to forge its own (African-Renaissance 
inspired) interpretations and policy recommendations on the epidemic. The
169 In this respect, Marais affirms that “the scale o f  the failure becomes clearer when one notes that 
the HIV prevalence rate in both Thailand and South Africa was less than 1% in 1990; eight years later 
it was 1.5% in Thailand compared to over 22% in South Africa” (Marais, 2000:7).
170 For example, based on a very controversial article published in 2001 by the Afrikaner journalist and 
writer Rian Malan (The Observer 21.12.2003), Mbeki’s administration suggested that UNAIDS’ 
computer systems have considerably overestimated HIV figures in the country. During the Global 
Conference on AIDS, held in Durban, in 2000, the South African Government released figures that 
showed that many fewer people were infected by HIV than the numbers presented by UNAIDS.
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divergences between these two broad worldviews would be further accentuated over 
the years.171
In 1997, three years after setting up the National Plan, not much had been 
accomplished to contain the spread of the epidemic. After a hopeful start, the 
institutional mechanisms put in place to harness political commitment proved to be 
ineffective and undermined by controversy and fragmentation. In the same year, a 
comprehensive National Review of South Africa's response to the HIV/AIDS 
epidemic suggested reforms, regarding the institutional arrangements established 
during the outset of Mandela's administration. The review pointed to the problem of 
interdepartmental conflict and the narrow focus on the health sector and 
recommended moving responsibility to the Deputy President in an attempt to 
guarantee political leadership at a higher level of political authority. Based on the 
review’s recommendations, the government decided to set up an Inter-Ministerial 
Committee (IMC) on HIV/AIDS. Formed by Cabinet Ministers and their deputies, 
the IMC’s task was to facilitate co-ordination between departments and improve 
their political commitment to addressing the epidemic. Ironically, the IMC was first 
headed by then Deputy President, Thabo Mbeki, who later embraced rather 
unconventional ideas on HIV/AIDS. The committee was disbanded in 1999 and 
replaced by the South African National Aids Council (SANAC).
In 2000, already under the presidency of Mbeki, the health minister Manto 
Tshabalala-Msimang who (like her predecessor Dlamini-Zuma) is a medical doctor,
171 Buder called these paradigms “mobilisation/biomedical” and “nationalist/ameliorative” 
respectively. Despite Buder’s similar identification o f  two competing sets o f  understandings about 
HIV /A ID S in South Africa, his interpretation differs in one very important aspect from the argument 
put forward here. The author explains the ascendancy o f  the “nationalist” paradigm in terms o f  its 
“administrative and political viability in South African conditions” (Buder, 2005:591). In this respect, 
he asserts that “instrumental calculation has played an increasingly prominent role in state strategy” 
(Buder, 2005:592). This thesis supports the view that a more fundamental ideological motivation 
inspired the government’s alternative reconceptualisation o f  H IV/AIDS.
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launched a new plan named the HIV/AIDS/STD Strategic Plan for South Africa, 
2000-2005. The contents of the plan were based upon the template given by 
UNAIDS as well as in the previous NAP of 1994 (DoH, 2000). Despite its widely 
praised holistic approach, the new plan lacked from the beginning clear political 
commitment and created divergences with civil society groups by excluding the ARV 
option for AIDS treatment (Butler, 2005:595). It followed UNAIDS advice to create 
a single HIV/AIDS coordinating agency headed by the top political leadership in the 
country. SANAC became South Africa’s national HIV/AIDS coordinating body. 
The Deputy President Jacob Zuma was appointed the first chair of the National 
HIV/AIDS Council (DoH, 2000). In 2006, during a rape trial, Zuma admitted to 
have engaged in unprotected sex with his alleged victim, who he knew was HIV 
positive (Mail <& Guardian 31.05.2006). This extreme case of reckless behaviour 
reveals the immense gap separating the international norms guiding HIV prevention 
and the social and cultural contexts in which political leaders operate in South Africa.
Despite its far-reaching agenda, SANAC has not fulfilled expectations by 
becoming the leading HIV/AIDS institutional body in South Africa (Schneider, 
1998b). SANAC is considered one of the most unproductive bodies of this kind in 
Southern Africa (Interview Caesar 08.07.2004 and Interview Ralph 25.08.2004). This 
is due mostly to domestic divergences surrounding HIV/AIDS policies. A common 
criticism of SANAC is that its current structure is controlled by the DoH, which is 
the sole agenda-setter for all meetings. This prevents other SANAC members from 
including issues in discussions (Strode and Grant, 2004:23). Moreover, as a sign of 
the government’s scepticism towards mainstreaming knowledge about HIV/AIDS, 
SANAC excluded leading HIV/AIDS researchers and NGOs, the Medical Research 
Council, and the Medicines’ Control Council (Butler, 2005:594). Not coincidentally, 
international partners were also not represented at SANAC.
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In March 2000, Mbeki and Msimang surprised domestic and international 
audiences by announcing the formation of a Presidential Advisory Panel (DoH, 
2001).172 Formed largely by non-South Africans, its tasks included assessment of 
some established scientific principles concerning the HIV virus and its links with the 
immune deficiency that leads to AIDS, as well as review of evidence that AZT and 
Nevirapine, two essential drugs in the treatment of AIDS, were ineffective and toxic 
(DoH, 2001). Apparently, Mbeki was seduced by the view of a few dissenting 
scientists, called ‘denialists’, the most notorious of whom was the US-based doctor 
Peter Duesberg, who scientifically questioned the link between HIV and AIDS and 
the efficacy of anti-retroviral drugs.
Mbeki’s personal beliefs deeply influenced the way his government 
addressed the epidemic. Government officials began to argue that, rather than the 
HIV virus, deep-rooted social problems such as poverty and exclusion were behind 
the immunodeficiency experienced by many black South Africans. The government’s 
questioning of the efficiency of AIDS drugs has also fundamentally impacted the 
collective imagery of South Africans. In a society in which leadership figures are very 
important, Mbeki’s and his Minister of Health’s ideas about XRVs greatly influenced 
people’s reasoning about whether they should take these drugs or not. According to 
a health worker interviewed in 2004, in Pretoria, the irregular provision of drugs is 
not the only problem they face; there is also the issue of convincing patients of the 
reliability and safety of these medicines.
In November 2003, amid great controversy between civil society groups 
and the government’s top-level decision-makers, namely President Mbeki himself 
and the Minister of Health, the Cabinet finally approved an ambitious plan to roll­
172 See, for example, “South Africa’s AIDS doubts baffle the experts”. M ail &  Guardian, 17 March
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out anti-retroviral treatment to an estimated 53,000 people by the end of March 
2005. The government's decision was the result of a lawsuit filed by an important 
South African HIV/AIDS NGO, the Treatment Action Campaign (TAC), against 
the Minister of Health and nine provincial health ministers.173 It was basically made 
up of two claims: the first compelling the government to make the drug Nevirapine 
available in the national public health system and the second ordering it to produce a 
clear national policy to prevent mother-to-child infection. At the end of 2001, the 
Constitutional Court of South Africa ruled in favour of TAC and ordered the 
government to initiate immediate nationwide provision of Nevirapine. After a series 
of court appeals, in which the government insisted that Nevirapine was toxic and 
that further research on its effects were needed, in May 2002, the Constitutional 
Court upheld the High Court's decision.
Eyen after the release of South Africa’s care and treatment plan, the 
government continued to challenge the efficiency and reliability of ARVs. Following 
the launch of the government’s plan to provide access to ARVs therapy, the Health 
Minister engaged in a campaign to promote alternative methods for preventing and 
treating HIV/AIDS such as garlic, lemon and beetroot.174 Moreover, during the 15th 
International Aids Conference, in Bangkok, in July 2004, Msimang created 
widespread bewilderment among participants, when she publicly questioned the 
validity of Nevirapine, an essential drug in preventing the transmission of HIV from 
mother to child (This Day 12.07.2004; The Star 15.07.1004). She claimed, referring to
2000 .
173 The role o f  TAC in South Africa’s response to H IV/AIDS is further analysed later in this chapter.
174 During the International AIDS Conference held in Toronto, Canada, in August 2006, TAC’s 
condemnation o f  the health minister’s advocating nutrition as an HIV prevention and treatment 
method was upheld by Stephen Lewis, the UN special envoy to Africa, who accused the ANC  
government o f  supporting theories “more worthy o f  a lunatic fringe than a concerned and 
compassionate state” {Mail and Guardian 19.08.2006).
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research undertaken by South Africa’s Medicines Control Council (MCC), that 
mothers who used this drug could develop resistance to ARVs in the future. Four 
years before Bangkok, at the international AIDS conference in Durban, the South 
African president cast doubts on the link between HIV and AIDS and questioned 
the reliability of ARVs. Mbeki stated on that occasion that he did not believe that a 
single virus could be responsible for all of Africa's public health problems (Mbeki, 
2000a: internet source).
Although the defensiveness of Mbeki’s administration slightly eased after 
2005, South Africa is still reluctant to follow the international guidelines agreed by 
national governments in multilateral forums of negotiation. During the 2006 UN 
High Level Meeting on HIV/AIDS, South African diplomacy worked hard to 
reverse the UNGASS Declaration of 2001 with regard to the goal of universal access 
to treatment (Aidsmap 01.06.2006). It also lobbied against the proposal of setting 
clear targets for national governments in the areas of prevention, care and treatment 
(Aidsmap 01.06.2006). These actions by the South African delegation suggest that 
confrontational mentalities that guide the policy preferences of decision-makers in 
Pretoria are still intact.
As noted later, the arrival of PEPFAR in South Africa, in 2003/4, was also 
a source of contention with the South African government, given the US insistence 
on purchasing only expensive name-brand AIDS drugs. Cabinet approval o f a 
general ARV program was predicated on using the cheaper generic drugs instead of 
the more costly brands. The US position was described by members of the ANC 
government as a capitalist plot against South Africa and its people. This illustrates 
how the socialisation work of HASN leaders, such as the US government, has 
encountered strident resistance from Mbeki’s government and its suspicion of the 
Western powers’ (good) intentions in Africa.
(
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4. Leadership perceptions and the domestic recognition of HASN
This section claims that deep-rooted principled beliefs and worldviews 
among top leaders in the South African government blocked (or at least deeply 
constrained) the cascading of HASN’s prescriptions in South Africa. It is shown that 
in the South African political context, external norms concerning HIV/AIDS were 
framed (adapted) by political elites to meet the existing normative order based on the 
contestation of white/western domination. In this sense, the characteristic of the 
South African decision-making system of power that is centralised in a few powerful 
individuals posed huge barriers to the securitising efforts of international HASN 
leaders. As analysed later, this led to tactical alliances with like-minded HIV/AIDS 
civil society groups within South Africa, aiming to bring about pressure to achieve 
domestic policy change.175
From the outset of democratic rule in South Africa, the ANC has 
demonstrated an increasing tendency for hierarchical and centralised leadership.176 
When Mandela assumed power in 1994, after a period of revolutionary euphoria, the 
general tendency in the party’s leadership was to view mass mobilisation as a 
potential source of instability rather than a legitimate manifestation of democratic 
rule (Johnson, 2002). This inclination toward centralised political control has further 
intensified during Mbeki’s presidency. After his election, in 1999, and with the ANC 
power already entrenched in the government’s machinery, intolerance towards
175 This process closely resembles the “boomerang effect” o f  domestic normative change as described 
by Keck and Sikkink (1998). The thesis returns to this point in a subsequent section.
176 According to Jones, "whilst undoubtedly committed to formal democracy, since 1994, a 
demobilizing tendency within the ruling Africa National Congress (ANC) party can be identified, and 
arguably, is exacerbated as power is consolidated through control o f  the state" (Jones, 2004:7).
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dissent became very pronounced.177 Public criticism of ANC policies was often 
depicted as counter-revolutionary or even racist.178 Furthermore, the many decades 
of anti-Apartheid struggle gave a huge amount of symbolic power to the ANC 
government. This logic also applies to state policies towards the HIV/AIDS 
epidemic. Mbeki's rejection of social mobilisation and protest politics for the 
definition of South Africa's official position on HIV/AIDS led to a system of 
decision-making characterised by the personal rule of the President and his inner 
circle of loyal supporters. Rather than unfolding complex systems of government and 
administration, the behaviour of a single individual, or a small group of decision­
makers, can be considered a more central variable in understanding South African 
government’s actions on HIV/AIDS.
Thabo Mvuyelwa Mbeki was bom  on 18 June 1942. The son of a former 
ANC president, he joined this organisation in 1956, initially in the ANC Youth 
League, advancing quickly through its ranks. During 1963 to 1967, he studied 
economics in Britain at the University of Sussex and subsequently worked in the 
ANC’s offices in London. He was also a member of the South African Communist 
Party and a sympathiser of the Soviet regime, where he received military training in 
thfe early 70s. Throughout his life, he passionately engaged in the cause of black 
liberation in Africa and the fight against Apartheid, establishing contacts with leading 
figures all over the world, becoming one of ANC’s most prominent figures. After the 
ANC assumed the government of South Africa, he was chosen for the pivotal 
function of Deputy President to Mandela, with actual responsibility for running the
177 For more on this, see, for example, “ANC Puts Party Before Democracy”. Mail &  Guardian, 6 
February 2001.
178 See, for example, “Thabo Mbeki, A Man o f  Two Faces”. The Economist, 20 January 2005.
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daily activities of the government. Mbeki was then pinpointed as Mandela’s natural 
successor, taking over the presidency in 1999.
Mbeki’s background of fighting white oppression against the black 
population deeply influenced his political choices while in the South African 
presidency, including decisions made in the area of HIV/AIDS. A recurrent theme in 
his speeches are references to the deep-seated legacies from the Apartheid era as a 
source of the social and economic problems faced by South African society. He 
regularly refers to the racial and colonial factors as underlying causes of conflict 
between political and social forces in the country and to the role played by Western 
governments in Africa.179
Internationally, Mbeki is engaged in a political struggle against global 
injustice and underdevelopment. Moving beyond discursive practices, he proposed 
real programmes, such as NEPAD and the African Renaissance, aiming to raise 
Africa’s profile in global affairs. Regionally, Mbeki’s constant support and public 
defence of Mugabe’s tyrannical regime in Zimbabwe is another example of how 
ideological and racial factors play an important role in understanding his policy 
positions. Mbeki responded to domestic criticism of his approach to Zimbabwe by 
lashing out against white sectors in the media and other opposition groups who, in 
his view, were linked with “white supremacists” (Schoeman and Alden, 2003:6). In 
fact, the ANC’s historical ties to Mugabe’s ZANU-PF have hindered Mbeki from 
taking serious action against Harare. As Schoeman and Alden put it, “if there is one 
thing that South African politics and foreign policy have made clear since 1994, it is 
that once the issue of race becomes entangled in the situation, South Africa cannot
179 This view is clearly articulated in an article published by Mbeki in 7 April 2006 in the South African 
newspaper Mail <& Guardian entitled “Africa Should Beware o f  Forces o f  Liberal Imperialism”.
234
exercise its commitment to demands of good governance and human rights abroad” 
(2003:6).
Similarly, Mbeki’s interpretations of the HIV/AIDS epidemic in South 
Africa cannot be disassociated from the broader political context of South Africa’s 
anti-Apartheid struggle and its (normative) legacies. For him, the epidemic exposes 
all the global disparities that threw the African continent into continued dependence. 
The South African president has been an outspoken critic of the unequal distribution 
of wealth generated by globalisation and the responsibility of developed states in 
perpetuating this situation (Eboko, 2005:42). For example, in October 1999, in an 
inspired speech at the launch of the African Renaissance Institute in Pretoria, Mbeki 
addressed these issues. He said:
The problem we are facing [...] is the reality that many among the developed 
countries of the North have lost all sense of the noble idea of human solidarity. What 
seems to predominate is the question, in its narrowest and most naked meaning - 
what is in it for me! What is in it for me! And all this with absolutely no apology and 
no sense of shame. (Quoted from Jacobs and Calland, 2002:14).
In this respect, Mbeki’s resistance to H A S N  entrepreneurship in South Africa 
can be understood in terms of a wider ideological contestation against the diktat of 
mainstream scientific knowledge and the resultant dogmatism of Western 
paternalistic solutions to the African problems. His speeches clearly echo widely held 
perceptions about the relationship between Africans and their former white colonial 
rulers. Responding to this historical legacy, Mbeki redefines both the common 
Western knowledge about the HIV/AIDS epidemic and what would be the 
appropriate responses to it. The HIV/AIDS epidemic and Mugabe’s regime in 
Zimbabwe were interpreted by the South African leader through the same mindset, 
which was the result of long-term historical and sociological processes. These
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examples are interesting social constructions derived from intersubjective processes that 
are not grasped by rational accounts of human behaviour. In the words of Mbeki;
We have in practice made the statement that we are determined that the African 
masses should reclaim their right to determine their destiny. We have done what we 
should and must do to ensure that the people fully enjoy the fruits of their liberation 
from colonial and racial domination (Mbeki, 2004: internet source).
The above statement would fit well into the speech of any of the ANC's 
influential leaders during the hot years of the Apartheid regime. It shows that, despite 
the obvious changes in South Africa's political power configuration after 1994, the 
discursive tools used by political leaders are still quite the same. Basically, what 
Mbeki meant, while saying "to ensure fully the fruits of liberation from racial 
domination", was resistance to any interference in how South Africa deals with its 
domestic and regional affairs. It also means fighting residual colonial influence, 
reflected in a new kind of foreign domination in the era o f globalisation. Concerning 
HIV/AIDS, this foreign domination is personalised by the economic interests of big 
pharmaceutical corporations, the US political agenda in Africa, and control of 
scientific knowledge by Western epistemic communities and multilateral agencies.
The allegedly monopoly of truth concerning Western responses to 
HIV/AIDS, and the alternative perspective upheld by the South African 
government, were highlighted by Mbeki himself, amid great controversy, in his 
opening speech at the 13th International AIDS Conference, held in Durban, on 9th 
July 2000. On this occasion, he stated that,
Some in our common world consider the questions I and the rest of our government 
have raised around the HIV/AIDS issue as akin to grave criminal and genocidal 
misconduct. What I hear being said repeatedly is do not ask any questions! [...] As I 
listened and heard the whole history told about our own country, it seemed to me 
that we could not blame everything on a single virus (Mbeki, 2000a: internet source).
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On 3 April 2000, a few months before the Durban Conference, Mbeki 
issued a controversial letter to world leaders vehemently asserting his views about the 
HIV/AIDS issue. He affirmed, for example, that
Not long ago, in our country, people were killed because the established authority 
believed that their views were dangerous and discredited. We are asked now to do 
precisely the same thing that the racist Apartheid tyranny we opposed did, because, it 
is said there exists a scientific view that is supported by the majority, against which 
dissent is prohibited (Mbeki, 2000b: 19).
Open questioning of established scientific knowledge about HIV/AIDS 
reinforced scepticism and denial that prevented behavioural change in South Africa’s 
society. From the government’s point of view, AIDS was a side effect of decades of 
exploitation, underdevelopment, and racism. In contrast to the securitisation emphasis 
of the international community of H A SN  leaders, there would be very little that the 
government of South Africa could do in the short-term to fight it. The solution to 
the AIDS problem would rest in long-term policies to combat poverty, malnutrition, 
and poor socioeconomic conditions.180 Although undoubtedly misleading, the South 
African president’s approach to HIV/AIDS is not irrational as some of his critics 
claim (Cohen, 2000:590). Mbeki’s reasoning is logically consistent with the ideas that 
traditionally guided his political activities as an ANC member. Domestically, he is 
linking the seriousness of the epidemic with the dreadful legacy of Apartheid’s social 
engineering and the consequent disempowerment of black people. Internationally, he
180 Notwithstanding the patent escalation o f  H IV/AIDS throughout South Africa, in his speech to 
MPs, during the State o f  the Nation Address at the opening o f  Parliament, on 4 February 2000, Mbeki 
only made a brief mention o f  the H IV/AIDS problem, concentrating instead on other issues, such as 
poverty alleviation, education, and nutrition (Mbeki, 2000c).
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seeks to use the epidemic to address the deep structural contradictions present in the 
neoliberal paradigm.
At a practical level, his message led to confusion and a slow response by 
the government. By taking away the sense of urgency, strongly advised by domestic 
and international promoters of HASN, Mbeki decided to fight two powerful 
adversaries at the same time: the epidemic itself and the international and domestic 
actors promoting its securitisation.181 It is not clear-cut as to whether Mbeki is 
actually using the denialist position to legitimise his stance and defy the international 
community or if he truly believes that HIV and AIDS are not related issues. What is 
important to bear in mind here is the impact of decision-makers’ ideas and deep- 
rooted values in shaping South Africa’s understandings and responses to 
HIV/AIDS. It is also important to understand the political and ideological 
environment in which the HIV/AIDS epidemic took hold in South Africa and how 
the interpretations of and the responses to the epidemic were influenced by this 
environment.
Next, this chapter assesses the role of H A SN  entrepreneurs in the country 
and the way HIV/AIDS civil society groups mobilised domestically and linked with 
external actors to influence policy decision-making at the governmental level.
181 In March 2001, despite strong international and domestic pressure, Mbeki rejected appeals to 
declare H IV/AIDS a national emergency. Additionally, in September o f  the same year, the South 
African government blocked the publication o f  a report from the MRC, which showed AIDS as the 
leading cause o f  death in South Africa (Copson, 2004:4).
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5. Norm Entrepreneurs in Action: The role of Multilateral Institutions, the US 
and Transnational Non-State Actors
5.1. The Multilateral Approach
In South Africa, the normative influence of multilateral H IV  I  A ID S actors 
began to have some impact in decision-making only after 1990. Before that, Botha’s 
discriminatory laws against HIV-positive individuals were the antithesis of the 
human rights approach of WHO’s HIV/AIDS Global Programme. Excluded from 
WHO, the Apartheid regime did not take part in the intensive HIV/AIDS planning 
in the mid 80s (Iliffe, 2006:72). However, in 1990, the NP government, together with 
the ANC leadership, requested WHO’s assistance in the national fight against 
HIV/AIDS. This opened the door for a more proactive role for this organisation in 
the country. This move was also very representative of changes in South Africa’s 
domestic politics and international status. A few years earlier, the idea of initiating 
policy debates with the ANC would have been inconceivable to the NP’s leadership. 
In the same way, the international labelling of South Africa’s Apartheid as a “pariah 
state” would have precluded participation in (and receipt of aid from) multilateral 
schemes such as the W HO’s Global Programme on HIV/AIDS.
After the democratic transition concluded in 1994, multilateral contacts 
gradually began to be re-established. As already shown, by the time Mandela came to 
power, the W HO/GPA had already been sending technical personnel to help in the 
implementation of NAP. In the years following the installation of the newly-elected 
ANC government, a more consultative and participatory decision-making process led 
to the expectation that all national and international HIV/AIDS stakeholders would 
work together in responding to the impact of the epidemic. As in other states in
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Southern Africa, South Africa adopted the international guidelines for action, which 
prescribed a variety of HIV/AIDS policies, strategies and the development of 
specific institutions to deal with the epidemic (Johnson, 2004:108). This period 
coincided in the international sphere with the securitisation move that led to the 
creation of UNAIDS in 1996. The more radical line of the international community 
urged states to adopt a multisectoral approach to the epidemic coordinated by a 
single agency placed at the top of the national policymaking structure. The South 
African government embraced these new policy ideas and seemed to be moving 
towards their implementation (Johnson, 2004:108). Additionally, in the first stage of 
NAP, the lack of locally trained personnel gave a special clout to foreign experts 
from W HO/UNAIDS and other epidemic communities of HIV/AIDS specialists. 
According to Crewe, it was a time when international HIV/AIDS actors became 
very influential in advising the government about how to respond to the epidemic 
(Interview 28.07.2004).
Despite this more positive policy environment for the penetration of 
international HIV/AIDS norms and actors, UNAIDS and its affiliated organisations 
faced in South Africa a state bureaucracy still going through the process of deep 
restructuring. The animosity between old-era Apartheid civil servants and the new 
ANC bureaucrats as well as among the various levels of government added to the 
chaotic and confusing efforts to implement NAP (Interview Crewe 28.07.2004). 
Besides, UNAIDS’ strategy in the country was criticised for being too optimistic 
about the leadership role of the newly-established national and provincial 
governments in the overall HIV/AIDS response (Interview Crewe 28.07.2004). The 
ANC’s overburdening task of running a politically troubled state in search of a 
unifying national project and identity diminished the internationally-accepted security 
relevance of HIV/AIDS. In this respect, the global securitisation of the epidemic of
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the late 90s was an external phenomenon completely alien to the pre-existing 
cognitive frames of the domestic political audiences in charge of building the new 
South African state. Mandela himself later recognised that his government’s response 
to the epidemic was obfuscated by what were then perceived as potentially greater 
threats to the future of the South African state (Interview Crewe 28.07.2004).
Since 2000, the institutional format for coordinated action between 
international development agencies, multilateral bodies, donor states and the South 
African government was provided by “The Three Ones” framework. Formally, 
SANAC represents the coordinating authority in the country and is also South 
Africa's Country Coordinating Mechanism (CCM) to the Global Fund. In April 2002, 
the Fund approved a grant of US$ 72 million to be used over two years in 
HIV/AIDS and tuberculosis programmes. The first beneficiary was KwaZulu-Natal, 
the South African province hardest hit by the epidemic. As shown in more detail in 
the next section, political/ideological disputes between the national and some 
provincial governments were by this time strongly shaping the HIV/AIDS policy 
environment in South Africa, therefore further complicating the work of multilateral 
agencies and donor states.
In June 2002, the South African government tried to block the Global 
Fund’s grant to KwaZulu-Natal, claiming that the application had bypassed the 
national government. The Minister of Health stated that any proposal should have 
been discussed at SANAC before being submitted to the Fund. Government officials 
from KwaZulu-Natal affirmed that they applied directly to the Fund because South 
Africa had not yet established a Country Coordinating Mechanism at the time of the 
application.182 After more than a year of conflicting arguments and failed
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negotiations, a final agreement was reached between the South African government 
and the Global Fund in August 2003, now also including the province of Western 
Cape as well as the AIDS NGOs LoveLife and Soul City (Ndlovu, 2005:12/13). The 
imbroglio was only resolved after the Global Fund agreed that the National Treasury 
would act as the main recipient of the money and that SANAC would coordinate the 
implementation of the proposals. However, in May 2004, the money was still held up 
in Pretoria {Aegis News 03.05.2003). O f the total US$ 26.741 million awarded by the 
Fund to KwaZulu-Natal, 48% was disbursed by the end of April 2005 (Ndlovu, 
2004:12). According to the South African government, complex technicalities 
surrounding the grant agreement caused the delays. However, in the view of some 
HIV/AIDS NGOs, it was evident that the delay was linked to political attitudes 
towards anti-retroviral treatment (Interview Nukeri 23.07.2004).
In the first ever Global AIDS Conference held in Africa, in Durban, from 
9 to 14 July 2000, Mbeki raised questions about the harmful nature of ARVs and 
defended studies which supposedly demonstrated the inefficacy and toxicity of those 
medicines (Mbeki, 2000:20). Even with approved legislation allowing better access to 
generic AIDS drugs, the South African executive disallowed the use of single-dose 
Nevirapine, a drug which was approved by WHO and that is widely used to prevent 
mother-to-child transmission (PMTCT) (Epstein, 2001:190). As already shown, in 
2002 the government’s decision was overruled by South Africa’s Constitutional 
Court, which obliged the government to provide the anti-retroviral drug in the public 
health system. WHO and UNAIDS have continuously supported the use of 
Nevirapine for PMTCT and a significant part of the Global Fund’s money is for 
purchase of this particular drug. In this respect, the GF’s grant to KwaZulu-Natal,
182 It was only in July 2002 that SANAC was designated South Africa’s national mechanism to the
242
which had a strong PMTCT component, was seen by Pretoria as foreign interference 
in the sovereign rights of the South African government to decide about the safety 
standards of HIV/AIDS drugs (Interview Nukeri 23.07.2004). Given the highly 
politicised HIV/AIDS policy environment in South Africa, the Nevirapine issue 
gained ideological contours with the government accusing the pharmaceutical 
industry and Western powers of putting profits before the life and health of Africans 
(Mail <& Guardian 19.12.2004).183
Despite those divergences, UNAIDS has been able to introduce some 
institutional innovations in the way the South African government manages its 
relationship with international partners. For example, in line with the “Three Ones” 
principles, the DoH put in place a Donor Communication Forum (DCF) in 2000. 
This body serves to coordinate activities and avoid duplication between donors, 
multilateral bodies and NGOs. In this way, the South African government can more 
easily facilitate communication between governmental and international partners as 
well as develop a more synchronised response to the epidemic. Additionally, the 
DoH, through funding from UNDP and the local UNAIDS Theme Group, has 
developed a database (Donor Matrix) aimed at monitoring donors’ financial 
commitments to HIV/AIDS in the country (Ndlovu, 2005:1).
There are two basic channels through which international money arrives in 
South Africa. It is either channelled through the National Treasury to specific 
governmental departments and private service organisations or bilaterally to NGOs, 
research institutions, and other non-governmental institutions (Interview Balfour 
23.08.2004). Concerning the bilateral route, the South African government’s 
monitoring of resources coming from international aid agencies is patchy. Since
Global Fund (Interview Caesar 08.07. 2004).
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donors channel their funds directiy to service providers and research institutes, the 
government does not comprehensively collect information on the allocation of these 
resources (Ndlovu, 2005:4). In addition, the above mentioned “Donor Matrix” does 
not provide a reliable guide to donor spending in the country given that it is based on 
donor commitments over many years instead of the actual allocation and 
disimbursement of money.184 This lack of control allows that international donors 
explore loopholes in the system and directly reach local governments and NGOs 
without any interference from the central government.
As a general case, it is fair to say that the relationship between the 
government and international agencies with regards to HIV/AIDS programmes is 
based on a kind of cautious co-operation,185 This means that clear and well- established 
bilateral and multilateral channels of resource allocation and technical assistance exist 
among organisations such as the DIFD, UNICEF, Global Fund, UNAIDS, UNPD, 
USAID (PEPFAR), and others. Nevertheless, and contrary to this thesis’ other case 
studies, a high reliance upon public sector funds for South Africa’s HIV/AIDS 
response helped to enhance the government’s own domestic policies at the expense 
of the agenda of international donors.
Currently, although only 1% of South Africa's overall GDP is based on 
international aid, the country is ranked among the top five countries that received the 
largest shares of HIV/AIDS foreign financial commitments. During the period of
183 See next section for more on this.
184 It is also due to the multitude o f statistical and resource distribution methodologies used by 
donors that make it very difficult for the government to track down their clients and grants. 
Moreover, it takes years for comprehensive and updated financial records to be provided by funding 
agencies (Interview Balfour 23.08.2004).
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2000/2002, 99% of all health aid to South Africa was for the epidemic (UNAIDS 
and OECD, 2004). It is a clear indicator of the growing international concern over 
the impact of HIV/AIDS in the country. However, contrasting with Mozambique, 
for example, where more than 90% of all HIV/AIDS financing comes from 
international sources, in South Africa only 40% of HIV/AIDS funds are from 
donors.186 This allows the government to reduce the power of multilateral actors to 
influence the national response to the epidemic.
The institutional relationship between multilateral donors and the South 
African government is confined to the lower ranks of political authority without any 
further engagement by the top levels of decision-making. While in Botswana and 
Mozambique there seems to exist a more direct engagement between HASN leaders 
and the government’s highest authorities, in South Africa this relationship is 
intermediated by intricate layers of state bureaucracy at provincial and central levels. 
For example, Ian Ralph, Health Advisor for the European Commission in South 
Africa (EC), indicates that, although the EC delegation has been working in close 
collaboration with the DoH for quite a long time, it has no contacts at higher levels 
of decision-making. Ralph described the relationship between donors and the South 
African top decision-makers as “poor and occasional”. He mentioned that "we 
usually deal with middle-ranked bureaucrats in the DoH” (Interview 25.08.2004).
This lack of direct communication has undermined the speech-act practices 
of international HASN leaders in South Africa. Even when discursive interactions 
did take place, the clash between transnational and domestic understandings of
185 It is worth mentioning at this point that I will not go into detail on the way these foreign 
bureaucracies work and relate institutionally with the South African state agencies but rather that I will 
stress some important general trends o f  their relationship.
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HIV/AIDS appeared insurmountable. In 2002, in an attempt to persuade Mbeki that 
HIV was the cause of AIDS, Pieter Piot, the director of UNAIDS, was brought to 
Cape Town for a low-profile meeting with the South African president. After long 
hours of discussion, the outcome was thoroughly unsuccessful with Mbeki firmly 
defending his unorthodox views on the epidemic (The Economist 12.12.2002). Despite 
the anecdotal character of this particular event, it is an interesting empirical snapshot 
on the conflictive dynamics of discursive persuasion that characterise the South African 
process of HASN incorporation.
After 1999, the HIV/AIDS policy environment became so politicised in 
South Africa that relations with UNAIDS became permanently strained. Essentially, 
the divergence between the government and this multilateral body is a function of 
their different definitions of the policy problem of HIV/AIDS. In contrast to the 
South African government’s developmental and long-term approach, the multilateral agency 
focuses on ameliorating the impact of HIV/AIDS in terms of an emergencial national 
crisis. These competing actions, interests and ideas can be translated in terms of, on 
one hand, international securitising actors attempting to respond with urgent measures to 
placate the urgent threat posed by the epidemic, and, on the other, domestic 
politicising actors who stress the structural and long-term social-economic problems 
that fuelled the spread of the vims.
Given domestic resistance by the government of South Africa, the most 
effective mechanisms by which EL4SN norm leaders have managed to introduce its 
principles into the South African domestic structure has been by linking up with 
domestic (like-minded) actors, such as some provincial governments, opposition
186 The South African government has significantly increased H IV /A ID S funding since 2000. The 
donors share o f  the total H IV/AIDS spending in South Africa dropped from 44% in 2000 to 40% in 
2002 (Ndlovu, 2005:7).
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members and ANC discontents in the national parliament, and by using the judicial 
system via local NGOs, as in the case o f TAC.
5.2. The Bilateral Approach: The United States Involvement in South Africa
The United States is an important development partner of the South 
African government. From the early years of democratic rule, the US government, 
mostly through the work of USAID and the US’ CDC, has helped the consecutive 
ANC administrations to develop primary health care structures in the poorest zones 
of the country.187 From 2000, at the outset of the global securitisation of HIV/AIDS, 
Clinton’s Global Initiative on AIDS injected considerable funds into South Africa’s 
fight against the epidemic. The US is currently the largest bilateral donor to South 
Africa’s health sector. In 2004 alone, already under Bush’s PEPFAR, it provided a 
total of US$ 100 million in financial support, the majority of this being for activities 
related to HIV/AIDS prevention, care and treatment (US Department of State, 
2005:99).188
However, notwithstanding the substantial involvement of the US in 
supporting South Africa’s national response to HIV/AIDS, the bilateral relations 
between the ANC and the US government in this particular area has been marked by 
growing dissent. One key area of dispute has been the pressure of pharmaceutical 
manufacturers, backed by the US government, to repeal a South African law enacted 
in 1997 that enables the government to import and produce generic substitutes of
187 For example, since 1997, USAID has been supporting the provincial government o f Eastern Cape, 
one o f  South Africa’s poorest provinces, to provide primary health care services in 689 clinics, 
covering over 6.4 million people (USAID, 2005:3).
188 In addition to the US, other major donors include the European Union, the UK, Belgium, 
Netherlands, Australia, France, Sweden and Germany (Interview Ralph 25.08.2004).
247
patented drugs (Bond, 1999). The two consecutive ANC governments have pursued 
a policy of slashing the costs of branded drugs by pushing for the local production of 
cheaper generics. This move boosted South Africa’s drug industry and it is currendy 
the largest in Africa. It also led to clashes between national government priorities and 
the economic interests of foreign pharmaceutical companies.
In 1998, the Pharmaceutical Manufacturer’s Association (PMA) sued the 
South African government over the new legislation (Mail <& Guardian 14.04.2004). 
The trial dragged on for three years when, finally, in 2001, after intense international 
and domestic lobbying, the PMA dropped the lawsuit. Meanwhile, acting on behalf 
of the pharmaceutical industry, the US government strongly resisted attempts by the 
South African diplomacy to defend the legality of South Africa’s position at the 
World Trade Organization (WTO) (Bond, 1999).189 Moreover, since the inception of 
PEPFAR in South Africa, USAID has insisted that the South African government 
should use the financial assistance of the US government to purchase branded ARVs 
from US-based pharmaceutical companies instead of using the money to buy cheaper 
generics elsewhere. This move was interpreted by individuals in both civil society and 
public sectors as skilful political (and financial) manoeuvring by which the US 
government would guarantee that aid money is eventually redirected into the 
American economy. At the same time, PEPFAR’s investment in AIDS treatment 
would also build a (rather opportune) positive international image of the US as a 
nation which cares and acts on the plight of HIV/AIDS in Africa (Interview Caesar 
08.07.2004; Interview Magongo 20.07.2004; Interview Nukeri 23.07.2004).
189 South Africa argued that the Medicines Act o f  1997 falls under Article 8 o f  the W TO’s Trade- 
Related Aspects o f  Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS), which allows for compulsory licensing in 
situations o f  health emergency (Halbert and May, 2005:195).
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In December 2004, the ANC’s online journal published a harsh attack on 
US government health officials, accusing them of “treating Africans like “guinea 
pigs” to promote AIDS drugs” (ANC, 2004). The controversy surrounded the drug 
Nevirapine. The article refers to violations of patient safeguards in a trial conducted 
in Uganda. The article claimed that Dr. Edmund Tramont, chief of the US National 
Institutes of Health (NIH), who was in charge of the project in Uganda, “ [...] entered 
into a conspiracy with a pharmaceutical company to tell lies to promote the sales of 
Nevirapine in Africa, with absolutely no consideration of the health impact of those 
lies on the lives of millions of Africans” (ANC, 2004). It also affirmed that “upon 
learning of the potential lethal side effects of Nevirapine, President Bush and his 
administration did nothing to stop the shipment and usage of the drug in Africa. 
They must be held accountable for their inaction” (ANC, 2004).
The efforts of the US (and other European states) to protect the interests 
of the pharmaceutical industry have been perceived by some powerful individuals 
within the ANC leadership as an “imperialist plot” against millions of Africans in 
need of essential drugs (Interview Ralph 25.08.2004; Interview Magongo 20.07.2004). 
In the imaginary of key decision-makers in the government, the US political backing 
of profit-oriented pharmaceutical corporations resembles the colonial system of 
imperial Britain whereby state power cleared the way for (and benefited from) the 
exploitative activities of big private capital (Interview Ralph 25.08.2004). 
Furthermore, during Apartheid, some views within ANC political ranks implied a 
direct link between biological weapons research programmes in the United States 
and its NATO allies and the spread of HIV/AIDS (Mzala, 1988). This also helped to 
lay the foundation for ANC’s later suspicion about the real intentions of the US 
government with regards to its HIV/AIDS policies in Africa (Youde, 1995:8).
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In this sense, the local production of generic versions of AIDS drugs 
symbolises a genuine African reaction to the hegemony of (white) Western capitalism 
and science by transferring essential medical technology to the hands of black 
people. An interesting point in this regard is that, whereas in Mozambique the 
government’s contestation of the US’ interference in the procurement of AIDS drugs 
was more strongly based on technical concerns about implementation costs and the 
overlapping of different drug regimens, in the case of South Africa, the ANC 
administration framed its disapproval in terms of an upfront accusation of economic 
(neo-colonial) exploitation of the African people. This illustrates how similar external 
securitisation moves by HASN leaders, in this case concerning PEPFAR’s policies 
for AIDS treatment, are reconstructed domestically to fit with particular normative 
ideas, worldviews and practices.
In line with its broader HIV/AIDS securitisation strategy, as unleashed by 
Bush’s PEPFAR in 2003, the US government put in place its own system of aid 
provision in South Africa. All HIV/AIDS activities of the US have been integrated 
into PEPFAR under the exclusive management of USAID/CDC and the US 
Embassy in Pretoria. Approval of funds for the implementation of plans are 
subjected to the US Global Aids Coordinator at the State Department in Washington 
and PEPFAR’s projects are run by the US Ambassador in Pretoria (US Department 
of State, 2005). As in the cases of Botswana and Mozambique, US representatives in 
South Africa avoided firmly engaging with the pre-existing multilateral mechanisms 
that were in place to coordinate the work of international partners. It deals bilaterally 
with more than 200 partners in the public, private and non-profit sectors (US 
Department of State, 2005).
In contrast to the other case studies, the US has very few entry points in 
the South African national structure of policy decision-making. Given South Africa’s
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quite explosive HIV/AIDS policy environment, the President and his Cabinet 
Members (namely the Minister of Health) have constantly tried to shield themselves 
from interference by external and domestic actors perceived as hostile to the 
government’s views. Similarly to the above mentioned multilateral institutions, US 
representatives only meet with middle-ranked officials in individual Ministries and at 
SANAC to assess their particular needs concerning the overall national response 
(Interview Balfour 23.08.2004). This system actually favours PEPFAR’s broad 
strategy of bypassing national coordinating structures to more rapidly mobilise 
groups and address problems at the grassroots levels. The Minister of Health has 
insisted that PEPFAR should be more closely integrated into government systems 
for external funding. She claimed that South Africa “had not asked for PEPFAR’s 
assistance” and that the Ministry’s coordination efforts to strengthen the country’s 
response to HIV/AIDS should not be jeopardised by duplication and the sometimes 
unaccountable initiatives of international partners (Aidsmap 23.06.2006).
Besides its participation at the national level, PEPFAR also negotiates the 
application of earmarked funds on local programmes directly with provincial 
executives (Interview Caesar 20.08.2004). The South African Constitution of 1996 
adopted a federal system of government with extensive autonomy at the provincial 
level. According to the Constitution, provinces may have executive and legislative 
powers coexisting with the national sphere over a number o f issues, including health 
policies (Dikeni, 2002). Crewe argued that, with regard to HIV/AIDS, this “jumble 
of authorities” led to the central government and nine provincial governments 
having ten different policies in cmcial areas (Crewe, 2000:29). In her words, “what 
this has meant is that much energy has been spent in feuding and in arguments over 
ownership, policy, and programmes, rather than in looking for a shared vision on 
policy and programme developments” (2000:29).
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In this kind of decentralised political system, the extent of (direct or 
indirect) international influence at the provincial level of decision-making is 
dependent on the political/ideological stance taken by the local administration vis-a- 
vis the central government’s policy positions. For example, the former Premier of 
Western Cape province, Peter Marais, was noted for his independent policies 
towards HIV/AIDS. In February 2002, he struck a deal with the producer of 
Nevirapine, Boehringer-Ingelheim, in which the pharmaceutical company accepted 
to provide the drug free of charge for a period of five years (Mail &  Guardian
19.09.2002).190 Marais’ opposition party, the Democratic Alliance, has been a strident 
critic of the national government’s unconventional views on HIV/AIDS and its 
delay in implementing a national plan to deliver ARVs.191 On the other hand, during 
the same period Mpumalanga province did not demonstrate any effective progress 
on the universal roll-out of Nevirapine. The provincial ANC administration is a well- 
known supporter of the national government’s dissident position (Mail &  Guardian
19.09.2002).
Since 2003, the US government - through its CDC representation in South 
Africa - has advocated the introduction of routine or “opt-out” HIV testing in the 
public health system. However, despite the growing support for the opt-out system 
among many HIV/AIDS stakeholders (including the HIV campaigner and South 
African Supreme Court of Appeals Judge, Edwin Cameron) voluntary counselling 
and testing (VCT) remains the standard procedure in the country (Aidsmap 
24.05.2006). As already noted in a previous chapter, Botswana was the first country
190 Since then, the Western Cape administration has shown an impressive record with all HIV-positive 
pregnant women having access to Nevirapine by March 2003 (DoH and Provincial Government o f  
Western Cape, 2004).
191 After the general elections o f  2004, the Democratic Alliance lost control o f  Western Cape province 
to the ANC-led government.
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in Africa to introduce this new (and more aggressive) approach to HIV testing in 
2004, after considerable domestic lobbying from the US/CDC. Contrary to 
Botswana, domestic resistance to routine testing in South Africa was mostly due to 
the construction of a particular post-Apartheid political culture with a very strong 
emphasis on individual human rights. The elaboration of South Africa’s first 
National HIV/AIDS Plan, in the early 90s, took place at a time when the South 
African National Bill of Rights was also being drawn up and discussions on human 
rights issues were at their peak (Schneider, 1998a:5). The protection of the human 
rights of people testing positive for HIV has been a key element of South Africa’s 
response to the epidemic.192
With regard to HIV prevention policies, PEPFAR’s “ABC” approach has 
also faced important challenges in South Africa. In a country with one of the highest 
rates of rape in the world, sexual coercion is cited by local NGOs as creating huge 
barriers to abstinence for girls and women (Interview Nukeri 23.07.2004). In fact, 
except for a (significant) number of Christian groups financed by the US 
government, the majority of civil society groups and government agencies dealing 
with HIV/AIDS in South Africa accept the more pragmatic view of multilateral 
agencies. Despite the financial incentives offered by PEPFAR, most of these secular 
groups reject (or at least moderate) the US administration’s moralistic approach to 
HIV prevention, instead concentrating on awareness campaigns and on the 
distribution of condoms (Interview Nukeri 23.07.2004).
In spite of the aggressive securitisation move by the US government in 
South Africa, the ideological bias of Mbeki’s administration made changes of
192 The Constitution o f  South Africa protects the rights o f  people living with H IV/AIDS. The Bill o f  
Rights made any discriminatory action against them illegal.
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direction in the South African government’s HIV/AIDS policies very difficult. 
Rather, the general (mis) representation of the US government as a new form of 
colonial/imperial/interventionist power led to a certain degree of suspicion (even 
hostility) towards PEPFAR’s HIV/AIDS initiatives in the country. In other words, 
the road maps (Goldstein and Keohane, 1993) within which key South African leaders 
operate served as very powerful filters (or stumbling blocks) to the policy ideas of the 
US securitisation front.
5.3. The Transnational Community of HASN Seeking Domestic Legitimacy: 
The Role of Civil Society HIV/AIDS Organisations
From the very beginning, and as the HIV/AIDS National Plan put clearly, 
any effective policy initiative to tackle HIV/AIDS would require full and co­
coordinated action between the state agencies and civil society organisations involved 
with the epidemic. The NACOSA plan, adopted by the South African government in 
1994, was the first formal institutional arrangement put in place to include society- 
based organisations working specifically with HIV/AIDS, in the state-led effort to 
combat the epidemic (Marais, 2000:31).
Prior to assuming the government of South Africa, the ANC worked 
closely with the first NGOs that appeared in South Africa to deal with the 
HIV/ AIDS epidemic. The most influential of these were the AIDS Consortium, the 
AIDS Law Project, the National Progressive Primary Health Care Network 
(NPPHCN), and the National Association of People Living with AIDS (NAPWA). 
These organisations led the way during this first period of the response to the 
epidemic. In cooperation with the ANC, they launched many successful initiatives 
such as the Charter on HIV/AIDS and Human Rights (1992), later endorsed by the
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first ANC administration, and a Code of Good Conduct on HIV/AIDS in the 
Workplace. The latter was turned into government policy during Mandela’s 
presidency (Heywood, 2004:2).
By the end of the 90s, NGO involvement in HIV/AIDS policymaking had 
begun to decline significantly. The reasons for this deterioration in the exchanges 
between state and non-state actors were varied and complex and it is not the aim 
here to discuss them in detail. It is suffice to say that, after 1994, many former civil 
society activists either moved into government or forged formal alliances with it. 
More importantly, the growing authoritarian tendencies of the South African 
government, following the election of Mbeki, led to a very low tolerance of policy 
positions contrary to those of the government (Johnson, 2002:222). Even within the 
government, decisions on AIDS policy were made at the political level away from 
bureaucrats and top civil servants (Johnson, 2004:121).
The clash between civil society and the South African government came to 
the fore in 1996/1997 in two separate episodes. The first was Sarafina 2, a highly 
controversial musical intended to promote awareness among youth. The merit of the 
musical’s content was questioned by newspapers and NGOs and some doubts were 
raised about the proper use of the national DoH’s budget in sponsoring the project. 
The second was the visibility given by the government to a group of researchers who 
claimed to have developed an AIDS vaccine, called Virodene. It was later found that 
the vaccine in case was in fact an industrial solvent. A number of NGOs as well as 
the MCC accused the government and the researches o f serious misconduct (Marais, 
2000).
In South Africa, there are around 650 NGOs focusing on HIV/AIDS 
related issues (I do not include here other civil society and economic groups either 
affected or with an interest in the epidemic, such as trade unions and private
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companies). Due to their proactive role as the government’s watchdogs as well as 
major securitising actors with regard to the politics of HIV/AIDS in South Africa, this 
thesis concentrates on the analysis of organisations concerned with lobbying and 
advocacy and with ensuring that people living with HIV/AIDS have their rights 
protected and that the government upholds its constitutional obligations in providing 
health care and social assistance to them. Three organisations were identified as 
notably influential in fighting for the rights of people living with HIV/AIDS and as 
an alternative voice outside the government's spheres of decision-making, namely 
NAPWA, The AIDS Consortium (which is basically an “umbrella” agency with a 
membership of more than 100 smaller organisations), The AIDS Law Project, and its 
further corollary, TAC. Given its domestic leadership and international salience, the 
remainder of this section concentrates on the role played by TAC as a powerful 
source of HASN diffusion within South African society.
Officially created on 10 December 1998, TAC was the result of an 
increasingly domestic and international acknowledgement, in the late 90s, of the 
importance of ARVs treatment to scale down the impact of HIV/AIDS worldwide. 
It is a powerful lobbying organisation, pressuring the South African government, as 
well as pharmaceutical corporations, to provide free treatment (or at least drugs with 
a significantly reduced price) to all people in need of them. As declared on its web 
page: “Its main objective is to campaign for greater access to HIV treatment for all 
South Africans, by raising public awareness and understanding about issues 
surrounding the availability, affordability and use of HIV treatments”.193 Through its 
mobilisation campaigns and judicial actions, TAC has been able to instrumentally use 
th,e international normative framework of HASN to change the political landscape of
193 Available at http://www.tac.org.za/ (accessed on 30.03.2003).
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HIV/AIDS interventions in South Africa. To do so, TAC firmly embraced 
international discourses of human rights/security as the driving force to gather 
national and international support for its cause.
Domestically, TAC built its legitimacy through the use of a discursive tool 
that combines the international representation of the epidemic, as a security and 
human rights issue, with domestic and deep-rooted images of the anti-Apartheid 
struggle. This is clear in the use of traditional anti-Apartheid human rights slogans 
on its national campaigns, such as, for example, the “Defiance Campaign” and the 
“Civil Disobedience Campaign”. While constructing the movement’s domestic 
legitimacy and support, TAC redefined some constitutive principles of HASN to fit 
into pre-existing domestic beliefs and practices. As Acharya puts it, “while the 
initiative to spread transnational norms can be undertaken either by local or foreign 
entrepreneurs, diffusion strategies that accommodate local sensitivity are more likely 
to succeed than those who seek to supplant the latter” (2004:249).
In this respect, it is interesting to note that TAC confronted the 
government of South Africa, and its inaction towards the supposed security threat 
posed by the HIV/AIDS epidemic, using similar persuasion strategies to those 
deployed by the liberation movement during the Apartheid period.194 Back then, 
transnational actors worked in unison with opposition groups in South Africa as well 
as in exile to exert pressure on the Apartheid State (Black, 1999). Their language and 
proposed action were based on the international norm of racial equality, within a 
broadening human rights perspective, that was then applied to the particular context 
of South Africa’s Apartheid (Klotz, 1995:44). The outcome of these tactics was the
194 The irony now is that the target o f  these campaigns, the ANC government, is the very same 
organisation which was at the forefront o f the struggle against the Apartheid regime.
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construction of a complex multi-levelled capacity to enable action and promote 
domestic change.
Similarly, TAC also built a multi-faceted capacity through linking up with 
state and non-state actors in different levels of political/social interactions. At the 
international level, TAC interacts at global AIDS conferences and other high profile 
multilateral meetings with international organisations and other transnational NGOs 
with similar interests and ideas. At the domestic level, it shares information, 
mobilises its mass base and liaises with other activist organisations of PLWHA. In 
pressuring the government, it also uses the formal political and judicial channels 
available in South Africa. TAC’s campaigns have drawn strongly upon a human 
rights discourse with the international support of important HASN leaders, such as 
UNAIDS. The language used differs slightly from the more straightforward state 
security approach of other securitising actors, namely the US. In this sense, TAC has 
strategically constructed a speech-act (or securitisation claim) that appeals to the long­
term sensitivities of South Africa’s society.
In the late 90’s, TAC intensively participated in transnational advocacy 
networks, which succeeded in influencing domestic change in South Africa. It also 
influenced the pre-existing belief among donors, other governments and the UN 
system itself, that therapy with ARVs was too complex for health systems in the 
Third World and that prevention campaigns were more cost-effective than treatment 
(Heywood, 2004). These international actors, after being resocialised with new ideas 
about the proper responses to the epidemic, then began pressuring governments, 
including the government of South Africa, to apply national HIV/AIDS plans that 
emphasise the importance of the provision of treatment to people suffering with 
AIDS.
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In contrast to the cases of Mozambique and Botswana, in South Africa the 
government strongly resisted domestic and international pressure to change its 
HIV/AIDS policies. An illustrative example of this fact is that only after TAC took 
legal action against the government was a comprehensive plan for the roll-out of 
drugs put in place in the country. From 1999 onwards, the government o f Mbeki 
began to use ideological discursive strategies to undermine TAC's legitimacy. 
Concerning the provision of Nevirapine, for example, the government has accused 
TAC of representing the interests of the pharmaceutical corporations instead of the 
South African people.195
Whether one introduces the ideological factor into the picture, Mbeki’s 
motivations become more evident. The denialist position taken by many ANC 
leaders, including President Mbeki himself, and its discursive linkages with post­
colonial white domination in South Africa lie beneath most of his support to 
“African bom” initiatives to combat the disease, as the Virodene fiasco has shown. 
Following this line of reasoning, TAC emphasis on the efficacy and urgent need for 
Western chugs and therapies would further aggravate the African dependency on 
powerful and inconsiderate capitalist interests, mainly with regard to the 
pharmaceutical industry. Along those lines Heywood asserts that,
Mbeki clothed the ‘scientific’ views of the denialists in a political analysis of neo­
colonialism, disease, and economy [...] Pharmaceutical companies that manufacture 
antiretroviral drugs were deemed to be part of a capitalist conspiracy to undermine 
the ANC government [...] It was hinted that HIV might even be an imaginary 
epidemic invented by pharmaceutical companies and neo-colonialists to make profits 
and to continue to dent Africa’s view of itself [...] Based on these contentions, it did 
not require a great leap in logic to depict treatment activists and mainstream
195 Mark Heywood asserts that, “in September 2000 it is alleged that Mbeki told the ANC  
parliamentary caucus that TAC was a front for drug companies, and had successfully ‘infiltrated’ the 
trade union movement” (Heywood, 2004:9).
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scientists as agents of an ‘omnipotent apparatus’ (imperialism or the pharmaceutical 
companies) (Heywood, 2004:9/10).
While analysing the above statement, it becomes evident that at the core of 
the confrontation between TAC and the South African government is the ideological 
and racial bias of the latter that masks the real policy problem, namely the high costs 
of branded AIDS drugs. However, there seems to exist a common ground between 
TAC and the government when it comes to the role played by big pharmaceutical 
companies in South Africa. For example, Zachie Achmed, TAC’s Chairperson, 
asserted that, “ [...] we’ve challenged the giants Pfizer, Glaxo SmithKline, Bristol 
Meyer Squibb, Abbot, and Roche. We will never forget that millions of people have 
died and will continue to die because they profiteer from medicines. They have blood 
on their hands [...]” (Achmed, 2001:4). In effect, TAC eagerly supported Mbeki’s 
administration in the court case brought by the PMA against the government.
The difference, nonetheless, lies in their use of distinct understandings and 
discursive strategies. TAC identifies the pharmaceutical corporations with Western 
capitalist interests and pragmatically stresses the need for alternatives to the 
dependency on the drugs they produce, whereas the government uses the ideological 
language of white dominance and neo-colonialism to describe the role played by 
them. It shows how different interpretations /perceptions of the same problem can 
limit rationality, produce confusion and conflict, and undermine the common goal of 
combating the epidemic. Given this political (and interpretative) deadlock, TAC has 
challenged (norm-violating) South Africa by participating in a transnational structure 
that simultaneously pressures the government from both inside and outside.
As already noted, Keck and Sikkink (1998) gave the name “the boomerang 
effect” to the process by which NGOs bypass intransigent national governments, 
directly approaching the international community. Risse and Sikkink (1999) built
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upon this concept to further develop a five-phased “spiral model” of domestic norm 
socialisation. According to them, successive boomerang throws by domestic opposition 
groups will lead to gradual domestic change, going through the stages of 1) 
repression, 2) denial, 3) tactical concessions, 4) prescripitive status and, finally, 5) 
rule-consistent behaviour.
Despite significant problems with this theoretical framework (which I 
briefly expose in this thesis’ conclusions), it helps in understanding the effects that 
TAC’s securitisation strategies had on the behaviour of the South African 
government. In this respect, one could say that Mbeki’s administration has already 
moved from the denial stage of the spiral model to that of tactical concessions to the 
demands of norm leaders. At this stage, “the norm-violating state seeks cosmetic 
changes to pacify international criticism” (Risse and Sikkink, 1999:25). 
Notwithstanding the South African government’s aggressive stance towards TAC, 
the transnational mobilisation led by the latter had a clear impact on the change of 
tone in the language of decision-makers in Pretoria. In 2003, for example, the 
supposed divorce between Mbeki and the denialist position led Bill Clinton to state 
that the South African president was “no longer in denial” (Aidsmap 12.04.2005).
However, the phase of tactical concessions is a very precarious one, “since 
it might move the process forward toward enduring change [...] but it can also result 
in a backlash” (Risse and Sikkink, 1999:25). In fact, the persistent acrimonious 
relationship between the government of South Africa and the international 
community of HASN leaders indicates that there is still a long way to go before 
Pretoria accepts the validity claims of the norm and engages more positively with the 
prescriptive/normative agenda of the domestic opposition led by TAC.
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6. Conclusions
HIV/AIDS is an epidemic fuelled by many factors that are common to 
most African nations, such as poverty, social/racial exclusion, gender imbalances and 
underdevelopment. However, these are not the only causes behind the fast and 
unchecked pace by which the virus progressed in South Africa. Despite its persistent 
and long-term social problems, post-Apartheid South African governments have 
developed fairly efficient social infrastructures when compared with the majority of 
states on the continent. Moreover, South Africa is today an economic and political 
power in the region with a dynamic economy and stable democracy. Why is it then 
that states with much less socioeconomic development have had more success than 
South Africa in the fight against HIV/AIDS?196 In the words of Walker, Reid and 
Cornell, “the spread of the disease is also influenced by personal choices, political 
responses and cultural factors” (2004:19).
Regarding the dynamics of HIV/AIDS in South Africa, this chapter 
attempted to unveil those personal choices,- political responses, and cultural factors 
surrounding the national response to the epidemic. It identified four main 
characteristics of South Africa’s domestic context that made a strong impact on the 
way HIV/AIDS initiatives were formulated and conducted by the government. 
These were: 1) a highly racialised and unequal socioeconomic environment, inherited 
from the white minority system of racial segregation, which paved the way for the 
rapid spread of the virus throughout the country; 2) the cultural/social legacies of the 
Apartheid regime that are still present in the way people interpret and react to the
196 Uganda and Senegal are examples o f  relatively poor countries which developed effective 
H IV /A ID S policies.
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epidemic; 3) the influence of those legacies upon the mindsets of key decision­
makers, such as the President himself, creating dubious directions, lack of 
coordination with civil society actors, inter-bureaucratic disputes about policy 
priorities and poor leadership from the South African government; and, 4) a vigorous 
sense of black nationalism and the identification of the international donors, 
pharmaceutical companies and Western governments with exploitative economic and 
political neo-colonial interests .
The chapter also illustrated how those particular features of South Africa’s 
domestic structure conditioned the entry of HASN into the country. It was shown 
that, in the South African case, the capacity of domestic and international securitising 
actors (or policy entrepreneur,s) to influence the ideas and preferences of key decision­
makers in the government proved to be limited. For example, it was demonstrated 
that it was only through the use of the national legal system that TAC managed to 
advance its demands for the countrywide provision of the HIV/AIDS drug 
nevirapine to prevent mother-to-child transmission. Given the rather intractable 
HIV/AIDS policy environment in South Africa, TAC also explored the transnational 
arena to exert pressure on the South African government by directly communicating 
with the international community. This was exemplified by its fierce lobbying at 
Global AIDS Conferences and at the UN General Assembly’s Special Meetings on 
HIV/AIDS.
On the international side, UNAIDS’ framework of concerted action “The 
Three Ones” and the UN’s Declaration of Commitment on HIV/AIDS (UNGASS), 
even though agreed upon by the South African government, lacked personal 
engagement and concrete actions. Some of the activities of the US’ PEPFAR 
programme in South Africa were also hampered by the government’s suspicion of
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pharmaceutical corporations and their political and economic connections with the 
US government.
Although the cascading of H A SN  has not yet occurred within South Africa, 
there are clear signs that the engagement of the international and domestic 
community of HASN leaders has triggered some normative change in the country. 
For example, on 18 February 2005, fifteen months after the official launching of the 
South African government’s ARVs programme, Tshabalala-Msimang announced that 
the Department of Health had finalised negotiations with drug companies to supply 
ARVs to public hospitals. This represented significant progress given the very slow 
pace of the drug procurement process. Only two days before the announcement, 
TAC organised a march on Parliament to demand the wider availability of ARVs in 
the public health system (Aidsmap 22.02.2005).
The government’s adoption of the international norm recommending 
universal access to AIDS treatment points to an incipient depersonalisation of norm 
compliance in South Africa, resulting in the domestic institutionalisation of this 
particular norm independently from the individual beliefs or moral conscience of 
leaders in the government (Hall and Taylor, 1996). Whether this process will 
eventually lead to the further cascading of HASN in South Africa is still uncertain. In 
fact, as shown by the Health Minister’s confrontational stance in international 
HIV/AIDS conferences and in her dealings with TAC, the South African 
government remains very active in its attempt to block the entry of HASN to the 
country.
264
Chapter 7
The Impact of HASN in Botswana, Mozambique and South Africa: 
Conclusions
1. Introduction
In June 2006, the delegates of the UN General Assembly gathered in New 
York to review the progress made by the UN member states in adopting the 2001 
UNGASS Declaration of Commitment on HIV/AIDS as well as to renew their 
political commitments urged in the Declaration. As already shown, after the first 
UNGASS meeting of 2001, a significant mass of states (Finnemore and Sikkink, 1998) 
agreed upon a comprehensive set of principles, conventions and policies to deal with 
the security threat posed by the epidemic. Similarly, the global mobilisation against 
HIV/AIDS, that firmly started in the mid 90s, has led to the creation of a specific 
international HIV/AIDS organisation, namely UNAIDS, multilateral and bilateral 
sources of funding to HIV/AIDS initiatives (such as the Global Fund, the World 
Bank’s MAP, and the US’ PEPFAR), as well as an extensive network of transnational 
HIV/AIDS NGOs.
As a result of these transnational processes, this thesis has argued that the 
securitisation of HIV/AIDS has increasingly become part of the collective 
understandings informing a global community of HIV/AIDS actors. These collective 
understandings about the epidemic and their further translation into policy principles 
were cast here under a single analytical concept, the H IV / A ID S securitisation norm 
(HASN). However, the present work has shown that the definition of the normative 
and policy frameworks of HASN by key international norm leaders was markedly
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antagonistic. Despite sharing the same claim for the securitisation of the epidemic, 
internal divisions concerning the proper means to achieve it put global securitising 
actors in two separate (opposing) camps led by the US government and UNAIDS 
respectively. As noted in chapter 2, notwithstanding those disagreements, the 
normative robustness of HASN increased gradually over time.197
Following an initial definition of HASN’s conceptual basis, the description 
of the historical (and rather divisive) process by which it became firmly embodied in 
the international security agenda and the examination of its main 
international/transnational proponents, the study then treated HASN as a constant, or 
a given element of the analysis rather than a variable. In this respect, the argument 
put forward here assumed that states highly affected by the HIV/AIDS epidemic 
were subjected to the same (or at least very similar) external pressures to securitise 
HIV/AIDS. However, the global HIV/AIDS polity and the securitisation norms they 
supported have had a variable impact on the domestic structure and in the daily 
practices of national governments. Given that, the study investigated the different 
processes and outcomes resulting from the penetration of transnational H IV /[AIDS 
securitisation norms into the domestic political arena of three states in Southern Africa: 
Botswana, Mozambique and South Africa.
In this conclusive chapter, I evaluate the findings of the three empirical 
cases in light of the research questions and theoretical propositions presented in 
chapters 1 and 2. These questions refer to 1) the similarities and differences in the 
effects of international HIV/AIDS norms on the conduct of Botswana, 
Mozambique and South Africa; 2) the policy outcomes resulting from the interaction
197 Despite the attention given here to the actual empirical identification o f  HASN, it was a 
methodological choice o f  the present study to concentrate the analysis only on variations in the 
process o f  its domestic incorporation. For an alternative theoretical view, which emphasises 
international norm robustness as a precondition for its domestic effectiveness, see Checkel (1997).
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between international HASN leaders and their domestic audiences in those three 
Southern African States and; 3) the extent to which H IV )A ID S securitisation attempts 
have been more successful in one domestic setting than in another. The chapter 
begins by briefly summarising the evidence found in the three case studies. It then 
proceeds to show how this thesis’ findings could contribute to the proposed merge 
between the constructivist literature on international norms and the securitisation 
framework. Finally, the work concludes with some final observations m ainly  
regarding potential avenues for future research.
2. Summarising the Evidence Regarding the Three Case Studies
Botswana: The case of Successful Securitisation
Botswana is the case of a well-established developmental state in Southern Africa. It 
presents a top-down corporativist system of state-society relations which have 
impaired the formation of an autonomous and outspoken civil society sector. Since 
independence from Britain, in 1966, consecutive BDP governments have gradually 
built robust state institutions and an efficient system for the delivery of social 
services. Due to Botswana’s smooth transition from colonial rule, which helped to 
create a political culture friendly to Western ideas, HASN securitising actors 
encountered a receptive political environment for the promotion of norms. Similarly, 
the (unusual by Southern African standards) ethnic and linguistic homogeneity of 
Botswana’s society created the right conditions for the establishment of a strong 
national identity and the wide recognition of the BDP state as the legitimate 
representative of the interests of the Botswanan people.
Due to Botswana’s centralised system of decision-making and a highly state- 
dependent civil society sector, the national executive, in particular the president
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himself, was a key target of international and domestic promoters of HASN. In fact, 
the tipping point after which the domestic cascading of the norm occurs was only 
reached in Botswana after Mogae became fully engaged in promoting the 
securitisation of the epidemic. Given his proximity to values and concepts which 
were originated in the Western liberal community as well as the lessons learnt from 
Botswana’s peaceful colonial past, Mogae’s pre-existing cognitive frames easily 
adapted to the securitisation claims of international HASN leaders. In this sense, 
President Mogae’s early conversion into a strong securitising actor led to the domestic 
salience of HASN and its consequent cascading throughout Botswana’s domestic 
system.
As a result, Botswana can be seen as a success stoiy for international attempts 
to securitise HIV/AIDS in states with extremely high HIV/AIDS prevalence rates. 
This means that within Botswana’s domestic system HASN has acquired “a taken- 
for-granted quality and are no longer a matter of broad public debate” (Finnemore 
and Sikkink, 1998:895). Currently, HIV/AIDS is widely recognised by both the 
government and civil society as a real threat to the survival of Botswana as a viable 
nation. A clear sign of Botswana’s full engagement with HASN prescriptions, the 
Botswanan government has declared HIV/AIDS a national emergency and, in 2002, 
it launched the first comprehensive plan on the African continent to roll-out AIDS 
drugs.
Transnational HIV/AIDS actors, such as ICASO, for example, played a 
significant role in Botswana as conduits of HASN’s prescriptions from the 
international to the domestic levels. Through advocacy networking (Keck and Sikkink, 
1998) and strategic coordination with local organisations, these groups helped to 
domestically embed the HIV/AIDS principles and policies, which were agreed by 
the national government in multilateral forums of negotiation. With the support of
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the US, faith-based groups were also important securitising actors while instigating, at 
the grassroots level, the moral agenda of transnational Christian associations. 
However, due to Botswana’s state-dominated domestic system, with just a few entry 
points in the policy-making structures, the impact of transnational/domestic winning 
coalitions in changing the conduct of top decision-makers in the government was fairly 
limited when compared with the more influential role played by the US government’s 
agencies, powerful international donors and UNAIDS.
Notwithstanding Botswana’s positive engagement with HASN leaders, with 
clear results in terms of the domestic securitisation of the epidemic, the particular 
manner in which Mogae’s administration has been conducting the implementation of 
the norm’s prescriptions reveals a preference for the principles and policy ideas 
supported by the securitising front led by the US government. For example, unlike 
Mozambique and South Africa, which approved cheaper generic versions of many 
ARVs, Botswana adopted a national treatment plan based on the provision of 
expansive patented AIDS drugs. As shown in chapter 4, the public-private 
partnership between the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation, the US pharmaceutical 
giant, Merck, and the Botswanan government (named ACHAP) was behind the 
government’s decision to pursue a national treatment programme based on branded 
AIDS drugs.
Similarly, in 2003, Botswana became the first state in Africa to promote a 
bold paradigmatic change in its national response, while adopting routine HIV 
testing in all its public health facilities. This more unilateral form of monitoring the 
spread of HIV has been criticised by HIV/AIDS NGOs that are concerned with the 
human rights of PLWHA. As noted earlier, routine HIV testing is, in fact, a 
recommendation of the US CDC without the full backing of UNAIDS and other 
important transnational HIV/AIDS actors. Concerning HIV/AIDS prevention, after
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the partial failure of the government’s early strategy, which was in line with the 
W HO/UNAIDS programme of sexual education combined with the massive 
distribution of condoms, the US-sponsored “abstinence and faithfulness” (AB) plan 
gained prominence in a revamped strategy to halt the spread of HIV among 
Botswanan youngsters.
These examples suggest that the persuasion strategies of the US have been 
more effective in the Botswanan domestic context vis-a-vis the approach of 
UNAIDS and its transnational allies. In this respect, the long-term collaboration 
between the highly-regarded US CDC and Botswana’s Ministry of Health (through 
the BOTUSA project) played a fundamental role in building very strong institutional 
and knowledge-based bounds between the Botswanan and US governments in the 
area of public health. Additionally, the openness of the national government to 
negotiations with a wide range of international actors (free from the ideological 
constraints verified in South Africa) favoured the establishment of 
international/national partnerships such as ACHAP. Finally, the stability of 
Botswana’s economy and political system, allied to the proactive and norm-friendly 
stance taken by Mogae’s administration, attracted wealthy US donors, as in the case 
of the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation, which were willing to invest generous 
resources in supporting the government’s response to the epidemic.
Mozambique: The Case of Partially Successful Securitisation
Mozambique is the case of an institutionally weak state in Southern Africa. Its many 
years of civil war led to the destruction of the country’s social fabric as well as its 
economy and state institutions. The subsequent internationally-led process of state- 
building created a stable, yet superficially established system of democratic rule. 
Despite the formal handover of power after the 1994 elections, the Mozambican
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government is still today highly dependent on external (technical and financial) 
support to run the country effectively and to exert its sovereignty rights. The ruling 
elite, Frelimo, has traditionally used its privileged position as the highest (indigenous) 
authority in the country to engage in tactics of extraversion with international donors 
and other sources of development aid. This is also the case concerning HIV/AIDS 
securitising actors.
Therefore, in Mozambique the securitisation of HIV/AIDS did not reach 
the tipping point in which full normative change occurs. The adoption of HASN was 
mosdy circumscribed to the level of discourse without a clear commitment by the 
country’s political elites to the norm’s prescriptions. Given the Mozambican elites 
vulnerability to international pressures, they discursively engaged securitising actors 
and appeared to be convinced by their arguments. However, notwithstanding 
Mozambique’s full participation in all the multilateral agreements which claimed for 
the securitisation of HIV/AIDS, the government’s strong words were not translated 
into effective action. As shown in chapter 5, despite Frelimo’s formal declaration that 
HIV/AIDS represented a national emergency and the subsequent launch of a 
comprehensive national plan to fight the epidemic, HIV/AIDS activities are still 
today mosdy centralised in the capital city, Maputo. Conversely, in the rural areas 
controlled by Renamo, which are most affected by the epidemic, the population have 
poor access to basic health facilities and, in some places, the government is 
conspicuous by its absence. In many cases, the provision of HIV/AIDS care and 
prevention services in those areas is delegated to international actors such as 
international NGOs and faith-based organisations without the involvement of the 
Mozambican government.
The government of Frelimo lacks national ownership of HIV/AIDS 
policies. The initiatives of the public and civil society sectors in tackling the epidemic
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are completely dominated by the agendas of powerful state donors, multilateral 
organisations and international HIV/AIDS NGOs. Due to Mozambique’s poorly 
established indigenous NGO sector, transnational non-profit (both secular and 
religious) organisations play simultaneously the roles of domestic pressure groups 
and foreign development partners. Similarly, the CNCS, which is the HIV/AIDS 
state bureaucracy set up exclusively to deal with the security threat posed by 
HIV/AIDS, is heavily permeated by foreign individuals and institutions. In this 
regard, the UNAIDS-led GP plays a central role in policy deliberation and agenda 
setting. Given the long-term presence of the UN in the country, UNAIDS has been 
a very influential actor in Mozambique. The very close institutional (and personal) 
relationship established between Frelimo’s administration and the UN peace-building 
operation (ONUMOZ) consolidated the latter’s position as a hegemonic institution of 
truth (Foucault, 1980) within Mozambique’s structure of decision-making.198
The prominence of UNAIDS inside the Mozambican HIV/AIDS 
structures has somehow limited the US capacity to influence policy-making. 
Contrasting to Botswana, the US pressure for a semi-compulsory and more 
aggressive system of HIV testing in Mozambique was blocked by the firmly 
established model of precounselling and voluntary testing devised and promoted by 
UNAIDS and WHO. The financial incentives of PEPFAR have nonetheless had a 
significant impact on Frelimo’s policy orientations. This was demonstrated by the 
inclusion of a stronger emphasis on the (US-supported) “AB” prevention strategy in 
the government’s revised HIV/AIDS Plan for 2004-2009. With regard to 
HIV/AIDS treatment, the Mozambican government aligned closer with the
198 For more on the role o f UNAIDS as an institution of truth, see section 2 o f  chapter 3.
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UNAIDS camp to ensure that the securitisation machinery introduced by PEPFAR 
would not interfere in the pre-existing treatment plan based on generic AIDS drugs.
Despite being surrounded and permeated by powerful HASN leaders, 
Frelimo’s ruling elites managed to negotiate the terms of HASN incorporation in the 
country. As shown in the cases of ARV treatment and HIV prevention policies, the 
government rhetorically (and skilfully) manoeuvred between the normative and 
policy divide separating the US and UNAIDS, achieving clear gains while advancing 
its own policy preferences. One could argue, in this regard, that the many years of 
experience in dependency politics have served the interests of Mozambique’s governing 
party well while dealing with international sources of HASN diffusion. This 
interestingly illustrates how the so-called audiences of securitisation (or norm takers) can 
be proactive actors rather than passive recipients of norms (or of securitising moves). 
In fact, the Mozambican case clearly reveals the centrality of these norm-receiving actors 
in understanding either the success or failure of securitisation attempts.
Notwithstanding the partial failure of its cascading within Mozambique’s 
domestic structure, the introduction of HASN into the political discourse of Frelimo 
promoted substantial change in the government’s policy agenda. The fact that 
Frelimo’s leadership formally embraced the internationally-proposed securitisation of 
HIV/AIDS means that this norm has been legitimised in Mozambique’s domestic 
politics. According to Cortell and Davis, for example, in these situations “the 
domestic debate shifts from being concerned with whether the norm is legitimate to 
one concerning why it should not be consistently applicable” (Cortell and Davis, 
2000:77). Similarly, the establishment of the government’s special agencies, such as 
the CNCS, devoted to the formulation and implementation of policies consistent 
with the tenets of HASN, is also indicative of its growing (yet still incipient) salience 
in the country.
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South Africa: The Case of Failed Securitisation
South Africa is an exceptional case of (fairly) peaceful democratic transition to black 
majority rule after the country had been ruled by a racist white minority under the 
brutal regime of Apartheid. The new regime (referred to as the “Rainbow Nation”) 
was personified by the emblematic figure of ANC, Nelson Mandela, who became the 
first black president of the democratic state. Despite the fond allusion to a rainbow 
to describe the multiracial and inclusive character of post-Apartheid South Africa, 
the country is still deeply burdened by the legacies of .Apartheid. South African 
society is, in many respects, as distinct and segregated along racial lines as ever, which 
leads to increased state-society tensions. This was clearly exemplified by the ardent 
black nationalism of most ANC leaders. Concerning HIV/AIDS policies, these 
tensions became apparent in the racialisation of the epidemic by the country’s political 
leadership. President Mbeki took a controversial stance while firmly contesting 
Western scientific knowledge about the epidemic. His rationale is primarily 
ideological and should be situated in a wider refutation of Western (white) views of 
Africa.
The rape charges involving former deputy president, Jacob Zuma, who was 
also the first chair of the National HIV/AIDS Council, are emblematic of the cultural 
mismatch (Checkel, 1999) between local understandings about the epidemic and the 
mainstream (scientific) knowledge of international HASN leaders.199 Similarly, public 
support by the health minister, Manto Tshabalala-Msimang, for unconventional 
methods of HIV/AIDS treatment and prevention shows her disregard for widely
199 After being formally denounced by his alleged victim, Zuma apologised on national television for 
having unprotected sex with an HIV-positive woman. In May 2006, he was acquitted o f  the rape 
charges by Johannesburg’s High Court (M ail dr Guardian 01.09.2006).
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accepted Western (white) orthodoxies about how to combat the epidemic. In South 
Africa the internationally proposed securitisation of HIV/AIDS faced a domestic 
context permeated by strong racial divisions and a political leadership sceptical (even 
hostile) towards HASN entrepreneurs. The securitisation efforts of these actors 
failed to convince decision-makers in the government of the urgent threat posed by 
the epidemic.
Both UNAIDS and the US government have faced significant obstacles in 
attempting to penetrate South Africa’s structures of decision-making. UNAIDS has 
nonetheless had more visible progress in this regard. Despite fierce policy 
divergences, UNAIDS’ Theme Group has managed to gradually establish some 
multilateral channels to improve communication between the government and the 
international partners, such as the Donor Communication Forum (DCF). 
Nevertheless, these channels have been circumscribed to the lower levels of policy­
making without the engagement of the government’s top leadership. This lack of 
effective communication has clearly undermined the securitisation moves (or speech-act 
practices) of the international HASN leaders based in South Africa.
The widespread (mis) representation of the US government as a new form 
of colonial/imperial power led to a certain degree of suspicion (even hostility) 
towards PEPFAR’s HIV/AIDS initiatives in the country. The close links between 
Bush’s administration and the pharmaceutical industry (for example, PEPFAR’s 
Global Aids Coordinator, Randal Tobias, was a former chief executive officer (CEO) 
of the US pharmaceutical company Eli Lilly) were interpreted by ANC’s ruling elites 
as a capitalist plot against black Africans. As shown earlier, the US government’s 
backing of the Pharmaceutical Manufacturers Association (PMA) in the court case 
against the South African government also compromised bilateral relations in the 
area of HIV/AIDS policies.
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US recommendations concerning HIV prevention and testing have also 
faced persistent resistance within South Africa. Notwithstanding the engagement of a 
significant number of Christian organisations at grassroots levels, the “AB” strategy 
was supplanted by the more pragmatic view of UNAIDS and its partners. Since very 
early on in the national response, both government officials and HIV/AIDS NGOs 
realised that deep-rooted gender imbalances in South African society would create 
significant barriers to abstinence practices of women and girls. According to 
HIV/AIDS activists, in this type of male-dominated social environment, the use of 
condoms would be more easily negotiated between sexual partners (Interview Nukeri
23.07.2004).200 With regards to HIV testing, the US/CDC’s lobby for the 
introduction in South Africa of routine semi-compulsory testing has also been fairly 
ineffective given the ANC’s strong emphasis on the individual human rights of the 
South African citizens.
Transnational advocacy networks have been more successful than other 
securitising actors in promoting normative/policy change within South Africa’s 
domestic structure. HIV/AIDS NGOs, such as the Treatment Action Campaign 
(TAC), aligned their political agendas with those of their transnational counterparts 
with significant results in terms of forcing the South African government to reassess 
its policy options. In 2002, for example, TAC sued the government given its refusal 
to roll-out ARV treatment (even after the advent of cheaper generic drugs). Despite 
the Mbeki administration’s reluctance to accept the benefits of ARVs, the 
government was forced by the South African Constitutional Court to provide AIDS 
drugs through the public health system. Similarly, after 2002, Mbeki began to
200 However, given, the record-breaking cases o f sexual violence against women in South Africa, their 
power to negotiate the use o f  condoms is also problematic.
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distance himself from the views of the so-called denialists. This slight change in the 
confrontational language of South Africa’s leader was due to the intense 
transnational/domestic mobilisation led by TAC. Through a global campaign of 
shaming (Keck and Sikkink, 1998) and sustained criticism against Mbeki’s response to 
the epidemic, TAC managed to embarrass the government vis-a-vis the wider 
international community. However, the row involving the South African 
government, TAC and most of the international community of HASN leaders 
persisted, becoming even more virulent over the years.
3. Assessing Results and the Implications of Case Findings to Theory
In understanding processes of HIV/AIDS norm incorporation in the three 
Southern African states, this study proposed an association between postulates of the 
securitisation framework and the constructivist scholarship on international norms. 
In what follows, I further explore some contributions that the case studies brought 
to the theoretical refinement of this proposed merge.
One general empirical finding of this thesis with clear theoretical 
implications is that similar transnational/international pressures for the socialisation 
of international norms can have very dissimilar results in terms of domestic policy 
outcomes. In this respect, differences in the domestic social, political and cultural 
structures of the three case studies were proved to be essential elements in 
understanding their distinct responses to HASN. This finding is in line with some 
constructivist domestic structure approaches in international relations which produced 
research on domestic variation in state responses to international influences and 
norms (e.g., Barnett, 1990; Katzenstein and Okawara; Berger, 1993; Risse, 1994; 
Klotz,1995; Katzenstein, 1996; Cortell and Davis Jr., 1996). It contradicts, on the
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other hand, structural explanations, whether realist or liberal, that do not account for 
domestic influences in state behaviour. It also disconfirms the (rather ethnocentric) 
notion put forward by some constructivist authors (e.g., Risse, Ropp and Sikkink, 
1999) affirming the indistinctive universal effectiveness of socialisation processes 
across a wide range of domestic social and cultural systems. This view sustains the 
fact that, given the intrinsic universal value of certain types of international norms 
(such as international human rights norms), violator states under similar socialisation 
pressure will eventually move towards positive change.
On the contrary, what this thesis’ case studies revealed is that, depending 
on variations in the domestic structure of states, international norms can be integrally 
accepted (Botswana), instrumentally used (Mozambique), or totally rejected (South 
Africa). Although the proposed securitisation of HIV/AIDS is not per se a good 
international norm given that it is an extreme measure outside normal politics, it is seen 
by its proponents as a necessary one given the magnitude of the challenges posed by the 
epidemic. But what is a good international norm in the first place? These normative 
understandings are in fact negotiated between advocates and recipients of a particular 
norm. In this regard, there is no such thing as an absolute good or perennially 
desirable norm.201 Rather, domestic acceptance/desirability of a particular 
international norm has to be constructed through intersubjective processes of 
persuasion. Risse asserts in this respect that “transnational promoters of foreign 
policy change must align with domestic coalitions supporting their cause in the
201 Even the almost universally accepted moral authority o f  international human rights norms are 
constantly subjected to processes o f  revalidation by national governments. For example, since the 
onset o f  the US’ War on Terror, international conventions on human rights have been systematically 
bypassed by the US government (mainly concerning the detention o f  prisoners and the alleged use o f  
torture during interrogations). In the same token, the British Conservative Party has argued in favour 
o f  readapting European human rights laws to the reality o f  international terrorism and the increased 
flux o f  illegal immigrants to Europe. For more on this, see, for example, “Just a Few Bad Apples?”
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“target state” to make an impact” (1994:187). What this thesis’ empirical study found 
is that the transnational promoters of HASN not only aligned with already in place 
domestic sympathisers of their cause, but also engaged in argumentative processes to 
build these domestic “allegiances”.
In an important constructivist work on the socialisation effects of 
international human rights norms, Risse and Sikkink (1999) stressed the strategic 
influence of social activism in pressuring decision makers in national governments. 
In situations in which the communication channels between local advocacy groups 
and the government are broken or significantly reduced, these domestic groups 
directly link up with transnational advocacy networks to bring combined pressure on 
their states from “above” and from “below”. As the aforementioned authors note, 
“international contacts can amplify the demands of domestic groups and then echo 
these demands back into the domestic arena” (Risse and Sikkink, 1999:18). Their 
representation of transnational protest mechanisms as pathways for domestic 
normative change held some truth in the case of South Africa’s incorporation of 
HASN.
As noted in chapter 6, TAC engaged in a dual strategy of organising mass 
protests at home and, at the same time, raised international awareness about the 
norm-violating South Africa. In the face of increasing civil society and transnational 
mobilisation, some members of ANC’s political leadership, mostly at the provincial 
level of decision-making, began to realise that complacency over the HIV/AIDS 
epidemic could bear high political costs. However, the central administration in 
Pretoria fiercely resisted HIV/AIDS social mobilisation. As already noted, it was 
only by judicial means that the federal government moved towards the
The Economist, 20 January 2005. See also “The Menace that Wasn’t: The Human Rights Act Has N ot 
Lived Up to Expectations”. The Economist, 11 November 2004.
279
implementation of a nationwide HIV/AIDS treatment plan. In this sense, what the 
South African case has shown is that, rather than engaging in direct argumentative 
practices with intransigent ANC authorities, local HIV/AIDS groups used alternative 
forms of social pressure that transcended the limits of the domestic arena of 
decision-making.
Conversely, in the cases of Botswana and Mozambique, despite the 
existence o f active domestic-transnational linkages engaged in the transmission of 
HASN prescriptions, socialisation processes occurred in the absence of strong social 
pressure. In those states, domestic-transnational articulations had only marginal 
impact on policy change. The ruling elites of these countries engaged direcdy with 
the securitisation “speech-act” of the US, UNAIDS and other transnational 
HIV/AIDS actors with clear variations in the outcomes of socialisation. Unlike 
South Africa, the Mozambican and Botswanan governments’ interactions with 
international sources of HASN diffusion were not strongly mediated by winning 
coalitions between national and transnational HIV/AIDS groups. However, the 
reasons behind these states’ more direct relationship with international HASN 
leaders were quite distinct.
In Mozambique, the lack of a truly indigenous domestic civil society sector 
favoured the Frelimo government’s strategies of extraversion. This means that the 
massive penetration of international actors into Mozambique’s domestic structure 
since the end of civil war resulted in a symbiotic (or interdependent) type of 
relationship between those actors and local political leaders. If, on the one hand, the 
government relinquished a substantial share of its sovereignty rights to foreign 
agents, on the other, these same international actors maintained and reinforced 
traditional patterns of domestic political control by Frelimo. In this regard, chapter 5 
has shown how the Mozambican government skilfully manipulated the securitisation
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language of the international community to keep donors onboard, albeit without 
demonstrating a clear engagement in the actual domestic securitisation of 
HIV/AIDS.
Botswana, in turn, presents a state-controlled domestic structure with a < 
highly centralised decision-making system. As already noted in chapter 4, the 
corporativist character of the Botswanan state led to the creation of a civil society 
sector highly dependent on the government for financial support and policy 
guidance. Good, for example, attested that in Botswana’s domestic system, 
“regarding liberties of expression and association in general, the national leadership 
has a definite preference for the depoliticisation of issues” (Good, 1992:85). 
HIV/AIDS local groups, notwithstanding their important connections to 
transnational HASN leaders, have been more reactive than proactive actors in 
influencing the national response to the epidemic. This granted the national 
government a fairly autonomous capacity to negotiate the domestic entry of 
international HASN’s actors and their securitising ideas concerning HIV/AIDS.
In fact, the location of agency in the personal leadership of key decision­
makers was a common feature of the three case studies. Given that all countries 
investigated presented (with important qualifications nonetheless) a centralised 
system of decision-making with power concentrated in a few individuals, the prior 
convincement of the top political leadership in the government about the need to 
securitise HIV/AIDS was an essential precondition for the domestic cascading of 
HASN. In effect, those ruling elites were the actual gatekeepers controlling the 
penetration of international norms in their respective states. Botswana is an 
interesting example in this regard. The positive engagement of Mogae with the 
securitisation ideas of international norm leaders triggered substantial domestic 
change after he took office in 1998. Accordingly, Frelimo’s political leadership in
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Mozambique adapted the imported principles of HASN to traditional patterns of 
these leaders’ relationship with international actors. Finally, South Africa under 
Mbeki’s rule rejected the interference of HASN leaders in the country based on the 
President’s, and his Minister of Health’s, ideological preconceptions about Western 
domination and race. Therefore, the struggles, consistencies and contestations over 
the domestic acceptance of HASN concern, to a large extent, the social identity of 
these actors.
By discussing the particular (mis) perceptions and reactions of national 
leaders (and their close supporters) towards international HIV/AIDS norms, the 
present argument analytically exposed a very important locus of normative change in 
these three polities. In several important respects, the personalist nature of these 
African states provided an important empirical contribution to the cumulative 
understanding of how international norms impact states’ domestic structures. It is 
important to emphasise, however, that top decision-makers do not behave in a 
complete political vacuum. As already seen, they are exposed to and constrained by 
the particular configuration of domestic forces, the values and principles that define 
the specific political culture of their countries and the limits placed on their power by 
the states’ political institutions.
The unfolding of these dynamics of HASN’s incorporation in Botswana, 
Mozambique and South Africa provided an important contribution to the ongoing 
securitisation debate in international relations. As chapter 2 has demonstrated, Buzan 
and Waever, as well as other members of the Copenhagen School, have attempted to 
provide a theoretical foundation for rethinking the processes by which issues become 
securitised. Notwithstanding their sustained efforts to accomplish such an endeavour, 
they have been quite unsuccessful in actually demonstrating when and how a speech-act 
removes a particular issue from the realm of normal politics to that of an existential
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threat. These authors concentrated mosdy on meta-theoretical assumptions about the 
inter subjective security articulations between securitising actors and their audiences 
rather than on the actual (and variable) empirical circumstances which determine the 
success of a securitisation attempt. I believe that the focus of this study on domestic 
processes of HASN incorporation expanded the capacity of securitisation theory to 
empirically understand the ways in which states (or the audiences of securitisation) 
absorb and respond to the securitisation claims of the so-called securitising actors.
The pendulum analogy used in chapter 2, by which issues are moved from the 
realm of politicisation to that of securitisation and back, makes sense only when the 
analyst clearly identifies the location of ageny in securitising processes and the 
domestic structural features that either enable or constrain the argumentative 
practices (or speech-acts) of securitising actors. In this regard, and as already noted, 
the understanding of the actual mechanisms whereby securitisation attempts are 
internalised by domestic actors, and how they respond to them, is the foremost 
shortcoming in securitisation analysis. So, the study of the differential impact of 
HASN in Botswana, Mozambique and South Africa has widened the scope of the 
securitisation research agenda to include a strong emphasis on the (usually neglected) 
audiences of securitisation. Indeed, I have argued at the beginning of this thesis that 
to convincingly demonstrate that an issue has been securitised requires a thorough 
examination of the acquiescence of an audience. The governments of the three case 
studies were likened here to the idea of “the national”, meaning those who 
objectively and legitimately speak security for their respective societies (MacSweeney, 
1996).202 As such, they were the main target audiences of the international securitising
202 Williams (1998) has criticised this objective criteria o f  taking “the state” (or national governments) 
as the ultimate beholder o f  its society’s security. He used Nazi Germany (and I could add the 
Apartheid regime as well) as an example o f  the fallacy o f  this stance. Yet, despite the pertinence o f  his 
argument, the particular empirical cases under analysis here allowed for the adoption o f  an objectivist
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actors described in chapter 3. This does not mean, however, that these governments 
were isolated political entities disconnected from the wider social dynamics and 
shared political culture of the states they represent and are supposed to protect. 
Rather, they were immersed in and constituted by the particular cultural/social 
environment of these states. To open up the black box of these complex audiences, this 
study employed theoretical insights from the constructivist scholarship on 
international norms, which concentrates mosdy on the variations in state compliance 
with externally devised norms. In so doing, it identified three models of state 
behaviour towards HASN, which corresponded to the particular domestic political 
processes of Botswana, Mozambique and South Africa.
These models were, in fact, the actual outcomes of the securitisation 
attempts by international HASN leaders in each one of the three case studies. 
Therefore, the fully successful, partially successful, or totally unsuccessful 
securitisation of HIV/AIDS in Botswana, Mozambique and South Africa, 
respectively, were a function of both the argumentative (and other negotiation) 
practices between securitising actors and their audiences and the facilitating structural 
factors that shaped (and were shaped by) the social interaction among them. The 
empirical measurement of HASN’s strength (or salience) in the domestic political arena 
of these states contributed to a more comprehensive understanding of the 
securitisation process, which gives a stronger and more systematic role to the 
audiences of securitisation and their social contexts.
The study was moreover crucial in identifying the domestic empirical 
conditions which either facilitated or hampered the successful transposition of
approach while defining who legitimately speaks security within those polities. Currently, Botswana, 
Mozambique and South Africa are formal democracies and the national governments o f  these states 
have an undisputed mandate to act on behalf o f  their societies.
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HIV/AIDS from the area of politicisation (normality) to that of securitisation 
(exceptionality). Four main factors (or variables) were identified in this respect: 1) the 
form of state-society relations; 2) the type of state institutions (either strong or weak) 
and the format of the decision-making process (either centralised or decentralised); 
3) the long-term values and principles that defined the political culture of the three 
states; and, finally, 4) the personal characteristics of key leaders in the government.
State-Society
Relations
State
Institudo
ns
and
decision­
m aking
process
M atch  
between  
H A SN  
and Pre­
existing  
Political 
Cultures
Political
Leadership on  
H IV /A ID S  After 
Securitisation 
M ove
O utcom e
Botsw ana Distant with weak 
civil society
Strong
and
centralised
Close Assertive Successful
Securitisation
M ozam bique Distant with weak 
civil society
Weak and 
centralised
Distant Instrumental/ Contin 
gent
Partially
Successful
Securitisation
South Africa Distant/conflictiv 
e with strong civil 
society
Strong
and
centralised
Distant Absent/Erratic Unsuccessful
Securitisation
Table 1: Analytical Variables and Case Studies
Finally, the argument put forward in this thesis has claimed that the 
semantic practice of securitisation should be analytically integrated within larger 
normative/historical processes at the global level. As demonstrated in chapter 2, 
through the explanation of the first (holistic) dimension of HASN, the domestic 
incorporation of this norm’s postulates makes sense only if one recognises broader 
historical, ideological and material divisions in the inter-state system/society. As
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noted by Ayoob (2002:35), the emergence of new states as a result of rapid 
decolonisation after the end of WWII brought significant normative tensions into 
the international society. Alongside the bipolar geo-strategic division of the global 
order, an equally conflictive North-South divide redefined material and ideological 
relations among states. This unprecedented expansion of international society and 
the normative changes it brought about are today still influencing the foreign policy 
decisions of a number of African political leaders. In this respect, the South African 
case suggests that Mbeki’s ideological resistance to HASN should be placed within 
the larger political agenda of the so-called “South”. By challenging Western 
institutions (which, in his view, would represent a kind of Gramscian historic bloc) 
Mbeki’s government has sought to buttress South Africa’s international identity as a 
key representative (and aspiring leader) of the developing world. As a general case, 
the constructivist scholarship on international norms and the securitisation 
framework have neglected this very important structural element while 
understanding how international norms are socialised within states as well as in 
shedding light on the interaction between securitising actors and their audiences. 
Instead, both perspectives have focused exclusively on the domestic and 
circumscribed impact of particular international norms and securitisation moves 
without fully acknowledging the wider ideational/material structure within which 
norms are created, promoted and also resisted.
It is worth noting that, among existing analytical perspectives in 
international relations, (neo)realist theories have also offered a structural ( and rather 
sceptical) interpretation of how, under what circumstances, and why states abide by 
international (mosdy security) norms (e.g., Gilpin, 1981; Waltz, 1979; Krasner, 1995; 
Mearsheimer, 1990, 1993). According to these authors, anarchy prevails in 
international relations and norms, when enforced, are just epiphenomenal to the
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power politics logic that dictates relations between states. Although the study of the 
impact of international norms in the behaviour of states is not a key issue in 
theoretical debates among realist authors, they emphasise very strongly the role of 
powerful states in the international system in leading (or blocking) processes of 
normative change. The US economic and political weight was indeed an important 
factor in understanding normative change towards HASN in the three case studies. 
The huge economic incentives of PEPFAR have undoubtedly influenced policy 
decision-making in Botswana, Mozambique and South Africa. However, this was not 
the crucial factor in understanding the incorporation of HASN in these three 
countries. Botswana, the country that least needed PEPFAR money, was the one 
which complied more closely with the demands of the US. Conversely, Mozambique, 
which most dramatically required US support, managed to articulate alternative views 
at the same time as keeping US financial channels open (see, for example, the cases 
of generic AIDS drugs and HIV prevention campaigns in chapter 5). South Africa, 
which is also a recipient of PEPFAR, constandy denounced the interference of US 
economic interests in Africa and actively resisted HASN interference in the country.
4. Conclusive Thoughts: The Way Forward
Although substantial research is still needed to devise an empirically 
useful securitisation theory, these three models of state reaction to HASN suggested 
that the way forward lies in a more in depth study of real-world securitisations. In this 
regard, understanding states (and the governments they represent) as complex 
audiences of securitisation would significandy improve the explanatory power of the 
securitisation framework. As chapter 2 has shown, this could be done by drawing
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upon the work of constructivist scholars who have argued (and showed how) 
international norms impact on state behaviour through domestic political systems.
Expositing the differences in domestic reception of HASN in three 
Southern African states can also shed some light on issues concerning regional 
security relations. As noted in this thesis’ introduction, regional attempts to securitise 
HIV/AIDS at SADC were undermined by inward-oriented states, lacking common 
understandings about how to respond to the epidemic. Bu2 an and Waever (re)defined 
regional security complexes (RSC) as “a set of units whose major processes of 
securitisation, desecuritisation, or both are so interlinked that their security problems 
cannot reasonably be analysed or resolved apart from one another” (Buzan and 
Waever, 2003:44). For them, “a RSC depends on there being significant levels of 
security interdependence among a group of states or other actors” (2003:229). What 
this thesis has revealed is that inside the SADC area, major processes of 
securitisation towards HIV/AIDS only took place within states rather than among 
them. A systematic analysis of processes of HASN incorporation in this regional 
institution would provide some further empirical evidence to challenge the idea that 
the Southern Africa region is an example of a RSC, as Buzan and Waever claimed in 
their book (Buzan and Waever, 2003:233).203
In addition to these theoretical contributions, the research developed here 
can also help to bridge the (rather wide) void between scholarly knowledge in 
international relations and governments’ policy-making. While systematically thinking 
about distinct state responses to the proposed securitisation of the HIV/AIDS 
epidemic, this thesis can be particularly helpful in laying the ground for a critical
203 In spite o f  Buzan’s and Waever’s reformulation o f  RSC to avoid the state-centric and militaristic 
focus o f  Buzan's previous definition (see Buzan, 1983), their actual identification o f  regional clusters 
o f security interdependent states, such as those in Southern Africa, remains framed in traditional 
security terms.
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assessment of the normative underpinnings (benefits and shortcomings) in 
securitising global epidemic diseases, such as HIV/AIDS, Avian Flu and SARS. 
Ultimately, this should provide some extra leverage to policy-makers and enable 
them to influence outcomes in a more enlightened fashion.
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